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THE

WORKS

OF

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

EDMUND BURKE.

A NEW EDITION.

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HINTS

HINTS

FOR

A MEMORIAL

TO BE DELIVERED TO

MONSIEUR DE M. M.

WRITTEN IN THE EARLY PART OF

1791.

HINTS

FOR

A MEMORIAL

TO BE DELIVERED TO

MONSIEUR DE M. M.

THE king my maſter, from his ſincere deſire of keeping up a good correſpondence with his moſt Chriſtian majeſty, and the French nation, has for ſome time beheld, with concern, the condition into which that ſovereign and nation have fallen.

Notwithſtanding the reality and the warmth of thoſe ſentiments, his Britannick majeſty has hitherto forborne in any manner to take part in their affairs; in hopes, that the common intereſt of king and ſubjects would render all parties ſenſible of the neceſſity of ſettling their government and their freedom, upon principles of moderation; as the only means of ſecuring permanence to both theſe bleſſings, as well as internal and external tranquillity, to the kingdom of France, and to all Europe.

His Britannick majeſty finds, to his great regret, that his hopes have not been realized. He

finds, that confuſions and diſorders have rather increaſed than diminiſhed, and that they now threaten to proceed to dangerous extremities.

In this ſituation of things, the ſame regard to a neighbouring ſovereign living in friendſhip with Great Britain, the ſame ſpirit of good-will to the kingdom of France, the ſame regard to the general tranquillity, which have cauſed him to view, with concern, the growth and continuance of the preſent diſorders, have induced the king of Great Britain to interpoſe his good offices towards a reconcilement of thoſe unhappy differences. This his majeſty does with the moſt cordial regard to the good of all deſcriptions concerned, and with the moſt perfect ſincerity, wholly removing from his royal mind, all memory of every circumſtance which might impede him in the execution of a plan of benevolence which he has ſo much at heart.

His majeſty, having always thought it his greateſt glory, that he rules over a people, perfectly and ſolidly, becauſe ſoberly, rationally, and legally free, can never be ſuppoſed to proceed in offering thus his royal mediation, but with an unaffected deſire and full reſolution, to conſider the ſettlement of a free conſtitution in France, as the very baſis of any agreement between the ſovereign and thoſe of his ſubjects who are unhappily at variance with him; to guarantee it to them, if it ſhould be deſired, in

the

the moſt ſolemn and authentick manner, and to do all that in him lies to procure the like guarantee from other powers.

His Britannick majeſty, in the ſame manner, aſſures the moſt Chriſtian king, that he knows too well, and values too highly, what is due to the dignity and rights of crowned heads, and to the implied faith of treaties which have always been made with the *crown* of France, ever to liſten to any propoſition by which that monarchy ſhall be deſpoiled of all its rights, ſo eſſential for the ſupport of the conſideration of the prince, and the concord and welfare of the people.

If, unfortunately, a due attention ſhould not be paid to theſe his majeſty's benevolent and neighbourly offers, or, if any circumſtances ſhould prevent the moſt Chriſtian king from acceding, (as his majeſty has no doubt he is well diſpoſed to do) to this healing mediation in favour of himſelf and all his ſubjects, his majeſty has commanded me to take leave of this court, as not conceiving it to be ſuitable to the dignity of his crown, and to what he owes to his faithful people, any longer to keep a publick miniſter at the court of a ſovereign who is not in poſſeſſion of his own liberty.

THOUGHTS

ON

FRENCH AFFAIRS,

&c. &c.

WRITTEN IN DECEMBER,

1791.

THOUGHTS

ON

FRENCH AFFAIRS,

&c. &c.

IN all our tranſactions with France, and at all periods, we have treated with that ſtate on the footing of a monarchy. Monarchy was conſidered in all the external relations of that kingdom with every power in Europe as its legal and conſtitutional government, and that in which alone its federal capacity was veſted.

It is not yet a year ſince Monſieur de Montmorin, formally, and with as little reſpect as can be imagined, to the king, and to all crowned heads, announced a total revolution in that country. He has informed the Britiſh miniſtry, that its frame of government is wholly altered; that he is one of the miniſters of the new ſyſtem; and in effect, that the king is no longer his maſter (nor does he even call him ſuch) but the "*firſt of the miniſters,*" in the new ſyſtem. Montmorin's Letter.

The

Acceptance of the conſtitution ratified.

The ſecond notification was that of the king's acceptance of the new conſtitution; accompanied with fanfaronades in the modern ſtyle of the French bureaus, things which have much more the air and character of the ſaucy declamations of their clubs, than the tone of regular office.

It has not been very uſual to notify to foreign courts, any thing concerning the internal arrangements of any ſtate. In the preſent caſe, the circumſtance of theſe two notifications, with the obſervations with which they are attended, does not leave it in the choice of the ſovereigns of Chriſtendom to appear ignorant either of this French revolution, or (what is more important) of its principles.

We know that very ſoon after this manifeſto of Monſieur de Montmorin, the king of France, in whoſe name it was made, found himſelf obliged to fly, with his whole family; leaving behind him a declaration, in which he diſavows and annuls that conſtitution, as having been the effect of force on his perſon and uſurpation on his authority. It is equally notorious that this unfortunate prince was, with many circumſtances of inſult and outrage, brought back priſoner, by a deputation of the pretended national aſſembly, and afterwards ſuſpended by their authority, from his government. Under equally notorious conſtraint, and under menaces of total depoſition, he has been compelled to accept

accept what they call a conſtitution, and to agree to whatever elſe the uſurped power, which holds him in confinement, thinks proper to impoſe.

His next brother, who had fled with him, and his third brother, who had fled before him, all the princes of his blood, who remained faithful to him, and the flower of his magiſtracy, his clergy, and his nobility, continue in foreign countries, proteſting againſt all acts done by him in his preſent ſituation, on the grounds upon which he had himſelf proteſted againſt them at the time of his flight; with this addition, that they deny his very competence, (as on good grounds they may) to abrogate the royalty, or the antient conſtitutional orders of the kingdom. In this proteſt they are joined by three hundred of the late aſſembly itſelf, and in effect, by a great part of the French nation. The new government (ſo far as the people dare to diſcloſe their ſentiments) is diſdained, I am perſuaded, by the greater number; who, as M. de la Fayette complains, and as the truth is, have declined to take any ſhare in the new elections to the national aſſembly, either as candidates or electors.

In this ſtate of things (that is in the caſe of a *divided* kingdom) by* the law of nations, Great Britain, like every other power, is free to take any part ſhe pleaſes. She may decline, with more or

* See Vattel, b. ii. c. 4. ſect. 56. and b. iii. c. 18. ſect. 296.

leſs

leſs formality, according to her diſcretion, to acknowledge this new ſyſtem; or ſhe may recogniſe it as a government *de facto*, ſetting aſide all diſcuſſion of its original legality, and conſidering the antient monarchy as at an end. The law of nations leaves our court open to its choice. We have no direction but what is found in the well-underſtood policy of the king and kingdom.

This declaration of a *new ſpecies* of government, on new principles, (ſuch it profeſſes itſelf to be) is a real criſis in the politicks of Europe. The conduct which prudence ought to dictate to Great Britain, will not depend (as hitherto our connexion or quarrel with other ſtates has for ſome time depended) upon merely *external* relations; but in a great meaſure alſo upon the ſyſtem which we may think it right to adopt for the internal government of our own country.

If it be our policy to aſſimilate our government to that of France, we ought to prepare for this change, by encouraging the ſchemes of authority eſtabliſhed there. We ought to wink at the captivity and depoſition of a prince, with whom, if not in cloſe alliance, we were in friendſhip. We ought to fall in with the ideas of Monſ. Montmorin's circular manifeſto; and to do buſineſs of courſe with the functionaries who act under the new power, by which that king, to whom his majeſty's miniſter has been ſent to reſide, has been depoſed

depoſed and impriſoned. On that idea we ought alſo to with-hold all ſorts of direct or indirect countenance from thoſe who are treating in Germany for the re-eſtabliſhment of the French monarchy and the ancient orders of that ſtate. This conduct is ſuitable to this policy.

The queſtion is, whether this policy be ſuitable to the intereſts of the crown and ſubjects of Great Britain. Let us therefore a little conſider the true nature and probable effects of the revolution which, in ſuch a very unuſual manner, has been twice diplomatically announced to his majeſty.

Difference between this revolution and others.

There have been many internal revolutions in the government of countries, both as to perſons and forms, in which the neighbouring ſtates have had little or no concern. Whatever the government might be with reſpect to thoſe perſons and thoſe forms, the ſtationary intereſts of the nation concerned, have moſt commonly influenced the new governments in the ſame manner in which they influenced the old; and the revolution, turning on matter of local grievance, or of local accommodation, did not extend beyond its territory.

Nature of the French revolution.

The preſent revolution in France ſeems to me to be quite of another character and deſcription; and to bear little reſemblance or analogy to any of thoſe which have been brought about in Europe, upon principles merely political. *It is a revolution of doctrine and theoretick dogma.* It has a much

much greater reſemblance to thoſe changes which have been made upon religious grounds, in which a ſpirit of proſelytiſm makes an eſſential part.

The laſt revolution of doctrine and theory which has happened in Europe, is the reformation. It is not for my purpoſe to take any notice here of the merits of that revolution, but to ſtate one only of its effects.

Its effects.

That effect was *to introduce other intereſts into all countries than thoſe which aroſe from their locality and natural circumſtances.* The principle of the reformation was ſuch, as by its eſſence, could not be local or confined to the country in which it had its origin. For inſtance, the doctrine of "Juſtification by faith or by works," which was the original baſis of the reformation, could not have one of its alternatives true as to Germany, and falſe as to every other country. Neither are queſtions of theoretick truth and falſehood governed by circumſtances any more than by places. On that occaſion, therefore, the ſpirit of proſelytiſm expanded itſelf with great elaſticity upon all ſides; and great diviſions were every where the reſult.

Theſe diviſions, however, in appearance merely dogmatick, ſoon became mixed with the political; and their effects were rendered infinitely more intenſe from this combination. Europe was for a long time divided into two great factions, under the name of Catholick and Proteſtant, which not only often

often alienated ſtate from ſtate, but alſo divided almoſt every ſtate within itſelf. The warm parties in each ſtate were more affectionately attached to thoſe of their own doctrinal intereſt in ſome other country than to their fellow citizens, or to their natural government, when they or either of them happened to be of a different perſuaſion. Theſe factions, wherever they prevailed, if they did not abſolutely deſtroy, at leaſt weakened and diſtracted the locality of patriotiſm. The public affections came to have other motives and other ties.

It would be to repeat the hiſtory of the two laſt centuries to exemplify the effects of this revolution.

Although the principles to which it gave riſe, did not operate with a perfect regularity and conſtancy, they never wholly ceaſed to operate. Few wars were made, and few treaties were entered into, in which they did not come in for ſome part. They gave a colour, a character, and direction to all the politicks of Europe.

New ſyſtem of politicks.

Theſe principles of internal, as well as external diviſion and coalition, are but juſt now extinguiſhed. But they who will examine into the true character and genius of ſome late events, muſt be ſatisfied that other ſources of faction, combining parties among the inhabitants of different countries into one connexion, are opened, and that from theſe ſources are likely to ariſe effects full as important

important as thoſe which had formerly ariſen from the jarring intereſts of the religious ſects. The intention of the ſeveral actors in the change in France, is not a matter of doubt. It is very openly profeſſed.

In the modern world, before this time, there has been no inſtance of this ſpirit of general political faction, ſeparated from religion, pervading ſeveral countries, and forming a principle of union between the partiſans in each. But the thing is not leſs in human nature. The antient world has furniſhed a ſtrong and ſtriking inſtance of ſuch a ground for faction, full as powerful and full as miſchievous as our ſpirit of religious ſyſtem had ever been, exciting in all the ſtates of Greece (European and Aſiatick) the moſt violent animoſities, and the moſt cruel and bloody perſecutions and proſcriptions. Theſe antient factions in each commonwealth of Greece, connected themſelves with thoſe of the ſame deſcription in ſome other ſtates; and ſecret cabals and publick alliances were carried on and made, not upon a conformity of general political intereſts, but for the ſupport and aggrandizement of the two leading ſtates which headed the ariſtocratick and democratick factions. For, as in latter times, the king of Spain was at the head of a catholick, and the king of Sweden of a proteſtant intereſt, France, (though catholick, acting ſubordinately to the latter,) in the like manner the Lacedemonians

Lacedemonians were every where at the head of the ariſtocratick intereſts, and the Athenians of the democratick. The two leading powers kept alive a conſtant cabal and conſpiracy in every ſtate, and the political dogmas concerning the conſtitution of a republick, were the great inſtruments by which theſe leading ſtates choſe to aggrandize themſelves. Their choice was not unwiſe; becauſe the intereſt in opinions (merely as opinions, and without any experimental reference to their effects) when once they take ſtrong hold of the mind, become the moſt operative of all intereſts, and indeed very often ſuperſede every other.

I might further exemplify the poſſibility of a political ſentiment running through various ſtates and combining factions in them, from the hiſtory of the middle ages in the Guelfs and Ghibellines. Theſe were political factions originally in favour of the emperour and the pope, with no mixture of religious dogmas; or if any thing religiouſly doctrinal they had in them originally, it very ſoon diſappeared; as their firſt political objects diſappeared alſo, though the ſpirit remained. They became no more than names to diſtinguiſh factions; but they were not the leſs powerful in their operation, when they had no direct point of doctrine, either religious or civil, to aſſert. For a long time, however, thoſe factions gave no ſmall degree of influence to the foreign chiefs in every

commonwealth in which they exiſted. I do not mean to purſue further the track of theſe parties. I allude to this part of hiſtory only, as it furniſhes an inſtance of that ſpecies of faction which broke the locality of publick affections, and united deſcriptions of citizens more with ſtrangers than with their countrymen of different opinions.

French fundamental principle.

The political dogma, which upon the new French ſyſtem, is to unite the factions of different nations, is this, "That the majority, told by "the head, of the taxable people in every coun- "try, is the perpetual, natural, unceaſing, inde- "feaſible ſovereign; that this majority is per- "fectly maſter of the form, as well as the admi- "niſtration of the ſtate, and that the magiſtrates, "under whatever names they are called, are only "functionaries to obey the orders, (general as "laws or particular as decrees) which that ma- "jority may make; that this is the only natural "government; that all others are tyranny and "uſurpation."

Practical project.

In order to reduce this dogma into practice, the republicans in France, and their aſſociates in other countries, make it always their buſineſs, and often their publick profeſſion, to deſtroy all traces of antient eſtabliſhments, and to form a new commonwealth in each country, upon the baſis of the French *Rights of Men*. On the principle of theſe rights, they mean to inſtitute in every country,

and

and as it were, the germe of the whole, parochial governments, for the purpoſe of what they call equal repreſentation. From them is to grow, by ſome media, a general council and repreſentative of all the parochial governments. In that repreſentative is to be veſted the whole national power; totally aboliſhing hereditary name and office, levelling all conditions of men, (except where money *muſt* make a difference, breaking all connexion between territory and dignity, and aboliſhing every ſpecies of nobility, gentry, and church eſtabliſhments; all their prieſts, and all their magiſtrates being only creatures of election and penſioners at will.

Knowing how oppoſite a permanent landed intereſt is to that ſcheme, they have reſolved, and it is the great drift of all their regulations, to reduce that deſcription of men to a mere peaſantry, for the ſuſtenance of the towns, and to place the true effective government in cities, among the tradeſmen, bankers, and voluntary clubs of bold, preſuming young perſons; advocates, attornies, notaries, managers of newſpapers, and thoſe cabals of literary men, called academies. Their republick is to have a firſt functionary, (as they call him) under the name of king, or not, as they think fit. This officer, when ſuch an officer is permitted, is however, neither in fact nor name, to be conſidered as ſovereign, nor the people as his ſubjects. The very uſe of theſe appellations is offenſive to their ears.

This ſyſtem, as it has firſt been realized, dogmatically, as well as practically, in France, makes France the natural head of all factions formed on a ſimilar principle, wherever they may prevail, as much as Athens was the head and ſettled ally of all democratick factions, wherever they exiſted. The other ſyſtem has no head.

Partiſans of the French ſyſtem.

This ſyſtem has very many partiſans in every country in Europe, but particularly in England, where they are already formed into a body, comprehending moſt of the diſſenters of the three leading denominations; to theſe are readily aggregated all who are diſſenters in character, temper, and diſpoſition, though not belonging to any of their congregations—that is, all the reſtleſs people who reſemble them, of all ranks and all parties—Whigs, and even Tories—the whole race of half-bred ſpeculators;—all the Atheiſts, Deiſts, and Socinians;—all thoſe who hate the clergy, and envy the nobility;—a good many among the monied people;—the Eaſt Indians almoſt to a man, who cannot bear to find that their preſent importance does not bear a proportion to their wealth. Theſe latter have united themſelves into one great, and in my opinion, formidable club,* which, though now quiet, may be brought into action with conſiderable unanimity and force.

* Originally called The Bengal club; but ſince opened to perſons from the other preſidencies, for the purpoſe of conſolidating the whole Indian intereſt.

Formerly

Formerly few, except the ambitious great, or the deſperate and indigent, were to be feared as inſtruments in revolutions. What has happened in France teaches us, with many other things, that there are more cauſes than have commonly been taken into our conſideration, by which government may be ſubverted. The monied men, merchants, principal tradeſmen, and men of letters (hitherto generally thought the peaceable and even timid part of ſociety) are the chief actors in the French revolution. But the fact is, that as money increaſes and circulates, and as the circulation of news, in politicks, and letters, becomes more and more diffuſed, the perſons who diffuſe this money, and this intelligence, become more and more important. This was not long undiſcovered. Views of ambition were in France, for the firſt time, preſented to theſe claſſes of men. Objects in the ſtate, in the army, in the ſyſtem of civil offices of every kind. Their eyes were dazzled with this new proſpect. They were, as it were, electrified and made to loſe the natural ſpirit of their ſituation. A bribe, great without example in the hiſtory of the world, was held out to them—the whole government of a very large kingdom.

Grounds of ſecurity ſuppoſed for England.

There are ſeveral who are perſuaded that the ſame thing cannot happen in England, becauſe here, (they ſay) the occupations of merchants,

tradeſmen, and manufacturers, are not held as degrading ſituations. I once thought that the low eſtimation in which commerce was held in France, might be reckoned among the cauſes of the late revolution; and I am ſtill of opinion, that the excluſive ſpirit of the French nobility, did irritate the wealthy of other claſſes. But I found long ſince, that perſons in trade and buſineſs were by no means deſpiſed in France in the manner I had been taught to believe. As to men of letters, they were ſo far from being deſpiſed or neglected, that there was no country perhaps in the univerſe, in which they were ſo highly eſteemed, courted, careſſed, and even feared; tradeſmen naturally were not ſo much ſought in ſociety (as not furniſhing ſo largely to the fund of converſation as they do to the revenues of the ſtate) but the latter deſcription got forward every day. M. Bailly, who made himſelf the popular mayor on the rebellion of the Baſtile, and is a principal actor in the revolt, before the change, poſſeſſed a penſion or office under the crown, of ſix hundred pound Engliſh, a year; for that country, no contemptible proviſion: and this he obtained ſolely as a man of letters, and on no other title. As to the monied men—whilſt the monarchy continued, there is no doubt, that merely as ſuch, they did not enjoy the *privileges* of nobility, but nobility was of ſo eaſy an acquiſition, that it was the fault or neglect of all of that deſcription,

Literary intereſt.

Monied intereſt.

deſcription, who did not obtain its privileges, for their lives at leaſt, in virtue of office. It attached under the royal government to an innumerable multitude of places, real and nominal, that were vendible; and ſuch nobility were as capable of every thing as their degree of influence or intereſt could make them, that is, as nobility of no conſiderable rank or conſequence. M. Necker, ſo far from being a French gentleman, was not ſo much as a Frenchman born, and yet we all know the rank in which he ſtood on the day of the meeting of the ſtates.

Mercantile intereſt.

As to the mere matter of eſtimation of the mercantile or any other claſs, this is regulated by opinion and prejudice. In England a ſecurity againſt the envy of men in theſe claſſes, is not ſo very complete as we may imagine. We muſt not impoſe upon ourſelves. What inſtitutions and manners together had done in France, manners alone do here. It is the natural operation of things where there exiſts a crown, a court, ſplendid orders of knighthood, and an hereditary nobility;—where there exiſts a fixed, permanent, landed gentry, continued in greatneſs and opulence by the law of primogeniture, and by a protection given to family ſettlements;—where there exiſts a ſtanding army and navy;—where there exiſts a church eſtabliſhment, which beſtows on learning and parts an intereſt combined with that of religion and the

ſtate;—in a country where ſuch things exiſt, wealth, new in its acquiſition, and precarious in its duration, can never rank firſt, or even near the firſt; though wealth has its natural weight, further, than as it is balanced and even preponderated amongſt us as amongſt other nations, by artificial inſtitutions and opinions growing out of them. At no period in the hiſtory of England have ſo few peers been taken out of trade or from families newly created by commerce. In no period has ſo ſmall a number of noble families entered into the counting-houſe. I can call to mind but one in all England, and his is of near fifty years ſtanding. Be that as it may, it appears plain to me from my beſt obſervation, that envy and ambition may by art, management and diſpoſition, be as much excited amongſt theſe deſcriptions of men in England, as in any other country; and that they are juſt as capable of acting a part in any great change.

Progreſs of the French ſpirit—Its courſe.

What direction the French ſpirit of proſelytiſm is likely to take, and in what order it is likely to prevail in the ſeveral parts of Europe, it is not eaſy to determine. The ſeeds are ſown almoſt every where, chiefly by newſpaper circulations, infinitely more efficacious and extenſive than ever they were. And they are a more important inſtrument than generally is imagined. They are a part of the reading of all, they are the whole of the

the reading of the far greater number. There are thirty of them in Paris alone. The language diffuſes them more widely than the Engliſh, though the Engliſh too are much read. The writers of theſe papers indeed, for the greater part, are either unknown or in contempt, but they are like a battery in which the ſtroke of any one ball produces no great effect, but the amount of continual repetition is deciſive. Let us only ſuffer any perſon to tell us his ſtory, morning and evening, but for one twelvemonth, and he will become our maſter.

All thoſe countries in which ſeveral ſtates are comprehended under ſome general geographical deſcription, and looſely united by ſome federal conſtitution; countries of which the members are ſmall, and greatly diverſified in their forms of government, and in the titles by which they are held —theſe countries, as it might be well expected, are the principal objects of their hopes and machinations. Of theſe, the chief are Germany and Switzerland: after them, Italy has its place as in circumſtances ſomewhat ſimilar.

As to Germany, (in which, from their relation to the emperour, I comprehend the Belgick provinces) it appears to me to be from ſeveral circumſtances, internal and external, in a very critical ſituation, and the laws and liberties of the empire are by no means ſecure from the contagion of the French doctrines and the effect of French intrigues; Germany.

or

or from the uſe which two of the greater German powers may make of a general derangement, to the general detriment. I do not ſay that the French do not mean to beſtow on theſe German ſtates, liberties and laws too, after their mode; but thoſe are not what have hitherto been underſtood as the laws and liberties of the empire. Theſe exiſt and have always exiſted under the principles of feodal tenure and ſucceſſion, under imperial conſtitutions, grants and conceſſions of ſovereigns, family compacts and publick treaties, made under the ſanction, and ſome of them guaranteed by the ſovereign powers of other nations, and particularly the old government of France, the author and natural ſupport of the treaty of Weſtphalia.

In ſhort, the Germanick body is a vaſt maſs of heterogeneous ſtates, held together by that heterogeneous body of old principles which formed the publick law poſitive and doctrinal. The modern laws and liberties which the new power in France propoſes to introduce into Germany, and to ſupport with all its force, of intrigue and of arms, is of a very different nature, utterly irreconcileable with the firſt, and indeed fundamentally the reverſe of it: I mean the *rights and liberties of the man*, the *droit de l'homme*. That this doctrine has made an amazing progreſs in Germany, there cannot be a ſhadow of doubt. They are infected by

by it along the whole courſe of the Rhine, the Maeſe, the Moſelle, and in the greater part of Suabia and Franconia. It is particularly prevalent amongſt all the lower people, churchmen and laity, in the dominions of the eccleſiaſtical electors. It is not eaſy to find or to conceive governments more mild and indulgent than theſe church ſovereignties; but good government is as nothing when the rights of man take poſſeſſion of the mind. Indeed the looſe rein held over the people in theſe provinces, muſt be conſidered as one cauſe of the facility with which they lend themſelves to any ſchemes of innovation, by inducing them to think lightly of their governments, and to judge of grievances not by feeling, but by imagination.

Eccleſiaſtical ſtate.

It is in theſe electorates that the firſt impreſſions of France are likely to be made, and if they ſucceed, it is over with the Germanick body as it ſtands at preſent. A great revolution is preparing in Germany; and a revolution, in my opinion, likely to be more deciſive upon the general fate of nations than that of France itſelf; other than as in France is to be found the firſt ſource of all the principles which are in any way likely to diſtinguiſh the troubles and convulſions of our age. If Europe does not conceive the independence, and the equilibrium of the empire to be in the very eſſence of the ſyſtem of balanced power in Europe, and if the ſcheme of publick law, or maſs of laws,

Balance of Germany.

upon

upon which that independence and equilibrium are founded, be of no leading conſequence as they are preſerved or deſtroyed, all the politicks of Europe for more than two centuries have been miſerably erroneous.

Pruſſia and emperour.

If the two great leading powers of Germany do not regard this danger (as apparently they do not) in the light in which it preſents itſelf ſo naturally, it is becauſe they are powers too great to have a ſocial intereſt. That ſort of intereſt belongs only to thoſe, whoſe ſtate of weakneſs or mediocrity is ſuch, as to give them greater cauſe of apprehenſion from what may deſtroy them, than of hope from any thing by which they may be aggrandized.

As long as thoſe two princes are at variance, ſo long the liberties of Germany are ſafe. But if ever they ſhould ſo far underſtand one another as to be perſuaded that they have a more direct and more certainly defined intereſt in a proportioned mutual aggrandizement than in a reciprocal reduction, that is, if they come to think that they are more likely to be enriched by a diviſion of ſpoil, than to be rendered ſecure by keeping to the old policy of preventing others from being ſpoiled by either of them, from that moment the liberties of Germany are no more.

That a junction of two in ſuch a ſcheme is neither impoſſible nor improbable, is evident from the partition of Poland in 1773, which was effected

effected by ſuch a junction as made the interpoſition of other nations to prevent it, not eaſy. Their circumſtances at that time hindered any other three ſtates, or indeed any two, from taking meaſures in common to prevent it, though France was at that time an exiſting power, and had not yet learned to act upon a ſyſtem of politicks of her own invention. The geographical poſition of Poland was a great obſtacle to any movements of France in oppoſition to this, at that time unparelleled league. To my certain knowledge, if Great Britain had at that time been willing to concur in preventing the execution of a project ſo dangerous in the example, even exhauſted as France then was by the preceding war, and under a lazy and unenterpriſing prince, ſhe would have at every riſk taken an active part in this buſineſs. But a languor with regard to ſo remote an intereſt, and the principles and paſſions which were then ſtrongly at work at home, were the cauſes why Great Britain would not give France any encouragement in ſuch an enterpriſe. At that time, however, and with regard to that object, in my opinion, Great Britain and France had a common intereſt.

Poſſible project of the emperour and king of Pruſſia.

But the poſition of Germany is not like that of Poland, with regard to France, either for good or for evil. If a conjunction between Pruſſia and the emperour ſhould be formed for the purpoſe of ſeculariſing and rendering hereditary the eccleſiaſtical

ſiaſtical electorates and the biſhoprick of Munſter, for ſettling two of them on the children of the emperour, and uniting Cologne and Munſter to the dominions of the king of Pruſſia on the Rhine, or if any other project of mutual aggrandizement ſhould be in proſpect, and that to facilitate ſuch a ſcheme, the modern French ſhould be permitted and encouraged to ſhake the internal and external ſecurity of theſe eccleſiaſtical electorates, Great Britain is ſo ſituated that ſhe could not with any effect ſet herſelf in oppoſition to ſuch a deſign. Her principal arm, her marine, could here be of no ſort of uſe.

To be reſiſted only by France.

France, the author of the treaty of Weſtphalia, is the natural guardian of the independence and balance of Germany. Great Britain (to ſay nothing of the king's concern as one of that auguſt body) has a ſerious intereſt in preſerving it; but, except through the power of France, *acting upon the common old principles of ſtate policy*, in the caſe we have ſuppoſed, ſhe has no ſort of means of ſupporting that intereſt. It is always the intereſt of Great Britain that the power of France ſhould be kept within the bounds of moderation. It is not her intereſt that that power ſhould be wholly annihilated in the ſyſtem of Europe. Though at one time through France the independence of Europe was endangered, it is and ever was through her alone that the common liberty of Germany

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can be ſecured againſt the ſingle or the combined ambition of any other power. In truth, within this century the aggrandizement of other ſovereign houſes has been ſuch that there has been a great change in the whole ſtate of Europe, and other nations as well as France may become objects of jealouſy and apprehenſion.

New principles of alliance.

In this ſtate of things, a new principle of alliances and wars is opened. The treaty of Weſtphalia is, with France, an antiquated fable. The rights and liberties ſhe was bound to maintain are now a ſyſtem of wrong and tyranny which ſhe is bound to deſtroy. Her good and ill diſpoſitions are ſhewn by the ſame means. *To communicate peaceably* the rights of men is the true mode of her ſhewing her *friendſhip;* to force ſovereigns to *ſubmit* to thoſe rights is her mode of *hoſtility.* So that either as friend or foe her whole ſcheme has been and is, to throw the empire into confuſion: and thoſe ſtateſmen, who follow the old routine of politicks, may ſee in this general confuſion, and in the danger of the *leſſer* princes, an occaſion as protectors or enemies, of connecting their territories to one or the other of the *two great* German powers. They do not take into conſideration that the means which they encourage, as leading to the event they deſire, will with certainty not only ravage and deſtroy the empire, but if they ſhould for a moment ſeem to aggrandize the two great houſes, will alſo eſtabliſh principles,

ciples, and confirm tempers amongſt the people, which will preclude the two ſovereigns from the poſſibility of holding what they acquire, or even the dominions which they have inherited. It is on the ſide of the eccleſiaſtical electorates that the dykes, raiſed to ſupport the German liberty, firſt will give way.

The French have begun their general operations by ſeizing upon thoſe territories of the Pope, the ſituation of which was the moſt inviting to the enterpriſe. Their method of doing it was by exciting ſedition and ſpreading maſſacre and deſolation through theſe unfortunate places, and then under an idea of kindneſs and protection, bringing forward an antiquated title of the crown of France, and annexing Avignon and the two cities of the Comtat with their territory to the French republick. They have made an at-

Geneva. tempt on Geneva, in which they very narrowly failed of ſucceſs. It is known that they hold out from time to time the idea of uniting all the other provinces of which Gaul was antiently

Savoy. compoſed, including Savoy on the other ſide, and on this ſide bounding themſelves by the Rhine.

Switzerland. As to Switzerland, it is a country whoſe long union, rather than its poſſible diviſion, is the matter of wonder. Here I know they entertain very ſanguine hopes. The aggregation to France of the democratick Swiſs republicks appears to them to be a work half done by their very form; and

it might ſeem to them rather an increaſe of importance to theſe little commonwealths, than a derogation from their independency, or a change in the manner of their government. Upon any quarrel amongſt the cantons, nothing is more likely than ſuch an event. As to the ariſtocratick republicks, the general clamour and hatred which the French excite againſt the very name, (and with more facility and ſucceſs than againſt monarchs) and the utter impoſſibility of their government making any ſort of reſiſtance againſt an inſurrection, where they have no troops, and the people are all armed and trained, render their hopes in that quarter, far indeed from unfounded. It is certain that the republick of Berne thinks itſelf obliged to a vigilance next to hoſtile, and to impriſon or expel all the French whom it finds in its territories. But indeed thoſe ariſtocracies which comprehend whatever is conſiderable, wealthy, and valuable in Switzerland, do now ſo wholly depend upon opinion, and the humour of their multitude, that the lighteſt puff of wind is ſufficient to blow them down. If France, under its ancient regimen, and upon the ancient principles of policy, was the ſupport of the Germanick conſtitution, it was much more ſo of that of Switzerland, which almoſt from the very origin of that confederacy reſted upon the cloſeneſs of its connexion with France, on which the Swiſs Cantons wholly

Old French maxims, the ſecurity of its independence.

repoſed themſelves for the preſervation of the parts of their body in their reſpective rights and permanent forms, as well as for the maintenance of all in their general independency.

Switzerland and Germany are the firſt objects of the new French politicians. When I contemplate what they have done at home, which is in effect little leſs than an amazing conqueſt wrought by a change of opinion, in a great part (to be ſure far from altogether) very ſudden, I cannot help letting my thoughts run along with their deſigns, and without attending to geographical order, to conſider the other ſtates of Europe ſo far as they may be any way affected by this aſtoniſhing revolution. If early ſteps are not taken in ſome way or other to prevent the ſpreading of this influence, I ſcarcely think any of them perfectly ſecure.

Italy. Italy is divided, as Germany and Switzerland are, into many ſmaller ſtates, and with ſome conſiderable diverſity as to forms of Government; but as theſe diviſions and varieties in Italy are not ſo conſiderable, ſo neither do I think the danger altogether ſo imminent there as in Germany and Switzerland. Savoy I know that the French conſider as in a very hopeful way, and I believe not at Lombardy. all without reaſon. They view it as an old member of the kingdom of France which may be eaſily re-united in the manner, and on the principles of the re-union of Avignon. This country communicates

nicates with Piedmont; and as the king of Sardinia's dominions were long the key of Italy, and as ſuch long regarded by France, whilſt France acted on her old maxims, and with views on Italy; ſo in this new French empire of ſedition, if once ſhe gets that key into her hands, ſhe can eaſily lay open the barrier which hinders the entrance of her preſent politicks into that inviting region. Milan, I am ſure, nouriſhes great diſquiets—and if Milan ſhould ſtir, no part of Lombardy is ſecure to the preſent poſſeſſors—whether the Venetian or the Auſtrian. Genoa is cloſely connected with France.

Bourbon princes in Italy.

The firſt prince of the houſe of Bourbon has been obliged to give himſelf up entirely to the new ſyſtem, and to pretend even to propagate it with all zeal; at leaſt that club of intriguers who aſſemble at the Feuillans, and whoſe cabinet meets at Madame Stahl's, and makes and directs all the miniſters, is the real executive government of France. The emperour is perfectly in concert, and they will not long ſuffer any prince of the houſe of Bourbon, to keep by force the French emiſſaries out of their dominions; nor whilſt France has a commerce with them, eſpecially through Marſeilles, (the hotteſt focus of ſedition in France) will it be long poſſible to prevent the intercourſe or the effects.

Naples has an old inveterate diſpoſition to republicaniſm, and (however for ſome time paſt

quiet) is as liable to exploſion as its own Veſuvius. Sicily I think has theſe diſpoſitions in full as ſtrong a degree. In neither of theſe countries exiſts any thing which very well deſerves the name of government or exact police.

Eccleſiaſtical State.

In the ſtates of the church, notwithſtanding their ſtrictneſs in baniſhing the French out of that country, there are not wanting the ſeeds of a revolution. The ſpirit of nepotiſm prevails there nearly as ſtrong as ever. Every Pope of courſe is to give origin or reſtoration to a great family, by the means of large donations. The foreign revenues have long been gradually on the decline, and ſeem now in a manner dried up. To ſupply this defect the reſource of vexatious and impolitick jobbing at home, if any thing, is rather increaſed than leſſened. Various well intended but ill underſtood practices, ſome of them exiſting, in their ſpirit at leaſt, from the time of the old Roman empire, ſtill prevail; and that government is as blindly attached to old abuſive cuſtoms, as others are wildly diſpoſed to all ſorts of innovations and experiments. Theſe abuſes were leſs felt whilſt the Pontificate drew riches from abroad, which in ſome meaſure counterbalanced the evils of their remiſs and jobbiſh government at home. But now it can ſubſiſt only on the reſources of domeſtick management; and abuſes in that management of courſe will be more intimately and more ſeverely felt.

In

In the midſt of the apparently torpid languor of the eccleſiaſtical ſtate, thoſe who have had opportunity of a near obſervation, have ſeen a little rippling in that ſmooth water, which indicates ſomething alive under it. There is in the eccleſiaſtical ſtate, a perſonage who ſeems capable of acting (but with more force and ſteadineſs) the part of the tribune Rienzi. The people once inflamed will not be deſtitute of a leader. They have ſuch an one already in the Cardinal or Archbiſhop *Buon Campagna*. He is, of all men, if I am not ill informed, the moſt turbulent, ſeditious, intriguing, bold, and deſperate. He is not at all made for a Roman of the preſent day. I think he lately held the firſt office of their ſtate, that of great chamberlain, which is equivalent to high treaſurer. At preſent he is out of employment, and in diſgrace. If he ſhould be elected Pope, or even come to have any weight with a new Pope, he will infallibly conjure up a democratick ſpirit in that country. He may indeed be able to effect it without theſe advantages. The next interregnum will probably ſhew more of him. There may be others of the ſame character, who have not come to my knowledge. This much is certain, that the Roman people, if once the blind reverence they bear to the ſanctity of the Pope, which is their only bridle, ſhould relax, are naturally turbulent, ferocious, and headlong, whilſt the police is defective, and

the government feeble and reſourceleſs beyond all imagination.

Spain. As to Spain, it is a nerveleſs country. It does not poſſeſs the uſe, it only ſuffers the abuſe of a nobility. For ſome time, and even before the ſettlement of the Bourbon dynaſty, that body has been ſyſtematically lowered, and rendered incapable by excluſion, and for incapacity excluded from affairs. In this circle the body is in a manner annihilated—and ſo little means have they of any weighty exertion either to controul or to ſupport the crown, that if they at all interfere, it is only by abetting deſperate and mobbiſh inſurrections, like that at Madrid which drove Squillace from his place. Florida Blanca is a creature of office, and has little connexion, and no ſympathy with that body.

As to the clergy, they are the only thing in Spain that looks like an independent order, and they are kept in ſome reſpect by the inquiſition, the ſole but unhappy reſource of public tranquillity and order now remaining in Spain. As in Venice, it is become moſtly an engine of ſtate, which indeed to a degree it has always been in Spain. It wars no longer with Jews and hereticks: it has no ſuch war to carry on. Its great object is to keep atheiſtick and republican doctrines from making their way in that kingdom. No French book upon any ſubject can enter there which does not

not contain ſuch matter. In Spain, the clergy are of moment from their influence, but at the ſame time with the envy and jealouſy that attend great riches and power. Though the crown has by management with the Pope got a very great ſhare of the eccleſiaſtical revenues into its own hands, much ſtill remains to them. There will always be about that court thoſe who look out to a farther diviſion of the church property as a reſource, and to be obtained by ſhorter methods than thoſe of negotiations with the clergy and their chief. But at preſent I think it likely that they will ſtop, leſt the buſineſs ſhould be taken out of their hands: and leſt that body in which remains the only life that exiſts in Spain, and is not a fever, may with their property loſe all the influence neceſſary to preſerve the monarchy, or being poor and deſperate, may employ whatever influence remains to them as active agents in its deſtruction.

Caſtile different from Catalonia & Arragon.

The Caſtilians have ſtill remaining a good deal of their old character, their *gravidad, lealdad,* and *il timor de Dios;* but that character neither is, nor ever was exactly true, except of the Caſtilians only. The ſeveral kingdoms which compoſe Spain, have perhaps ſome features which run through the whole; but they are in many particulars as different as nations who go by different names; the Catalans, for inſtance, and the Arragonians too, in a great meaſure have the ſpirit of the Miquelets, and much more of republicaniſm than

of an attachment to royalty. They are more in the way of trade and intercourſe with France; and upon the leaſt internal movement, will diſcloſe and probably let looſe a ſpirit that may throw the whole Spaniſh monarchy into convulſions.

It is a melancholy reflection that the ſpirit of melioration which has been going on in that part of Europe, more or leſs during this century, and the various ſchemes very lately on foot for further advancement are all put a ſtop to at once. Reformation certainly is nearly connected with innovation—and where that latter comes in for too large a ſhare, thoſe who undertake to improve their country may riſk their own ſafety. In times where the correction, which includes the confeſſion of an abuſe, is turned to criminate the authority which has long ſuffered it, rather than to honour thoſe who would amend it (which is the ſpirit of this malignant French diſtemper) every ſtep out of the common courſe becomes critical, and renders it a taſk full of peril for princes of moderate talents to engage in great undertakings. At preſent the only ſafety of Spain is the old national hatred to the French. How far that can be depended upon, if any great ferments ſhould be excited, it is impoſſible to ſay.

As to Portugal, ſhe is out of the high road of theſe politicks—I ſhall, therefore, not divert my thoughts that way; but return again to the North of Europe, which at preſent ſeems the part moſt intereſted,

intereſted, and there it appears to me that the French ſpeculation on the northern countries, may be valued in the following, or ſome ſuch manner.

Denmark and Norway, do not appear to furniſh any of the materials of a democratick revolution, or the diſpoſitions to it. Denmark can only be *conſequentially* affected by any thing done in France; but of Sweden I think quite otherwiſe. The preſent power in Sweden is too new a ſyſtem, and too green and too ſore from its late revolution, to be conſidered as perfectly aſſured. The king by his aſtoniſhing activity, his boldneſs, his deciſion, his ready verſatility, and by rouſing and employing the old military ſpirit of Sweden, keeps up the top with continual agitation and laſhing. The moment it ceaſes to ſpin, the royalty is a dead bit of box. Whenever Sweden is quiet externally for ſome time, there is great danger that all the republican elements ſhe contains will be animated by the new French ſpirit, and of this I believe the king is very ſenſible.

Denmark.

Sweden.

The Ruſſian Government is of all others the moſt liable to be ſubverted by military ſeditions, by court conſpiracies, and ſometimes by headlong rebellions of the people, ſuch as the turbinating movement of Pugatchef. It is not quite ſo probable that in any of theſe changes the ſpirit of ſyſtem may mingle in the manner it has done in France.

Ruſſia.

France. The Muſcovites are no great ſpeculators —but I ſhould not much rely on their uninquiſitive diſpoſition, if any of their ordinary motives to ſedition ſhould ariſe. The little catechiſm of the rights of men is ſoon learned; and the inferences are in the paſſions.

Poland. Poland, from one cauſe or other, is always unquiet. The new conſtitution only ſerves to ſupply that reſtleſs people with new means, at leaſt new modes of cheriſhing their turbulent diſpoſition. The bottom of the character is the ſame. It is a great queſtion, whether the joining that crown Saxony. with the electorate of Saxony, will contribute moſt to ſtrengthen the royal authority of Poland, or to ſhake the ducal in Saxony. The elector is a catholick; the people of Saxony are, ſix ſeventhſ at the very leaſt, proteſtants. He *muſt* continue a catholick according to the Poliſh law, if he accepts that crown. The pride of the Saxons, formerly flattered by having a crown in the houſe of their prince, though an honour which coſt them dear; the German probity, fidelity and loyalty; the weight of the conſtitution of the empire under the treaty of Weſtphalia; the good temper and good nature of the princes of the houſe of Saxony; had formerly removed from the people all apprehenſion with regard to their religion, and kept them perfectly quiet, obedient, and even affectionate. The ſeven years war made ſome change in the minds of the

Saxons. They did not, I believe, regret the loſs of what might be conſidered almoſt as the ſucceſſion to the crown of Poland, the poſſeſſion of which, by annexing them to a foreign intereſt, had often obliged them to act an arduous part, towards the ſupport of which that foreign intereſt afforded no proportionable ſtrength. In this very delicate ſituation of their political intereſts, the ſpeculations of the French and German *œconomiſts*, and the cabals, and the ſecret, as well as publick doctrines of the *illuminatenorden* and *free maſons*, have made a conſiderable progreſs in that country; and a turbulent ſpirit under colour of religion, but in reality ariſing from the French rights of man, has already ſhewn itſelf, and is ready on every occaſion to blaze out.

The preſent elector is a prince of a ſafe and quiet temper, of great prudence, and goodneſs. He knows that in the actual ſtate of things, not the power and reſpect belonging to ſovereigns, but their very exiſtence depends on a reaſonable frugality. It is very certain that not one ſovereign in Europe can either promiſe for the continuance of his authority in a ſtate of indigence and inſolvency, or dares to venture on a new impoſition to relieve himſelf. Without abandoning wholly the ancient magnificence of his court, the elector has conducted his affairs with infinitely more œconomy than any of his predeceſſors, ſo as to reſtore his finances beyond what was thought poſſible from the

the ſtate in which the ſeven years war had left Saxony. Saxony during the whole of that dreadful period having been in the hands of an exaſperated enemy, rigorous by reſentment, by nature and by neceſſity, was obliged to bear in a manner the whole burden of the war; in the intervals when their allies prevailed, the inhabitants of that country were not better treated.

The moderation and prudence of the preſent elector, in my opinion, rather perhaps reſpites the troubles than ſecures the peace of the electorate. The offer of the ſucceſſion to the crown of Poland is truly critical, whether he accepts, or whether he declines it. If the ſtates will conſent to his acceptance, it will add to the difficulties, already great, of his ſituation between the king of Pruſſia and the Emperour. But theſe thoughts lead me too far, when I mean to ſpeak only of the interiour condition of theſe princes. It has always however ſome neceſſary connexion with their foreign politicks.

Holland. With regard to Holland, and the ruling party there, I do not think it at all tainted, or likely to be ſo except by fear; or that it is likely to be miſled unleſs indirectly and circuitouſly. But the predominant party in Holland is not Holland. The ſuppreſſed faction, though ſuppreſſed, exiſts. Under the aſhes, the embers of the late commotions are ſtill warm. The anti-orange party has from the day of its origin been French, though alienated

alienated in ſome degree for ſome time, through the pride and folly of Louis the Fourteenth. It will ever hanker after a French connexion; and now that the internal government in France has been aſſimilated in ſo conſiderable a degree to that which the immoderate republicans began ſo very lately to introduce into Holland, their connexion, as ſtill more natural, will be more deſired. I do not well underſtand the preſent exterior politicks of the Stadtholder, nor the treaty into which the newſpapers ſay he has entered for the ſtates with the emperour. But the emperour's own politicks with regard to the Netherlands ſeem to me to be exactly calculated to anſwer the purpoſe of the French revolutioniſts. He endeavours to cruſh the ariſtocratick party—and to nouriſh one in avowed connexion with the moſt furious democratiſts in France.

Theſe provinces in which the French game is ſo well played, they conſider as part of the old French empire: certainly they were amongſt the oldeſt parts of it. Theſe they think very well ſituated, as their party is well-diſpoſed to a reunion. As to the greater nations, they do not aim at making a direct conqueſt of them, but by diſturbing them through a propagation of their principles, they hope to weaken, as they will weaken them, and to keep them in perpetual alarm and agitation, and thus render all their efforts againſt

againſt them utterly impracticable, whilſt they extend the dominion of their ſovereign anarchy on all ſides.

England. As to England, there may be ſome apprehenſion from vicinity, from conſtant communication, and from the very name of liberty, which, as it ought to be very dear to us, in its worſt abuſes carries ſomething ſeductive. It is the abuſe of the firſt and beſt of the objects which we cheriſh. I know that many who ſufficiently diſlike the ſyſtem of France, have yet no apprehenſions of its prevalence here. I ſay nothing to the ground of this ſecurity in the attachment of the people to their conſtitution, and their ſatisfaction in the diſcreet portion of liberty which it meaſures out to them. Upon this I have ſaid all I have to ſay, in the appeal I have publiſhed. That ſecurity is ſomething, and not inconſiderable. But if a ſtorm ariſes I ſhould not much rely upon it.

Objection to the ſtability of the French ſyſtem. There are other views of things which may be uſed to give us a perfect (though in my opinion a deluſive) aſſurance of our own ſecurity. The firſt of theſe is from the weakneſs and ricketty nature of the new ſyſtem in the place of its firſt formation. It is thought that the monſter of a commonwealth cannot poſſibly live—that at any rate the ill contrivance of their fabrick will make it fall in pieces of itſelf—that the aſſembly muſt be bankrupt, and that this bankruptcy will totally deſtroy that

that ſyſtem, from the contagion of which apprehenſions are entertained.

For my part I have long thought that one great cauſe of the ſtability of this wretched ſcheme of things in France was an opinion that it could not ſtand; and, therefore, that all external meaſures to deſtroy it were wholly uſeleſs.

Bankruptcy.

As to the bankruptcy, that event has happened long ago, as much as it is ever likely to happen. As ſoon as a nation compels a creditor to take paper currency in diſcharge of his debt, there is a bankruptcy. The compulſory paper has in ſome degree anſwered; not becauſe there was a ſurplus from church lands, but becauſe faith has not been kept with the clergy. As to the holders of the old funds, to them the payments will be dilatory, but they will be made, and whatever may be the diſcount on paper, whilſt paper is taken, paper will be iſſued.

Reſources.

As to the reſt, they have ſhot out three branches of revenue to ſupply all thoſe which they have deſtroyed, that is, *the Univerſal Regiſter of all Tranſactions*, the heavy and univerſal *Stamp Duty*, and the new *Territorial Impoſt*, levied chiefly on the reduced eſtates of the gentlemen. Theſe branches of the revenue, eſpecially as they take aſſignats in payment, anſwer their purpoſe in a conſiderable degree, and keep up the credit of their paper; for as they receive it in their treaſury, it is in reality

funded

funded upon all their taxes and future reſources of all kinds, as well as upon the church eſtates. As this paper is become in a manner the only viſible maintenance of the whole people, the dread of a bankruptcy is more apparently connected, with the delay of a counter-revolution than with the duration of this republick; becauſe the intereſt of the new republick manifeſtly leans upon it; and in my opinion, the counter-revolution cannot exiſt along with it. The above three projects ruined ſome miniſters under the old government, merely for having conceived them. They are the ſalvation of the preſent rulers.

As the aſſembly has laid a moſt unſparing and cruel hand on all men who have lived by the bounty, the juſtice, or the abuſes of the old government, they have leſſened many expences. The royal eſtabliſhment, though exceſſively and ridiculouſly great for *their* ſcheme of things, is reduced at leaſt one half; the eſtates of the king's brothers, which under the ancient government had been in truth royal revenues, go to the general ſtock of the confiſcation; and as to the crown lands, though under the monarchy, they never yielded two hundred and fifty thouſand a year, by many they are thought at leaſt worth three times as much.

As to the eccleſiaſtical charge, whether as a compenſation for loſſes, or a proviſion for religion, of which they made at firſt a great parade, and entered

entered into a ſolemn engagement in favour of it, it was eſtimated at a much larger ſum than they could expect from the church property, moveable or immoveable: they are completely bankrupt as to that article. It is juſt what they wiſh; and it is not productive of any ſerious inconvenience. The non-payment produces diſcontent and occaſional ſedition; but is only by fits and ſpaſms, and amongſt the country people who are of no conſequence. Theſe ſeditions furniſh new pretexts for non-payment to the church eſtabliſhment, and help the aſſembly wholly to get rid of the clergy, and indeed of any form of religion, which is not only their real, but avowed object.

Want of Money how ſupplied.

They are embarraſſed indeed in the higheſt degree, but not wholly reſourceleſs. They are without the ſpecies of money. Circulation of money is a great convenience, but a ſubſtitute for it may be found. Whilſt the great objects of product on and conſumption, corn, cattle, wine, and the like, exiſt in a country, the means of giving them circulation with more or leſs convenience, cannot be *wholly* wanting. The great confiſcation of the church and of the crown lands, and of the appenages of the princes, for the purchaſe of all which their paper is always received at par, gives means of continually deſtroying and continually creating, and this perpetual deſtruction and renovation feeds the ſpeculative market, and prevents, and

will prevent, till that fund of confiſcation begins to fail, a *total* depreciation.

Monied intereſt not neceſſary to them.

But all conſideration of publick credit in France is of little avail at preſent. The action indeed of the monied intereſt was of abſolute neceſſity at the beginning of this revolution; but the French republick can ſtand without any aſſiſtance from that deſcription of men, which, as things are now circumſtanced, rather ſtands in need of aſſiſtance itſelf from the power which alone ſubſtantially exiſts in France; I mean the ſeveral diſtricts and municipal republicks, and the ſeveral clubs which direct all their affairs and appoint all their magiſtrates. This is the power now paramount to every thing, even to the aſſembly itſelf called national, and that to which tribunals, prieſthood, laws, finances, and both deſcriptions of military power are wholly ſubſervient, ſo far as the military power of either deſcription yields obedience to any name of authority.

The world of contingency and political combination is much larger than we are apt to imagine. We never can ſay what may, or may not happen, without a view to all the actual circumſtances. Experience upon other data than thoſe, is of all things the moſt deluſive. Prudence in new caſes can do nothing on grounds of retroſpect. A conſtant vigilance and attention to the train of things as they ſucceſſively emerge, and to act

on

on what they direct, are the only ſure courſes. The phyſician that let blood, and by blood-letting cured one kind of plague, in the next added to its ravages. That power goes with property is not univerſally true, and the idea that the operation of it is certain and invariable, may miſlead us very fatally.

Power ſeparated from property.

Whoever will take an accurate view of the ſtate of thoſe republicks, and of the compoſition of the preſent aſſembly deputed by them (in which aſſembly there are not quite fifty perſons poſſeſſed of an income amounting to 100l. ſterling yearly) muſt diſcern clearly, *that the political and civil power of France is wholly ſeparated from its property of every deſcription;* and of courſe that neither the landed nor the monied intereſt poſſeſſes the ſmalleſt weight or conſideration in the direction of any publick concern. The whole kingdom is directed by the *refuſe of its chicane*, with the aid of the buſtling, preſumptuous young clerks of counting-houſes and ſhops, and ſome intermixture of young gentlemen of the ſame character in the ſeveral towns. The rich peaſants are bribed with church lands; and the poorer of that deſcription are, and can be, counted for nothing. They may riſe in ferocious, ill-directed tumults—but they can only diſgrace themſelves and ſignalize the triumph of their adverſaries.

Effect of the rota.

The *truly* active citizens, that is, the above deſcriptions, are all concerned in intrigue reſpecting

the various objects in their local or their general government. The rota which the French have eſtabliſhed for their national aſſemby, holds out the higheſt objects of ambition to ſuch vaſt multitudes as, in an unexampled meaſure, to widen the bottom of a new ſpecies of intereſt merely political, and wholly unconnected with birth or property. This ſcheme of a rota, though it enfeebles the ſtate, conſidered as one ſolid body, and indeed wholly diſables it from acting as ſuch, gives a great, an equal, and a diffuſive ſtrength to the democratick ſcheme. Seven hundred and fifty people, every two years raiſed to the ſupreme power, has already produced at leaſt fifteen hundred bold, acting politicians; a great number for even ſo great a country as France. Theſe men never will quietly ſettle in ordinary occupations, nor ſubmit to any ſcheme which muſt reduce them to an entirely private condition, or to the exerciſe of a ſteady, peaceful, but obſcure and unimportant induſtry. Whilſt they ſit in the aſſembly they are denied offices of truſt and profit—but their ſhort duration makes this no reſtraint—during their probation and apprenticeſhip they are all ſalaried with an income to the greateſt part of them immenſe; and after they have paſſed the novitiate, thoſe who take any ſort of lead are placed in very lucrative offices, according to their influence and credit, or appoint thoſe who divide their profits with them.

This

This ſupply of recruits to the corps of the higheſt civil ambition, goes on with a regular progreſſion. In very few years it muſt amount to many thouſands. Theſe, however, will be as nothing in compariſon to the multitude of municipal officers, and officers of diſtrict and department, of all ſorts, who have taſted of power and profit, and who hunger for the periodical return of the meal. To theſe needy agitators, the glory of the ſtate, the general wealth and proſperity of the nation, and the riſe or fall of publick credit, are as dreams; nor have arguments deduced from theſe topicks any ſort of weight with them. The indifference with which the aſſembly regards the ſtate of their colonies, the only valuable part of the French commerce, is a full proof how little they are likely to be affected by any thing but the ſelfiſh game of their own ambition, now univerſally diffuſed.

Impracticability of reſiſtance.

It is true, amidſt all theſe turbulent means of ſecurity to their ſyſtem, very great diſcontents every where prevail. But they only produce miſery to thoſe who nurſe them at home, or exile, beggary, and in the end confiſcation, to thoſe who are ſo impatient as to remove from them. Each municipal republick has a committee, or ſomething in the nature of a *committee of reſearch*. In theſe petty republicks the tyranny is ſo near its object, that it becomes inſtantly acquainted with every act of every man. It ſtifles conſpiracy

in its very firſt movements. Their power is abſolute and uncontroulable. No ſtand can be made againſt it. Theſe republicks are beſides ſo diſconnected, that very little intelligence of what happens in them, is to be obtained, beyond their own bounds, except by the means of their clubs, who keep up a conſtant correſpondence, and who give what colour they pleaſe to ſuch facts as they chooſe to communicate out of the track of their correſpondence. They all have ſome ſort of communication, juſt as much or as little as they pleaſe, with the centre. By this confinement of all communication to the ruling faction, any combination grounded on the abuſes and diſcontents in one, ſcarcely can reach the other. There is not one man, in any one place, to head them. The old government had ſo much abſtracted the nobility from the cultivation of provincial intereſt, that no man in France exiſts, whoſe power, credit or conſequence extends to two diſtricts, or who is capable of uniting them in any deſign, even if any man could aſſemble ten men together, without being ſure of a ſpeedy lodging in a priſon. One muſt not judge of the ſtate of France by what has been obſerved elſewhere. It does not in the leaſt reſemble any other country. Analogical reaſoning from hiſtory or from recent experience in other places is wholly deluſive.

In my opinion there never was ſeen ſo ſtrong a government internally as that of the French municipalities,

cipalities. If ever any rebellion can ariſe againſt the preſent ſyſtem, it muſt begin, where the revolution which gave birth to it did, at the capital. Paris is the only place in which there is the leaſt freedom of intercourſe. But even there, ſo many ſervants as any man has, ſo many ſpies, and irreconcileable domeſtick enemies.

But that place being the chief ſeat of the power and intelligence of the ruling faction, and the place of occaſional reſort for their fierceſt ſpirits, even there a revolution is not likely to have any thing to feed it. The leaders of the ariſtocratick party have been drawn out of the kingdom by order of the princes, on the hopes held out by the emperour and the king of Pruſſia at Pilnitz; and as to the democratick factions in Paris, amongſt them there are no leaders poſſeſſed of an influence for any other purpoſe but that of maintaining the preſent ſtate of things. The moment they are ſeen to warp, they are reduced to nothing. They have no attached army—no party that is at all perſonal. Gentlemen are fugitives.

It is not to be imagined becauſe a political ſyſtem is, under certain aſpects, very unwiſe in its contrivance, and very miſchievous in its effects, that it therefore can have no long duration. Its very defects may tend to its ſtability, becauſe they are agreeable to its nature. The very faults in the conſtitution of Poland made it laſt; the *veto* which deſtroyed all its energy preſerved its life.

What can be conceived ſo monſtrous as the republick of Algiers? and that no leſs ſtrange republick of the Mamalukes in Egypt? They are of the worſt form imaginable, and exerciſed in the worſt manner, yet they have exiſted as a nuiſance on the earth for ſeveral hundred years.

From all theſe conſiderations, and many more that crowd upon me, three concluſions have long ſince ariſen in my mind—

Concluſions

Firſt, that no counter-revolution is to be expected in France from internal cauſes ſolely.

Secondly, that the longer the preſent ſyſtem exiſts, the greater will be its ſtrength; the greater its power to deſtroy diſcontents at home, and to reſiſt all foreign attempts in favour of theſe diſcontents.

Thirdly, that as long as it exiſts in France, it will be the intereſt of the managers there, and it is in the very eſſence of their plan, to diſturb and diſtract all other governments, and their endleſs ſucceſſion of reſtleſs politicians will continually ſtimulate them to new attempts.

Proceeding of princes; defenſive plans.

Princes are generally ſenſible that this is their common cauſe; and two of them have made a publick declaration of their opinion to this effect. Againſt this common danger, ſome of them, ſuch as the king of Spain, the king of Sardinia, and the republick of Berne, are very diligent in uſing defenſive meaſures.

If

If they were to guard againſt an invaſion from France, the merits of this plan of a merely defenſive reſiſtance might be ſupported by plauſible topicks; but as the attack does not operate againſt theſe countries externally, but by an internal corruption (a ſort of dry rot); they who purſue this merely defenſive plan, againſt a danger which the plan itſelf ſuppoſes to be ſerious, cannot poſſibly eſcape it. For it is in the nature of all defenſive meaſures to be ſharp and vigorous under the impreſſions of the firſt alarm, and to relax by degrees; until at length the danger, by not operating inſtantly, comes to appear as a falſe alarm; ſo much ſo that the next menacing appearance will look leſs formidable, and will be leſs provided againſt. But to thoſe who are on the offenſive it is not neceſſary to be always alert. Poſſibly it is more their intereſt not to be ſo. For their unforeſeen attacks contribute to their ſucceſs.

The French party how compoſed.

In the mean time a ſyſtem of French conſpiracy is gaining ground in every country. This ſyſtem happening to be founded on principles the moſt deluſive indeed, but the moſt flattering to the natural propenſities of the unthinking multitude, and to the ſpeculations of all thoſe who think, without thinking very profoundly, muſt daily extend its influence. A predominant inclination towards it appears in all thoſe who have no religion, when otherwiſe their diſpoſition leads them to

to be advocates even for deſpotiſm. Hence Hume, though I cannot ſay that he does not throw out ſome expreſſions of diſapprobation on the proceedings of the levellers in the reign of Richard the Second, yet affirms that the doctrines of *John Ball* were "conformable to the ideas of primitive "equality, *which are engraven in the hearts of all "men.*"

Boldneſs formerly was not the character of Atheiſts as ſuch. They were even of a character nearly the reverſe; they were formerly like the old Epicureans, rather an unenterpriſing race. But of late they are grown active, deſigning, turbulent and ſeditious. They are ſworn enemies to kings, nobility and prieſthood. We have ſeen all the academicians at Paris, with Condorcet, the friend and correſpondent of Prieſtley, at their head, the moſt furious of the extravagant republicans.

Condorcet. The late aſſembly, after the laſt captivity of the king, had actually choſen this Condorcet by a majority in the ballot, for preceptor to the dauphin, who was to be taken out of the hands and direction of his parents, and to be delivered over to this fanatick atheiſt, and furious democratick republican. His untractability to theſe leaders, and his figure in the club of jacobins, which at that time they wiſhed to bring under, alone prevented that part of the arrangement, and others in the ſame

ſame ſtyle, from being carried into execution. Whilſt he was candidate for this office, he produced his title to it by promulgating the following ideas of the title of his royal pupil to the crown. In a paper written by him, and publiſhed with his name, againſt the re-eſtabliſhment, even of the appearance of monarchy under any qualifications, He ſays, "Juſqu'á ce moment ils [l'Aſſemblée Nationale] n'ont rien préjugé encore. En ſe reſervant de nommer un gouverneur au dauphin, ils n'ont pas prononcé *que cet enfant dût regner;* mais ſeulement qu'il *étoit poſſible* que la conſtitution l'y deſtinât; ils ont voulu que l'éducation, effaçant tout ce que *les preſtiges du Trône* ont pu lui inſpirer de préjugés ſur les droits prétendus de ſa naiſſance, qu'elle lui fit connoître de bonne heure, et *l'Egalité naturelle des hommes, et la Souveraineté du peuple;* qu'elle lui apprit à ne pas oublier que c'eſt *du peuple* qu'il tiendra le titre de roi, et que *le peuple n'a pas même le droit de renoncer à celui de l'en depouiller.* Doctrine of the French.

"Ils ont voulu que cette éducation le rendit également digne, par ſes lumières, et ſes vertus, de recevoir *avec reſignation*, le fardeau dangereux d'une couronne, ou de la *dépoſer avec joie* entre le mains de ſes frères, qu'il ſentit que le devoir, et la gloire du roi d'un peuple libre, eſt de hâter le moment de n'être plus qu'un citoyen ordinaire.

"Ils

"Ils ont voulu que *l'inutilité d'un roi*, la néceſſité "de chercher les moyens de remplacer *un pouvoir* "*fondé ſur les illuſions*, fut une des premières véri- "tés offertes a ſa raiſon; *l'obligation d'y concourir* "*lui même un des premières devoirs de ſa morale;* "*et le deſir, de n'être plus affranchi du joug de la* "*loi, par une injurieuſe inviolabilité, le premier* "*ſentiment de ſon cœur.* Ils n'ignorent pas que "dans ce moment il s'agit bien moins de former "un roi que de lui apprendre à *ſavoir*, à *vouloir* "*ne plus l'être.*"*

Such

* Until now, they (the national aſſembly) have prejudged nothing. Reſerving to themſelves a right to appoint a preceptor to the dauphin, they did not declare that *this child was* to reign; but only that *poſſibly* the conſtitution *might* deſtine him to it: they willed that while education ſhould efface from his mind all the prejudices ariſing from the *deluſions of the throne* reſpecting his pretended birth-right, it ſhould alſo teach him not to forget, that it is *from the people* he is to receive the title of king, and that *the people do not even poſſeſs the right of giving up their power to take it from him.*

They willed that this education ſhould render him worthy by his knowledge, and by his virtues, both to receive *with ſubmiſſion* the dangerous burden of a crown, and *to reſign* it *with pleaſure* into the hands of his brethren: that he ſhould be conſcious that the haſtening of that moment when he is to be only a common citizen, conſtitutes the duty and the glory of a king of a free people.

They willed that the *uſeleſſneſs of a king*, the neceſſity of ſeeking means to eſtabliſh ſomething in lieu of *a power founded on illuſions*, ſhould be one of the firſt truths offered to his reaſon; *the obligation*

Such are the ſentiments of the man who has occaſionally filled the chair of the national aſſembly, who is their perpetual ſecretary, their only ſtanding officer, and the moſt important by far. He leads them to peace or war. He is the great theme of the republican faction in England. Theſe ideas of M. Condorcet, are the principles of thoſe to whom kings are to entruſt their ſucceſſors, and the intereſts of their ſucceſſion. This man would be ready to plunge the poniard in the heart of his pupil, or to whet the axe for his neck. Of all men, the moſt dangerous is a warm, hot-headed, zealous atheiſt. This ſort of man aims at dominion, and his means are, the words he always has in his mouth, "L'égalité naturelle des hommes, "et la ſouveraineté du peuple."

All former attempts grounded on theſe rights of men, had proved unfortunate. The ſucceſs of this laſt makes a mighty difference in the effect of the doctrine. Here is a principle of a nature, to the multitude, the moſt ſeductive, always exiſting before their eyes, *as a thing feaſible in practice.* After ſo many failures, ſuch an enterpriſe previous

obligation of conforming himſelf to this, the firſt of his moral duties; and the deſire of no longer being freed from the yoke of the law, by an injurious inviolability, the firſt and chief ſentiment of his heart. They are not ignorant that in the preſent moment the object is leſs to form a king than to teach him *that he ſhould know how to wiſh no longer to be ſuch.*

to

to the French experiment, carried ruin to the contrivers, on the face of it; and if any enthuſiaſt was ſo wild as to wiſh to engage in a ſcheme of that nature, it was not eaſy for him to find followers: now there is a party almoſt in all countries, ready made, animated with ſucceſs, with a ſure ally in the very centre of Europe. There is no cabal ſo obſcure in any place, that they do not protect, cheriſh, foſter, and endeavour to raiſe it into importance at home and abroad. From the loweſt, this intrigue will creep up to the higheſt. Ambition, as well as enthuſiaſm, may find its account in the party and in the principle.

Character of miniſters.

The miniſters of other kings, like thoſe of the king of France (not one of whom was perfectly free from this guilt, and ſome of whom were very deep in it) may themſelves be the perſons to foment ſuch a diſpoſition and ſuch a faction. Hertzberg, the king of Pruſſia's late miniſter, is ſo much of what is called a philoſopher, that he was of a faction with that ſort of politicians in every thing, and in every place. Even when he defends himſelf from the imputation of giving extravagantly into theſe principles, he ſtill conſiders the revolution of France as a great publick good, by giving credit to their fraudulent declaration of their univerſal benevolence, and love of peace. Nor are his Pruſſian majeſty's preſent miniſters at all diſinclined to the ſame ſyſtem. Their

oſtentatious preamble to certain late edicts, demonſtrates (if their actions had not been ſufficiently explanatory of their caſt of mind) that they are deeply infected with the ſame diſtemper of dangerous, becauſe plauſible, though trivial, and ſhallow ſpeculation.

Miniſters turning their backs on the reputation which properly belongs to them, aſpire at the glory of being ſpeculative writers. The duties of theſe two ſituations are, in general, directly oppoſite to each other. Speculators ought to be neutral. A miniſter cannot be ſo. He is to ſupport the intereſt of the publick as connected with that of his maſter. He is his maſter's truſtee, advocate, attorney, and ſteward—and he is not to indulge in any ſpeculation which contradicts that character or even detracts from its efficacy. Necker had an extreme thirſt for this ſort of glory; ſo had others; and this purſuit of a miſplaced and miſunderſtood reputation, was one of the cauſes of the ruin of theſe miniſters, and of their unhappy maſter. The Pruſſian miniſters in foreign courts have (at leaſt not long ſince) talked the moſt democratick language with regard to France, and in the moſt unmanaged terms.

Corps diplomatique.

The whole corps diplomatique, with very few exceptions, leans that way. What cauſe produces in them a turn of mind, which at firſt one would think unnatural to their ſituation, it is not impoſſible to explain. The diſcuſſion would however be

be ſomewhat long and ſomewhat invidious. The fact itſelf is indiſputable, however they may diſguiſe it to their ſeveral courts. This diſpoſition is gone to ſo very great a length in that corps, in itſelf ſo important, and ſo important as *furniſhing* the intelligence which ſways all cabinets, that if princes and ſtates do not very ſpeedily attend with a vigorous controul to that ſource of direction and information, very ſerious evils are likely to befal them.

Sovereigns —their diſpoſitions.

But indeed kings are to guard againſt the ſame ſort of diſpoſitions in themſelves. They are very eaſily alienated from all the higher orders of their ſubjects, whether civil or military, laick or eccleſiaſtical. It is with perſons of condition that ſovereigns chiefly come into contact. It is from them that they generally experience oppoſition to their will. It is with *their* pride and impracticability, that princes are moſt hurt; it is with *their* ſervility and baſeneſs, that they are moſt commonly diſguſted; it is from their humours and cabals, that they find their affairs moſt frequently troubled and diſtracted. But of the common people in pure monarchical governments, kings know little or nothing; and therefore being unacquainted with their faults (which are as many as thoſe of the great, and much more deciſive in their effects when accompanied with power) kings generally regard them with tenderneſs and favour, and turn their eyes towards that deſcription of their

ſubjects,

ſubjects, particularly when hurt by oppoſition from the higher orders. It was thus that the king of France (a perpetual example to all ſovereigns) was ruined. I have it from very ſure information (and it was indeed obvious enough from the meaſures which were taken previous to the aſſembly of the ſtates and afterwards) that the king's counſellors had filled him with a ſtrong diſlike to his nobility, his clergy, and the corps of his magiſtracy. They repreſented to him, that he had tried them all ſeverally, in ſeveral ways, and found them all untractable. That he had twice called an aſſembly (the notables) compoſed of the firſt men of the clergy, the nobility, and the magiſtrates; that he had himſelf named every one member in thoſe aſſemblies, and that though ſo picked out, he had not, in this their collective ſtate, found them more diſpoſed to a compliance with his will than they had been ſeparately. That there remained for him, with the leaſt proſpect of advantage to his authority in the ſtates general, which were to be compoſed of the ſame ſorts of men, but not choſen by him, only the *tiers état*. In this alone he could repoſe any hope of extricating himſelf from his difficulties, and of ſettling him in a clear and permanent authority. They repreſented (theſe are the words of one of my informants) "That the royal authority compreſſed "with the weight of theſe ariſtocratick bodies,

" full of ambition, and of faction, when once " unloaded, would riſe of itſelf, and occupy its " natural place without diſturbance or controul:" that the common people would protect, cheriſh, and ſupport, inſtead of cruſhing it. " The peo- " ple," (it was ſaid) " could entertain no objects " of ambition;" they were out of the road of intrigue and cabal; and could poſſibly have no other view than the ſupport of the mild and parental authority by which they were inveſted, for the firſt time collectively with real importance in the ſtate, and protected in their peaceable and uſeful employments.

King of France.

This unfortunate king (not without a large ſhare of blame to himſelf) was deluded to his ruin by a deſire to humble and reduce his nobility, clergy, and his corporate magiſtracy; not that I ſuppoſe he meant wholly to eradicate theſe bodies, in the manner ſince effected by the democratick power; I rather believe that even Necker's deſigns did not go to that extent. With his own hand, however, Louis the XVIth pulled down the pillars which upheld his throne; and this he did, becauſe he could not bear the inconveniences which are attached to every thing human; becauſe he found himſelf cooped up, and in durance by thoſe limits which nature preſcribes to deſire and imagination; and was taught to conſider as low and degrading, that mutual dependence which

Providence has ordained that all men ſhould have on one another. He is not at this minute perhaps cured of the dread of the power and credit like to be acquired by thoſe who would ſave and reſcue him. He leaves thoſe who ſuffer in his cauſe to their fate; and hopes by various mean deluſive intrigues in which I am afraid he is encouraged from abroad, to regain among traitors and regicides, the power he has joined to take from his own family, whom he quietly ſees proſcribed before his eyes, and called to anſwer to the loweſt of his rebels, as the vileſt of all criminals.

Emperour. It is to be hoped that the emperour may be taught better things by this fatal example. But it is ſure that he has adviſers who endeavour to fill him with the ideas which have brought his brother-in-law to his preſent ſituation. Joſeph the Second was far gone in this philoſophy, and ſome, if not moſt who ſerve the emperour, would kindly initiate him into all the myſteries of this free-maſonry. They would perſuade him to look on the national aſſembly not with the hatred of an enemy, but the jealouſy of a rival. They would make him deſirous of doing, in his own dominions, by a royal deſpotiſm, what has been done in France by a democratick. Rather than abandon ſuch enterpriſes, they would perſuade him to a ſtrange alliance between thoſe extremes. Their grand object being now, as in his brother's time, at any rate to deſtroy the higher orders,

they think he cannot compaſs this end, as certainly he cannot, without elevating the lower. By depreſſing the one and by raiſing the other, they hope in the firſt place to increaſe his treaſures and his army; and with theſe common inſtruments of royal power they flatter him that the democracy which they help, in his name, to create, will give him but little trouble. In defiance of the freſheſt experience, which might ſhew him that old impoſſibilities are become modern probabilities, and that the extent to which evil principles may go, when left to their own operation, is beyond the power of calculation, they will endeavour to perſuade him that ſuch a democracy is a thing which cannot ſubſiſt by itſelf; that in whoſever hands the military command is placed, he muſt be in the neceſſary courſe of affairs, ſooner or later the maſter; and that being the maſter of various unconnected countries, he may keep them all in order by employing a military force, which to each of them is foreign. This maxim too, however formerly plauſible, will not now hold water. This ſcheme is full of intricacy, and may cauſe him every where to loſe the hearts of his people. Theſe counſellors forget that a corrupted army was the very cauſe of the ruin of his brother-in-law; and that he is himſelf far from ſecure from a ſimilar corruption.

Inſtead

Inſtead of reconciling himſelf heartily and *bonâ fide* according to the moſt obvious rules of policy to the ſtates of Brabant, *as they are conſtituted*, and who in the *preſent ſtate of things* ſtand on the ſame foundation with the monarchy itſelf, and who might have been gained with the greateſt facility, they have adviſed him to the moſt unkingly proceeding which, either in a good or in a bad light, has ever been attempted. Under a pretext taken from the ſpirit of the loweſt chicane, they have counſelled him wholly to break the publick faith, to annul the amneſty, as well as the other conditions through which he obtained an entrance into the provinces of the Netherlands, under the guarantee of Great Britain and Pruſſia. He is made to declare his adherence to the indemnity in a criminal ſenſe, but he is to keep alive in his own name, and to encourage in others a *civil* proceſs in the nature of an action of damages for what has been ſuffered during the troubles. Whilſt he keeps up this hopeful law-ſuit in view of the damages he may recover againſt individuals, he loſes the hearts of a whole people, and the vaſt ſubſidies which his anceſtors had been uſed to receive from them. Brabant.

This deſign once admitted, unriddles the myſtery of the whole conduct of the emperour's miniſters with regard to France. As ſoon as they ſaw the life of the king and queen of France no longer as Emperour's conduct with regard to France.

they thought in danger, they entirely changed their plan with regard to the French nation. I believe that the chiefs of the revolution (thoſe who led the conſtituting aſſembly) have contrived as far as they can do it, to give the emperour ſatisfaction on this head. He keeps a continual tone and poſture of menace to ſecure this his only point. But it muſt be obſerved, that he all along grounds his departure from the engagement at Pilnitz to the princes, on the will and actions of *the king* and the majority of the people, without any regard to the natural and conſtitutional orders of the ſtate, or to the opinions of the whole houſe of Bourbon. Though it is manifeſtly under the conſtraint of impriſonment and the fear of death, that this unhappy man has been guilty of all thoſe humilities which have aſtoniſhed mankind, the adviſers of the emperour will conſider nothing but the *phyſical* perſon of Louis, which, even in his preſent degraded and infamous ſtate, they regard as of ſufficient authority to give a compleat ſanction to the perſecution and utter ruin of all his family, and of every perſon who has ſhewn any degree of attachment or fidelity to him, or to his cauſe; as well as competent to deſtroy the whole ancient conſtitution and frame of the French monarchy.

The preſent policy therefore of the Auſtrian politicians, is to recover deſpotiſm through democracy; or at leaſt, at any expence, every where to ruin

ruin the deſcription of men who are every where the objects of their ſettled and ſyſtematick averſion, but more eſpecially in the Netherlands. Compare this with the emperour's refuſing at firſt all intercourſe with the preſent powers in France, with his endeavouring to excite all Europe againſt them, and then his not only withdrawing all aſſiſtance and all countenance from the fugitives who had been drawn by his declarations from their houſes, ſituations, and military commiſſions, many even from the means of their very exiſtence, but treating them with every ſpecies of inſult and outrage.

Combining this unexampled conduct in the emperour's adviſers, with the timidity (operating as perfidy) of the king of France, a fatal example is held out to all ſubjects, tending to ſhew what little ſupport, or even countenance they are to expect from thoſe for whom their principle of fidelity may induce them to riſk life and fortune. The emperour's adviſers would not for the world reſcind one of the acts of this or of the late French aſſembly; nor do they wiſh any thing better at preſent for their maſter's brother of France, than that he ſhould really be, as he is nominally, at the head of the ſyſtem of perſecution of religion and good order, and of all deſcriptions of dignity, natural and inſtituted; they only wiſh all this done with a little more reſpect to the king's perſon, and

with more appearance of conſideration for his new ſubordinate office; in hopes that yielding himſelf for the preſent, to the perſons who have effected theſe changes, he may be able to game for the reſt hereafter. On no other principles than theſe, can the conduct of the court of Vienna be accounted for. The ſubordinate court of Bruſſels talks the language of a club of Feuillans and Jacobins.

Moderate party.

In this ſtate of general rottenneſs among ſubjects, and of deluſion and falſe politicks in princes, comes a new experiment. The king of France is in the hands of the chiefs of the regicide faction, the Barnaves, Lameths, Fayettes, Perigords, Duports, Robeſpierres, Camus's, &c. &c. &c. They who had impriſoned, ſuſpended, and conditionally depoſed him, are his confidential counſellors. The next deſperate of the deſperate rebels, call themſelves the *moderate* party. They are the chiefs of the firſt aſſembly, who are confederated to ſupport their power during their ſuſpenſion from the preſent, and to govern the exiſtent body with as ſovereign a ſway as they had done the laſt. They have, for the greater part, ſucceeded; and they have many advantages towards procuring their ſucceſs in future. Juſt before the cloſe of their regular power, they beſtowed ſome appearance of prerogatives on the king, which in their firſt plans they had refuſed to him; particularly the miſchievous, and in his ſituation, dreadful prerogative of

a *Veto*. This prerogative (which they hold as their bit in the mouth of the national aſſembly for the time being) without the direct aſſiſtance of their club, it was impoſſible for the king to ſhew even the deſire of exerting with the ſmalleſt effect, or even with ſafety to his perſon. However, by playing through this *Veto*, the aſſembly againſt the king, and the king againſt the aſſembly, they have made themſelves maſters of both. In this ſituation, having deſtroyed the old government by their ſedition, they would preſerve as much of order as is neceſſary for the ſupport of their own uſurpation.

French ambaſſador.

It is believed that this, by far the worſt party of the miſcreants of France, has received direct encouragement from the counſellors who betray the emperour. Thus ſtrengthened by the poſſeſſion of the captive king (now captive in his mind as well as in body) and by a good hope of the emperour, they intend to ſend their miniſters to every court in Europe; having ſent before them ſuch a denunciation of terrour and ſuperiority to every nation without exception, as has no example in the diplomatick world. Hitherto the miniſters to foreign courts had been of the appointment of the ſovereign of France *previous to the revolution;* and either from inclination, duty or decorum, moſt of them were contented with a merely paſſive obedience to the new power. At preſent the king being entirely

entirely in the hands of his jailors, and his mind broken to his ſituation, can ſend none but the enthuſiaſts of the ſyſtem—men framed by the ſecret committee of the Feuillans, who meet in the houſe of Madame de Stahl, M. Necker's daughter. Such is every man whom they have talked of ſending hither. Theſe miniſters will be ſo many ſpies and incendiaries; ſo many active emiſſaries of democracy. Their houſes will become places of rendezvous here, as every where elſe, and centers of cabal for whatever is miſchievous and malignant in this country, particularly among thoſe of rank and faſhion. As the miniſter of the national aſſembly will be admitted at this court, at leaſt with his uſual rank, and as entertainments will be naturally given and received by the king's own miniſters, any attempt to diſcountenance the reſort of other people to that miniſter would be ineffectual, and indeed abſurd, and full of contradiction. The women who come with theſe ambaſſadors will aſſiſt in fomenting factions amongſt ours, which cannot fail of extending the evil. Some of them I hear are already arrived. There is no doubt they will do as much miſchief as they can.

Connexion of clubs.

Whilſt the publick miniſters are received under the general law of the communication between nations, the correſpondences between the factious clubs in France and ours, will be, as they now are, kept up: but this pretended embaſſy will be a cloſer,

cloſer, more ſteady and more effectual link between the partiſans of the new ſyſtem on both ſides of the water. I do not mean that theſe Anglo-Gallick clubs in London, Mancheſter, &c. are not dangerous in a high degree. The appointment of feſtive anniverſaries has ever in the ſenſe of mankind been held the beſt method of keeping alive the ſpirit of any inſtitution. We have one ſettled in London; and at the laſt of them, that of the 14th of July, the ſtrong diſcountenance of government, the unfavourable time of the year, and the then uncertainty of the diſpoſition of foreign powers, did not hinder the meeting of at leaſt nine hundred people, with good coats on their backs, who could afford to pay half a guinea a head to ſhew their zeal for the new principles. They were with great difficulty, and all poſſible addreſs, hindered from inviting the French ambaſſador. His real indiſpoſition, beſides the fear of offending any party, ſent him out of town. But when our court ſhall have recogniſed a government in France, founded on the principles announced in Montmorin's letter, how can the French ambaſſador be frowned upon for an attendance on thoſe meetings wherein the eſtabliſhment of the government he repreſents is celebrated? An event happened a few days ago, which in many particulars was very ridiculous; yet even from the ridicule and abſurdity of the proceedings,

ings, it marks the more ſtrongly the ſpirit of the French aſſembly. I mean the reception they have given to the Frith-Street alliance. This, though the delirium of a low, drunken alehouſe club, they have publickly announced as a formal alliance with the people of England, as ſuch ordered it to be preſented to their king, and to be publiſhed in every province in France. This leads more directly and with much greater force than any proceeding with a regular and rational appearance, to two very material conſiderations. Firſt, it ſhews that they are of opinion that the current opinions of the Engliſh have the greateſt influence on the minds of the people in France, and indeed of all the people in Europe, ſince they catch with ſuch aſtoniſhing eagerneſs at every the moſt trifling ſhew of ſuch opinions in their favour. Next, and what appears to me to be full as important, it ſhews that they are willing publickly to countenance and even to adopt every factious conſpiracy that can be formed in this nation, however low and baſe in itſelf, in order to excite in the moſt miſerable wretches here, an idea of their own ſovereign importance, and to encourage them to look up to France, whenever they may be matured into ſomething of more force, for aſſiſtance in the ſubverſion of their domeſtick government. This addreſs of the alehouſe club was actually propoſed and accepted by the aſſembly as an *alliance*. The procedure

dure was in my opinion a high miſdemeanor in thoſe who acted thus in England, if they were not ſo very low and ſo very baſe, that no acts of theirs can be called high, even as a deſcription of criminality; and the aſſembly in accepting, proclaiming, and publiſhing this forged alliance, has been guilty of a plain aggreſſion, which would juſtify our court in demanding a direct diſavowal, if our policy ſhould not lead us to wink at it.

Whilſt I look over this paper to have it copied, I ſee a manifeſto of the aſſembly, as a preliminary to a declaration of war againſt the German princes on the Rhine. This manifeſto contains the whole ſubſtance of the French politicks with regard to foreign ſtates. They have ordered it to be circulated amongſt the people in every country of Europe—even previouſly to its acceptance by the king and his new privy council, the club of the Feuillans. Therefore, as a ſummary of their policy avowed by themſelves, let us conſider ſome of the circumſtances attending that piece, as well as the ſpirit and temper of the piece itſelf.

Declaration againſt the Emperour.

It was preceded by a ſpeech from Briſſot, full of unexampled inſolence towards all the ſovereign ſtates of Germany, if not of Europe. The aſſembly, to expreſs their ſatisfaction in the ſentiments which it contained, ordered it to be printed. This Briſſot had been in the loweſt and baſeſt employ under the depoſed monarchy: a ſort of thief-taker,

taker, or ſpy of police, in which character he acted after the manner of perſons in that deſcription. He had been employed by his maſter, the lieutenant de police, for a conſiderable time in London, in the ſame or ſome ſuch honourable occupation. The revolution which has brought forward all merit of that kind, raiſed him, with others of a ſimilar claſs and diſpoſition, to fame and eminence. On the revolution he became a publiſher of an infamous newſpaper, which he ſtill continues. He is charged, and I believe juſtly, as the firſt mover of the troubles in Hiſpaniola. There is no wickedneſs, if I am rightly informed, in which he is not verſed, and of which he is not perfectly capable. His quality of news writer, now an employment of the firſt dignity in France, and his practices and principles, procured his election into the aſſembly, where he is one of the leading members. M. Condorcet produced on the ſame day a draft of a declaration to the king, which the aſſembly publiſhed before it was preſented.

Condorcet (though no marquis, as he ſtyled himſelf before the revolution) is a man of another ſort of birth, faſhion, and occupation from Briſſot; but in every principle, and every diſpoſition to the loweſt as well as the higheſt and moſt determined villanies, fully his equal. He ſeconds Briſſot in the aſſembly, and is at once his coadjutor and his rival in a newſpaper, which in his

own

own name and as ſucceſſor to M. Garat, a member alſo of the aſſembly, he has juſt ſet up in that empire of Gazettes. Condorcet was choſen to draw the firſt declaration preſented by the aſſembly to the king, as a threat to the elector of Treves, and the other princes on the Rhine. In that piece, in which both Feuillans and Jacobins concurred, they declared publickly, and moſt proudly and inſolently, the principle on which they mean to proceed in their future diſputes with any of the ſovereigns of Europe; for they ſay, "that it is not with fire and ſword they mean "to attack their territories, but by what will be "*more dreadful* to them, the introduction of "liberty."—I have not the paper by me to give the exact words—but I believe they are nearly as I ſtate them. *Dreadful* indeed will be their hoſtility, if they ſhould be able to carry it on according to the example of *their* modes of introducing liberty. They have ſhewn a perfect model of their whole deſign, very complete, though in little. This gang of murderers and ſavages have wholly laid waſte and utterly ruined the beautiful and happy country of the Comtat Venaiſſin and the city of Avignon. This cruel and treacherous outrage the ſovereigns of Europe, in my opinion, with a great miſtake of their honour and intereſt, have permitted even without a remonſtrance to be carried to the deſired point, on the principles on which they are now themſelves threatened in

their

their own ſtates; and this, becauſe, according to the poor and narrow ſpirit now in faſhion, their brother ſovereign, whoſe ſubjects have been thus traiterouſly and inhumanly treated in violation of the law of nature and of nations, has a name ſomewhat different from theirs, and inſtead of being ſtyled king, or duke, or landgrave, is uſually called pope.

State of the Empire.

The electors of Treves and Mentz were frightened with the menace of a ſimilar mode of war. The aſſembly, however, not thinking that the electors of Treves and Mentz had done enough under their firſt terrour, have again brought forward Condorcet, preceded by Briſſot, as I have juſt ſtated. The declaration which they have ordered now to be circulated in all countries, is in ſubſtance the ſame as the firſt, but ſtill more inſolent, becauſe more full of detail. There they have the impudence to ſtate that they aim at no conqueſt; inſinuating that all the old lawful powers of the world had each made a conſtant open profeſſion of a deſign of ſubduing his neighbours. They add, that if they are provoked, their war will be directed only againſt thoſe who aſſume to be *maſters*. But to the *people* they will bring peace, law, liberty, &c. &c. There is not the leaſt hint that they conſider thoſe whom they call perſons "*aſſuming to be maſters*," to be the lawful government of their country, or perſons to be treated with

with the leaſt management or reſpect. They regard them as uſurpers and enſlavers of the people. If I do not miſtake they are deſcribed by the name of tyrants in Condorcet's firſt draft. I am ſure they are ſo in Briſſot's ſpeech, ordered by the aſſembly to be printed at the ſame time and for the ſame purpoſes. The whole is in the ſame ſtrain, full of falſe philoſophy and falſe rhetorick, both however calculated to captivate and influence the vulgar mind, and to excite ſedition in the countries in which it is ordered to be circulated. Indeed it is ſuch, that if any of the lawful acknowledged ſovereigns of Europe had publickly ordered ſuch a manifeſto to be circulated in the dominions of another, the ambaſſador of that power would inſtantly be ordered to quit every court without an audience.

Effect of fear on the Sovereign Powers.

The powers of Europe have a pretext for concealing their fears, by ſaying that this language is not uſed by the king; though they well know that there is in effect no ſuch perſon, that the aſſembly is in reality, and by that king is acknowledge to be *the maſter*, that what he does is but matter of formality, and that he can neither cauſe nor hinder, accelerate nor retard any meaſure whatſoever, nor add to nor ſoften the manifeſto which the aſſembly has directed to be publiſhed with the declared purpoſe of exciting mutiny and rebellion in the ſeveral countries governed by theſe powers.

By the generality alſo of the menaces contained in this paper (though infinitely aggravating the outrage) they hope to remove from each power ſeparately the idea of a diſtinct affront. The perſons firſt pointed at by the menace are certainly the princes of Germany, who harbour the perſecuted houſe of Bourbon and the nobility of France; the declaration, however, is general, and goes to every ſtate with which they may have a cauſe of quarrel. But the terrour of France has fallen upon all nations. A few months ſince all ſovereigns ſeemed diſpoſed to unite againſt her, at preſent they all ſeem to combine in her favour. At no period has the power of France ever appeared with ſo formidable an aſpect. In particular the liberties of the empire can have nothing more than an exiſtence the moſt tottering and precarious, whilſt France exiſts with a great power of fomenting rebellion, and the greateſt in the weakeſt; but with neither power nor diſpoſition to ſupport the ſmaller ſtates in their independence againſt the attempts of the more powerful.

I wind up all in a full conviction within my own breaſt, and the ſubſtance of which I muſt repeat over and over again, that the ſtate of France is the firſt conſideration in the politicks of Europe, and of each ſtate, externally as well as internally conſidered.

Moſt of the topicks I have uſed are drawn from fear

fear and apprehenſion. Topicks derived from fear or addreſſed to it, are, I well know, of doubtful appearance. To be ſure, hope is in general the incitement to action. Alarm ſome men—you do not drive them to provide for their ſecurity; you put them to a ſtand; you induce them not to take meaſures to prevent the approach of danger, but to remove ſo unpleaſant an idea from their minds; you perſuade them to remain as they are, from a new fear that their activity may bring on the apprehended miſchief before its time. I confeſs freely that this evil ſometimes happens from an overdone precaution; but it is when the meaſures are raſh, ill choſen, or ill combined, and the effects rather of blind terrour than of enlightened foreſight. But the few to whom I wiſh to ſubmit my thoughts, are of a character which will enable them to ſee danger without aſtoniſhment, and to provide againſt it without perplexity.

To what lengths this method of circulating mutinous manifeſtos, and of keeping emiſſaries of ſedition in every court under the name of ambaſſadors, to propagate the ſame principles and to follow the practices, will go, and how ſoon they will operate, it is hard to ſay—but go on it will —more or leſs rapidly, according to events, and to the humour of the time. The princes menaced

with the revolt of their ſubjects, at the ſame time they have obſequiouſly obeyed the ſovereign mandate of the new Roman ſenate, have received with diſtinction, in a public character, ambaſſadors from thoſe who in the ſame act had circulated the manifeſto of ſedition in their dominions. This was the only thing wanting to the degradation and diſgrace of the Germanick body.

The ambaſſadors from the rights of man, and their admiſſion into the diplomatick ſyſtem, I hold to be a new æra in this buſineſs. It will be the moſt important ſtep yet taken to affect the exiſtence of ſovereigns, and the higher claſſes of life—I do not mean to exclude its effects upon all claſſes—but the firſt blow is aimed at the more prominent parts in the ancient order of things.

What is to be done?

It would be preſumption in me to do more than to make a caſe. Many things occur. But as they, like all political meaſures, depend on diſpoſitions, tempers, means, and external circumſtances, for all their effect, not being well aſſured of theſe, I do not know how to let looſe any ſpeculations of mine on the ſubject. The evil is ſtated in my opinion as it exiſts. The remedy muſt be where power, wiſdom, and information, I hope are more united with good intentions than they can be with me. I have done with this ſubject.

ject, I believe for ever. It has given me many anxious moments for the two laſt years. If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it; the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it; and then they who perſiſt in oppoſing this mighty current in human affairs, will appear rather to reſiſt the decrees of Providence itſelf, than the mere deſigns of men. They will not be reſolute and firm, but perverſe and obſtinate.

HEADS

FOR

CONSIDERATION

ON THE

PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.

WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER,

1792.

HEADS

FOR

CONSIDERATION,

&c. &c.

THAT France, by its mere geographical poſition, independently of every other circumſtance, muſt affect every ſtate of Europe; ſome of them immediately, all of them through mediums not very remote.

That the ſtanding policy of this kingdom ever has been to watch over the *external* proceedings of France, (whatever form the *interiour* government of that kingdom might take) and to prevent the extenſion of its dominion or its ruling influence, over other ſtates.

That, there is nothing in the preſent *internal* ſtate of things in France, which alters the national policy with regard to the exteriour relations of that country.

That there are, on the contrary, many things in the internal circumſtances of France (and perhaps of this country too) which tend to fortify the principles

principles of that fundamental policy; and which render the active aſſertion of thoſe principles more preſſing at this, than at any former time.

That, by a change effected in about three weeks, France has been able to penetrate into the heart of Germany; to make an abſolute conqueſt of Savoy; to menace an immediate invaſion of the Netherlands; and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetick body, which is in a moſt perilous ſituation. The great ariſtocratick cantons having, perhaps, as much or more to dread from their own people whom they arm, but do not chooſe or dare to employ, as from the foreign enemy, which againſt all publick faith has butchered their troops, ſerving by treaty in France. To this picture, it is hardly neceſſary to add, the means by which France has been enabled to effect all this, namely, the apparently entire deſtruction of one of the largeſt, and certainly the higheſt diſciplined, and beſt appointed army ever ſeen, headed by the firſt military ſovereign in Europe, with a captain under him of the greateſt renown; and that without a blow given or received on any ſide. This ſtate of things ſeems to me, even if it went no further, truly ſerious.

Circumſtances have enabled France to do all this by *land*. On the other element ſhe has begun to exert herſelf; and ſhe muſt ſucceed in her deſigns, if enemies very different from thoſe ſhe has hitherto had to encounter, do not reſiſt her.

She

She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at ſea, by which ſhe is enabled to give law to the whole Mediterranean. It is known as a fact (and if not ſo known, it is in the nature of things highly probable) that ſhe propoſes the ravage of the Eccleſiaſtical ſtate, and the pillage of Rome, as her firſt object; that next ſhe means to bombard Naples; to awe, to humble and thus to command all Italy—to force it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence—to compel the Italian princes and republicks to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an open intercourſe, and the ſure concomitant, of that intercourſe, the *affiliated ſocieties*, in a manner ſimilar to thoſe ſhe has eſtabliſhed at Avignon, the Comtat, Chamberry, London, Manchester, &c. &c. which are ſo many colonies planted in all theſe countries, for extending the influence, and ſecuring the dominion of the French republick.

That there never has been hitherto a period in which this kingdom would have ſuffered a French fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to force ITALY to ſubmit to ſuch terms as France would think fit to impoſe—to ſay nothing of what has been done upon land in ſupport of the ſame ſyſtem. The great object for which we preſerved Minorca, whilſt we could keep it, and for which we ſtill retain Gibraltar, both at a great expence, was, and is, to prevent the predominance of France over the Mediterranean.

Thus

Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of that armament upon the Italian ſtates. The probable effect which that armament, and the other armaments preparing at Toulon, and other ports, may have upon SPAIN, on the ſide of the Mediterranean, is worthy of the ſerious attention of the Britiſh councils.

That it is moſt probable, we may ſay, in a manner certain, that if there ſhould be a rupture between France and Spain, France will not confine her offenſive piratical operations againſt Spain, to her efforts in the Mediterranean; on which ſide, however, ſhe may grievouſly affect Spain, eſpecially if ſhe excites Morocco and Algiers, which undoubtedly ſhe will, to fall upon that power.

That ſhe will fit out armaments upon the ocean, by which the flota itſelf may be intercepted, and thus the treaſures of all Europe, as well as the largeſt and ſureſt reſources of the Spaniſh monarchy, may be conveyed into France, and become powerful inſtruments for the annoyance of all her neighbours.

That ſhe makes no ſecret of her deſigns.

That, if the inward and outward bound flota ſhould eſcape, ſtill France has more and better means of diſſevering many of the provinces in the Weſt and Eaſt Indies, from the ſtate of Spain, than Holland had when ſhe ſucceeded in the ſame attempt. The French marine reſembles not a little

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the old armaments of the Flibuſtiers, which about a century back, in conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought ſuch calamities upon the Spaniſh colonies. They differ only in this, that the preſent piratical force is, out of all meaſure and compariſon, greater; one hundred and fifty ſhips of the line, and frigates, being ready built, moſt of them in a manner new, and all applicable in different ways to that ſervice. Privateers and Mooriſh corſaires poſſeſs not the beſt ſeamanſhip, and very little diſcipline, and indeed can make no figure in regular ſervice, but in deſperate adventures, and animated with a luſt of plunder, they are truly formidable.

That the land forces of France are well adapted to concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions of this nature. In ſuch expeditions, enterprize ſupplies the want of diſcipline, and perhaps more than ſupplies it. Both for this, and for other ſervice, (however contemptible their military is in other reſpects) one arm is extremely good, the engineering and artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being compoſed for the greater part of thoſe who were not gentlemen, or gentlemen newly ſuch, few have abandoned the ſervice, and the men are veterans well enough diſciplined, and very expert. In this piratical way they muſt make war with good advantage. They muſt do ſo, even on the ſide of Flanders, either offenſively or defenſively. This ſhews the difference between

tween the policy of Louis the XIVth, who built a wall of braſs about his kingdom; and that of Joſeph the Second, who premeditatedly uncovered his whole frontier.

That Spain, from the actual and unexpected prevalence of French power, is in a moſt perilous ſituation; perfectly dependent on the mercy of that republick. If Auſtria is broken, or even humbled, ſhe will not dare to diſpute its mandates.

In the preſent ſtate of things, we have nothing at all to dread from the power of Spain by ſea, or by land, or from any rivalry in commerce.

That we have much to dread from the connexions into which Spain may be forced.

From the circumſtances of her territorial poſſeſſions, of her reſources, and the whole of her civil and political ſtate, we may be authorized ſafely, and with undoubted confidence to affirm, that

Spain is not a ſubſtantive power;

That ſhe muſt lean on France, or on England.

That it is as much for the intereſt of Great Britain to prevent the predominancy of a French intereſt in that kingdom, as if Spain were a province of the crown of Great Britain, or a ſtate actually dependent on it; full as much ſo as ever Portugal was reputed to be. This is a dependency of much greater value: and its deſtruction, or its being carried to any other dependency, of much more ſerious misfortune.

One of theſe two things muſt happen. Either Spain

Spain muſt ſubmit to circumſtances, and take ſuch conditions as France will impoſe; or ſhe muſt engage in hoſtilities along with the emperour, and the king of Sardinia.

If Spain ſhould be forced or awed into a treaty with the republick of France, ſhe muſt open her ports and her commerce, as well as the land communication for the French labourers, who were accuſtomed annually to gather in the harveſt in Spain. Indeed ſhe muſt grant a free communication for travellers and traders through her whole country. In that caſe it is not conjectural, it is certain, the clubs will give law in the provinces; Bourgoing, or ſome ſuch miſcreant, will give law at Madrid.

In this England may acquieſce if ſhe pleaſes; and France will conclude a triumphant peace with Spain under her abſolute dependence, with a broad highway into that, and into every ſtate of Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to divide with her the ſpoils of the new world, and to make a partition of the Spaniſh monarchy. Clearly it is better to do ſo, than to ſuffer France to poſſeſs theſe ſpoils, and that territory alone; which, without doubt, unreſiſted by us, ſhe is altogether as able, as ſhe is willing to do.

This plan is propoſed by the French, in the way in which they propoſe all their plans; and in the only way in which indeed they can propoſe them,

them, where there is no regular communication between his majeſty and their republick.

What they propoſe is *a plan.* It is *a plan* alſo to reſiſt their predatory project. To remain quiet, and to ſuffer them to make their own uſe of a naval power before our face, ſo as to awe and bully Spain into a ſubmiſſive peace, or to drive them into a ruinous war, without any meaſure on our part, I fear is no plan at all.

However, if the plan of co-operation which France deſires, and which her affiliated ſocieties here ardently wiſh and are conſtantly writing up, ſhould not be adopted, and the war between the Emperour and France ſhould continue, I think it not at all likely that Spain ſhould not be drawn into the quarrel. In that caſe, the neutrality of England will be a thing abſolutely impoſſible. The time only is the ſubject of deliberation.

Then the queſtion will be, whether we are to defer putting ourſelves into a poſture for the common defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or both, until Spain is actually attacked; that is, whether our court will take a decided part for Spain, whilſt Spain on her ſide, is yet in a condition to act with whatever degree of vigour ſhe may have; whilſt that vigour is yet unexhauſted; or whether we ſhall connect ourſelves with her broken fortunes; after ſhe ſhall have received material blows, and when we ſhall have the whole

ſlow length of that always unwieldy, and ill conſtructed, and then wounded and crippled body, to drag after us, rather than to aid us. Whilſt our diſpoſition is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herſelf in ſuch a ſtate of defence as will make her hoſtility formidable, or her neutrality reſpectable.

If the deciſion is ſuch as the ſolution of this queſtion, (I take it to be the true queſtion) conducts to—no time is to be loſt. But the meaſures, though prompt, ought not to be raſh and indigeſted. They ought to be well choſen, well combined, and well purſued. The ſyſtem muſt be general; but it muſt be executed, not ſucceſſively, or with interruption, but all together, *uno flatu*, in one melting, and one mould.

For this purpoſe, we muſt put Europe before us, which plainly is, juſt now, in all its parts, in a ſtate of diſmay, derangement and confuſion; and very poſſibly amongſt all its ſovereigns, full of ſecret heart burning, diſtruſt, and mutual accuſation. Perhaps it may labour under worſe evils. There is no vigour any where, except the diſtempered vigour and energy of France. That country has but too much life in it, when every thing around is ſo diſpoſed to tameneſs and languor. The very vices of the French ſyſtem at home tend to give force to foreign exertions. The generals *muſt* join the armies. They muſt lead them to

enterpriſe, or they are likely to periſh by their hands. Thus without law or government of her own, France gives law to all the governments in Europe.

This great maſs of political matter muſt have been always under the view of thinkers for the publick, whether they act in office or not. Amongſt events, even the late calamitous events were in the book of contingency. Of courſe, they muſt have been in deſign, at leaſt, provided for. A plan which takes in as many as poſſible of the ſtates concerned, will rather tend to facilitate and ſimplify a rational ſcheme for preſerving Spain, (if that were our ſole, as I think it ought to be our principal object) than to delay and perplex it.

If we ſhould think that a provident policy (perhaps now more than provident, urgent and neceſſary) ſhould lead us to act, we cannot take meaſures as if nothing had been done. We muſt ſee the faults, if any, which have conducted to the preſent misfortunes; not for the ſake of criticiſm, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming perſons and counſels which have not been ſucceſsful; but in order, if we can, to adminiſter ſome remedy to theſe diſaſters, by the adoption of plans, more bottomed in principle, and built on with more diſcretion. Miſtakes may be leſſons.

There ſeem indeed to have been ſeveral miſtakes

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in the political principles on which the war was entered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was conducted; ſome of them very fundamental, and not only viſibly, but I may ſay, palpably erroneous; and I think him to have leſs than the diſcernment of a very ordinary ſtateſman, who could not foreſee from the very beginning, unpleaſant conſequences from thoſe plans, though not the unparalleled diſgraces and diſaſters which really did attend them: for they were, both principles and meaſures, wholly new and out of the common courſe, without any thing apparently very grand in the conception, to juſtify this total departure from all rule.

For, in the firſt place, the united ſovereigns very much injured their cauſe by admitting, that they had nothing to do with the interiour arrangements of France; in contradiction to the whole tenour of the publick law of Europe, and to the correſpondent practice of all its ſtates, from the time we have any hiſtory of them. In this particular, the two German courts ſeem to have as little conſulted the publiciſts of Germany, as their own true intereſts, and thoſe of all the ſovereigns of Germany and Europe. This admiſſion of a falſe principle in the law of nations brought them into an apparent contradiction, when they inſiſted on the re-eſtabliſhment of the royal authority in France. But this confuſed and contradictory proceeding gave riſe to a practical

errour of worſe conſequence. It was derived from one and the ſame root; namely, that the perſon of the monarch of France was every thing; and the monarchy, and the intermediate orders of the ſtate, by which the monarchy was upheld, were nothing. So that if the united potentates had ſucceeded ſo far, as to re-eſtabliſh the authority of that king, and that he ſhould be ſo ill-adviſed as to confirm all the confiſcations, and to recognize as a lawful body, and to claſs himſelf with, that rabble of murderers (and there wanted not perſons who would ſo have adviſed him) there was nothing in the principle, or in the proceeding of the united powers, to prevent ſuch an arrangement.

An expedition to free a brother ſovereign from priſon, was undoubtedly a generous and chivalrous undertaking. But the ſpirit and generoſity would not have been leſs, if the policy had been more profound, and more comprehenſive; that is, if it had taken in thoſe conſiderations, and thoſe perſons, by whom, and, in ſome meaſure, for whom, monarchy exiſts. This would become a bottom for a ſyſtem of ſolid and permanent policy, and of operations conformable to that ſyſtem.

The ſame fruitful errour was the cauſe why nothing was done to impreſs the people of France (ſo far as we can at all conſider the inhabitants of France as a people) with an idea that the government was ever to be really French, or indeed

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any thing elſe than the nominal government of a monarch, a monarch abſolute as over them, but whoſe ſole ſupport was to ariſe from foreign potentates, and who was to be kept on his throne by German forces; in ſhort, that the king of France was to be a viceroy to the emperour and the king of Pruſſia.

It was the firſt time that foreign powers, interfering in the concerns of a nation divided into parties, have thought proper to thruſt wholly out of their councils, to poſtpone, to diſcountenance, to reject, and in a manner to diſgrace the party whom thoſe powers came to ſupport. The ſingle perſon of a king cannot be a party. Woe to the king who is himſelf his party! The royal party with the king or his repreſentatives at its head, is the *royal cauſe*. Foreign powers have hitherto choſen to give to ſuch wars as this, the appearance of a civil conteſt, and not that of an hoſtile invaſion. When the Spaniards, in the ſixteenth century, ſent aids to the chiefs of the league, they appeared as allies to that league, and to the impriſoned king (the cardinal de Bourbon) which that league had ſet up. When the Germans came to the aid of the Proteſtant princes, in the ſame ſeries of civil wars, they came as allies. When the Engliſh came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appeared as allies to that prince. So did the French always when they intermeddled in the

affairs of Germany. They came to aid a party there. When the Engliſh and Dutch intermeddled in the ſucceſſion of Spain, they appeared as allies to the emperour Charles the Sixth. In ſhort, the policy has been as uniform as its principles were obvious to an ordinary eye.

According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by the French princes of the blood, nobles, and parliaments, and then recognized by the combined powers. Fundamental law and antient uſage, as well as the clear reaſon of the thing, have always ordained it during an impriſonment of the king of France; as in the caſe of John, and of Francis the Firſt. A monarchy ought not to be left a moment without a repreſentative, having an intereſt in the ſucceſſion. The orders of the ſtate ought alſo to have been recognized in thoſe amongſt whom alone they exiſted in freedom, that is, in the emigrants.

Thus, laying down a firm foundation on the recognition of the authorities of the kingdom of France, according to nature and to its fundamental laws, and not according to the novel and inconſiderate principles of the uſurpation which the united powers were come to extirpate, the king of Pruſſia and the emperour, as allies of the antient kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, firſt, to free the monarch, if poſſible;

poſſible; if not, to ſecure the monarchy as principal in the deſign; and in order to avoid all riſks to that great object (the object of other ages than the preſent, and of other countries than that of France) they would of courſe avoid proceeding with more haſte, or in a different manner than what the nature of ſuch an object required.

Adopting this, the only rational ſyſtem, the rational mode of proceeding upon it, was to commence with an effective ſiege of Liſle, which the French generals muſt have ſeen taken before their faces, or be forced to fight. A plentiful country of friends, from whence to draw ſupplies, would have been behind them; a plentiful country of enemies, from whence to force ſupplies, would have been before them. Good towns were always within reach to depoſit their hoſpitals and magazines. The march from Liſle to Paris, is through a leſs defenſible country, and the diſtance is hardly ſo great as from Longwy to Paris.

If the old politick and military ideas had governed, the advanced guard would have been formed of thoſe who beſt knew the country, and had ſome intereſt in it, ſupported by ſome of the beſt light troops and light artillery, whilſt the grand ſolid body of an army diſciplined to perfection, proceeded leiſurely, and in cloſe connexion with all its ſtores, proviſions, and heavy cannon, to ſupport the expedite body in caſe of miſadventure, or to improve and complete its ſucceſs.

The direct contrary of all this was put in practice. In conſequence of the original ſin of this project, the army of the French princes was every where thrown into the rear, and no part of it brought forward to the laſt moment, the time of the commencement of the ſecret negotiation. This naturally made an ill impreſſion on the people, and furniſhed an occaſion for the rebels at Paris to give out that the faithful ſubjects of the king were diſtruſted, deſpiſed, and abhorred by his allies. The march was directed through a ſkirt of Lorraine, and thence into a part of Champagne, the Duke of Brunſwick leaving all the ſtrongeſt places behind him; leaving alſo behind him, the ſtrength of his artillery; and by this means giving a ſuperiority to the French, in the only way in which the preſent France is able to oppoſe a German force.

In conſequence of the adoption of thoſe falſe politicks, which turned every thing on the king's ſole and ſingle perſon, the whole plan of the war was reduced to nothing but a *coup de main*, in order to ſet that prince at liberty. If that failed every thing was to be given up.

The ſcheme of a *coup de main*, might, (under favourable circumſtances) be very fit for a partiſan at the head of a light corps, by whoſe failure nothing material would be deranged. But for a royal army of eighty thouſand men, headed by a king in perſon, who was to march an hundred

and fifty miles through an enemy's country—ſurely this was a plan unheard of.

Although this plan was not well choſen, and proceeded upon principles altogether ill judged and impolitick, the ſuperiority of the military force might in a great degree have ſupplied the defects, and furniſhed a corrective to the miſtakes. The greater probability was that the Duke of Brunſwick would make his way to Paris, over the bellies of the rabble of drunkards, robbers, aſſaſſins, rioters, mutineers, and half-grown boys, under the ill-obeyed command of a theatrical, vapouring, reduced captain of cavalry, who oppoſed that great commander and great army. But—*Diis aliter viſum*—He began to treat, the winds blew, and the rains beat, the houſe fell—becauſe it was built upon ſand—and great was the fall thereof. This march was not an exact copy of either of the two marches made by the Duke of Parma into France.

There is ſome ſecret. Sickneſs and weather may defeat an army purſuing a wrong plan; not that I believe the ſickneſs to have been ſo great as it has been reported; but there is a great deal of ſuperfluous humiliation in this buſineſs, a perfect prodigality of diſgrace. Some advantage, real or imaginary, muſt compenſate to a great ſovereign, and to a great general, for ſo immenſe a loſs of reputation. Longwy, ſituated as it is, might (one

ſhould

ſhould think) be evacuted without a capitulation with a republick juſt proclaimed by the king of Pruſſia as an uſurping and rebellious body. He was not far from Luxembourg. He might have taken away the obnoxious French in his flight. It does not appear to have been neceſſary that thoſe magiſtrates who declared for their own king, on the faith, and under the immediate protection of the king of Pruſſia, ſhould be delivered over to the gallows. It was not neceſſary that the emigrant nobility and gentry who ſerved with the king of Pruſſia's army, under his immediate command, ſhould be excluded from the cartel, and given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was ſo groſs, and ſo cruel a breach of the publick faith, not with an enemy, but with a friend. Dumourier has dropped very ſingular hints. Cuſtine has ſpoken out more broadly. Theſe accounts have never been contradicted. They tend to make an eternal rupture between the powers. The French have given out, that the Duke of Brunſwick endeavoured to negotiate ſome name and place for the captive king, amongſt the murderers and proſcribers of thoſe who have loſt their all for his cauſe. Even this has not been denied.

It is ſingular, and indeed, a thing, under all its circumſtances, inconceivable, that every thing ſhould by the emperour be abandoned to the king of Pruſſia. That monarch was conſidered as

principal.

principal. In the nature of things, as well as in his poſition with regard to the war, he was only an ally; and a new ally, with croſſing intereſts in many particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain. At beſt, and ſuppoſing him to act with the greateſt fidelity, the emperour, and the empire, to him muſt be but ſecondary objects. Countries out of Germany, muſt affect him in a ſtill more remote manner. France, other than from the fear of its doctrinal principles, can to him be no object at all. Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swiſs, are left to their fate. The king of Pruſſia has no *direct* and immediate concern with France; *conſequentially*, to be ſure, a great deal; but the emperour touches France *directly* in many parts: he is a near neighbour to Sardinia, by his Milaneſe territories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, poſſeſſed by his uncle, is between Mentz, Treves, and the king of Pruſſia's territories on the Lower Rhine. The emperour is the natural guardian of Italy and Germany; the natural balance againſt the ambition of France, whether republican or monarchical. His miniſters and his generals, therefore, ought to have had their full ſhare in every material conſultation, which I ſuſpect they had not. If he has no miniſter capable of plans of policy, which comprehend the ſuperintendency of a war, or no general with the leaſt of a political head, things have been as they muſt be.

However,

However, in all the parts of this ſtrange proceeding, there muſt be a ſecret.

It is probably known to miniſters. I do not mean to penetrate into it. My ſpeculations on this head muſt be only conjectural. If the king of Pruſſia, under the pretext, or on the reality of ſome information relative to ill practice on the part of the court of Vienna, takes advantage of his being admitted into the heart of the emperour's dominions in the character of an ally, afterwards to join the common enemy, and to enable France to ſeize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble the empire, I cannot conceive, upon every principle, any thing more alarming for this country, ſeparately, and as a part of the general ſyſtem. After all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of politicks, for what is only the operation of temper and character upon accidental circumſtances—But I never knew accidents to decide the *whole* of any great buſineſs; and I never knew temper to act, but that ſome ſyſtem of politicks, agreeable to its peculiar ſpirit, was blended with it, ſtrengthened it, and got ſtrength from it. Therefore the politicks can hardly be put out of the queſtion.

Great miſtakes have been committed; at leaſt I hope ſo. If there have been none, the caſe in future is deſperate. I have endeavoured to point out ſome of thoſe which have occurred to me, and moſt of them very early.

Whatever

Whatever may be the cauſe of the preſent ſtate of things, on a full and mature view and compariſon of the hiſtorical matter, of the tranſactions that have paſſed before our eyes, and of the future proſpect, I think I am authorized to form an opinion without the leaſt heſitation.

That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, nor ever can be, the leaſt rational hope of making an impreſſion on France by any continental powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the ſoul, of the whole confederacy againſt it.

This, ſo far as it is an anticipation of future, is grounded on the whole tenour of former hiſtory —In ſpeculation it is to be accounted for on two plain principles.

Firſt, That Great Britain is likely to take a more fair and equal part in the alliance, than the other powers, as having leſs of croſſing intereſt, or perplexed diſcuſſion with any of them.

Secondly, Becauſe France cannot have to deal with any of theſe continental ſovereigns, without their feeling that nation, as a maritime power, greatly ſuperiour to them all put together; a force which is only to be kept in check by England.

England, except during the eccentrick aberration of Charles the Second, has always conſidered it as her duty and intereſt, to take her place in ſuch a confederacy. Her chief diſputes muſt ever

be

be with France, and if England ſhews herſelf indifferent and unconcerned when theſe powers are combined againſt the enterprizes of France, ſhe is to look with certainty for the ſame indifference on the part of theſe powers, when ſhe may be at war with that nation. This will tend totally to diſconnect this kingdom from the ſyſtem of Europe, in which, if ſhe ought not raſhly to meddle, ſhe ought never wholly to withdraw herſelf from it.

If then England is put in motion, whether by a conſideration of the general ſafety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the probable operations of this new ſyſtem on the Netherlands, it muſt embrace in its project the whole as much as poſſible, and the part it takes ought to be as much as poſſible a leading and preſiding part.

I therefore beg leave to ſuggeſt,

Firſt, That a miniſter ſhould forthwith be ſent to Spain, to encourage that court to perſevere in the meaſures they have adopted againſt France; to make a cloſe alliance and guarantee of poſſeſſions, as againſt France, with that power, and whilſt the formality of the treaty is pending, to aſſure them of our protection, poſtponing any leſſer diſputes to another occaſion.

Secondly, To aſſure the court of Vienna, of our deſire to enter into our antient connexions with her, and to ſupport her effectually in the war which France has declared againſt her.

5. Thirdly,

Thirdly, To animate the Swiſs, and the king of Sardinia, to take a part, as the latter once did on the principles of the grand alliance.

Fourthly, To put an end to our diſputes with Ruſſia, and mutually to forget the paſt. I believe if ſhe is ſatisfied of this oblivion, ſhe will return to her old ſentiments, with regard to this court, and will take a more forward part in this buſineſs than any other power.

Fifthly, If what has happened to the king of Pruſſia is only in conſequence of a ſort of panick or of levity, and an indiſpoſition to perſevere long in one deſign—the ſupport and concurrence of Ruſſia will tend to ſteady him, and to give him reſolution. If he be ill diſpoſed, with that power on his back, and without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will not be eaſily led to derange the plan.

Sixthly, To uſe the joint influence of our court, and of our then allied powers, with Holland, to arm as fully as ſhe can by ſea, and to make ſome addition by land.

Seventhly, To acknowledge the king of France's next brother (aſſiſted by ſuch a council and ſuch repreſentatives of the kingdom of France, as ſhall be thought proper) regent of France, and to ſend that prince a ſmall ſupply of money, arms, cloathing and artillery.

Eighthly, To give force to theſe negotiations, an inſtant

inſtant naval armament ought to be adopted; one ſquadron for the Mediterranean; another for the Channel. The ſeaſon is convenient, moſt of our trade being, as I take it, at home.

After ſpeaking of a plan formed upon the antient policy and practice of Great Britain, and of Europe; to which this is exactly conformable in every reſpect, with no deviation whatſoever, and which is, I conceive, much more ſtrongly called for by the preſent circumſtances than by any former, I muſt take notice of another which I fear, but cannot perſuade myſelf to believe, is in agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very ſame view of things which is here ſtated, namely, the danger to all ſovereigns, and old republicks, from the prevalence of French power and influence.

It is to form a congreſs of all the European powers, for the purpoſe of a general defenſive alliance, the objects of which ſhould be,

Firſt, The recognition of this new republick (which they well know is formed on the principles, and for the declared purpoſe of the deſtruction of all kings), and whenever the heads of this new republick ſhall conſent to releaſe the royal captives, to make peace with them.

Secondly, To defend themſelves with their joint forces againſt the open aggreſſions or the ſecret practices, intrigues and writings, which are uſed to propagate the French principles.

It

It is eaſy to diſcover from whoſe ſhop this commodity comes. It is ſo perfectly abſurd, that if that, or any thing like it, meets with a ſerious entertainment in any cabinet, I ſhould think it the effect of what is called a judicial blindneſs, the certain forerunner of the deſtruction of all crowns and kingdoms.

An *offenſive* alliance, in which union is preſerved, by common efforts in common dangers, againſt a common active enemy, may preſerve its conſiſtency, and may produce, for a given time, ſome conſiderable effect; though this is not eaſy, and for any very long period, can hardly be expected. But a *defenſive* alliance, formed of long diſcordant intereſts, with innumerable diſcuſſions exiſting, having no one pointed object to which it is directed, which is to be held together with an unremitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in war, is ſo evidently impoſſible, is ſuch a chimera, is ſo contrary to human nature, and the courſe of human affairs, that I am perſuaded no perſon in his ſenſes, except thoſe whoſe country, religion and ſovereign, are depoſited in the French funds, could dream of it. There is not the ſlighteſt petty boundary ſuit, no difference between a family arrangement, no ſort of miſunderſtanding, or croſs purpoſe between the pride and etiquette of courts, that would not entirely diſjoint this ſort of alliance, and render it as futile in its effects, as it is feeble

in its principle. But when we conſider that the main drift of that defenſive alliance muſt be to prevent the operation of intrigue, miſchievous doctrine and evil example, in the ſucceſs of unprovoked rebellion, regicide, and ſyſtematick aſſaſſination and maſſacre, the abſurdity of ſuch a ſcheme becomes quite lamentable. Open the communication with France, and the reſt follows of courſe.

How far the interiour circumſtances of this country ſupport what is ſaid with regard to its foreign politicks, muſt be left to better judgments. I am ſure the French faction here is infinitely ſtrengthened by the ſucceſs of the aſſaſſins on the other ſide of the water. This evil in the heart of Europe muſt be extirpated from that center, or no part of the circumference can be free from the miſchief which radiates from it, and which will ſpread circle beyond circle, in ſpite of all the little defenſive precautions which can be employed againſt it.

I do not put my name to theſe hints ſubmitted to the conſideration of reflecting men. It is of too little importance to ſuppoſe the name of the writer could add any weight to the ſtate of things contained in this paper. That ſtate of things preſſes irreſiſtibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain, with a heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think that what is done in France, is beneficial to the human race. If it were, the

Engliſh

Engliſh conſtitution ought no more to ſtand againſt it than the antient conſtitution of the kingdom in which the new ſyſtem prevails. I thought it the duty of a man, not unconcerned for the publick, and who is a faithful ſubject to the king, reſpectfully to ſubmit this ſtate of facts at this new ſtep in the progreſs of the French arms and politicks, to his Majeſty, to his confidential ſervants, and to thoſe perſons who, though not in office, by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character and their reputation for wiſdom, ſeem to me to have a large ſtake in the ſtability of the antient order of things.

Bath, November 5, 1792.

REMARKS

ON

THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES

WITH

RESPECT TO FRANCE.

BEGUN IN OCTOBER,

1793.

REMARKS

ON THE

POLICY OF THE ALLIES.

AS the propoſed manifeſto is, I underſtand, to promulgate to the world the general idea of a plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and through the regulation of that kingdom probably to decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a more ſerious deliberation with regard to the time of making it, the circumſtances of thoſe to whom it is addreſſed, and the matter it is to contain.

As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own opinion) I have ſome doubts whether it is not rather unfavourable to the iſſuing any manifeſto, with regard to the intended government of France: and for this reaſon, that it is, (upon the principal point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifeſtoes of this nature are commonly made when the army of ſome ſovereign enters into the enemy's country in great force, and under the impoſing authority of that force employs menaces towards thoſe whom he deſires to awe; and makes

promiſes to thoſe whom he wiſhes to engage in his favour.

As to a party, what has been done at Toulon leaves no doubt, that the party for which we declare muſt be that which ſubſtantially declares for royalty as the baſis of the government.

As to menaces—Nothing in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any ſovereign in the publick eſtimation, and to turn his defeats into diſgraces, than to threaten in a moment of impotence. The ſecond manifeſto of the duke of Brunſwick appeared therefore to the world to be extremely ill-timed. However, if his menaces in that manifeſto had been ſeaſonable, they were not without an object. Great crimes then apprehended, and great evils then impending, were to be prevented. At this time, every act, which early menaces might poſſibly have *prevented*, is done. Puniſhment and vengeance alone remain, and God forbid that they ſhould ever be forgotten. But the puniſhment of enormous offenders will not be the leſs ſevere, or the leſs exemplary when it is not threatened at a moment when we have it not in our power to execute our threats. On the other ſide, to paſs by proceedings of ſuch a nefarious nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on in France, without any ſignification of reſentment, would be in effect to ratify them; and thus to become acceſſaries after the fact, in all thoſe enormities which

it is impoſſible to repeat, or think of without horrour. An abſolute ſilence appears to me to be at this time the only ſafe courſe.

The ſecond uſual matter of manifeſtoes is compoſed of *promiſes* to thoſe who co-operate with our deſigns. Theſe promiſes depend in a great meaſure, if not wholly, on the apparent power of the perſon who makes them to fulfil his engagements. A time of diſaſter on the part of the promiſer, ſeems not to add much to the dignity of his perſon, or to the effect of his offers. One would hardly wiſh to ſeduce any unhappy perſons to give the laſt provocation to a mercileſs tyranny, without very effectual means of protecting them.

The time therefore ſeems (as I ſaid) not favourable to a general manifeſto, on account of the unpleaſant ſituation of our affairs. However, I write in a changing ſcene, when a meaſure very imprudent to-day, may be very proper to-morrow. Some great victory may alter the whole ſtate of the queſtion, ſo far as it regards our *power* of fulfilling any engagement we may think fit to make.

But there is another conſideration of far greater importance for all the purpoſes of this manifeſto. The publick, and the parties concerned, will look ſomewhat to the diſpoſition of the promiſer indicated by his conduct, as well as to his power of fulfilling his engagements.

Speaking of this nation as part of a general combination

combination of powers, are we quite ſure, tha others can believe us to be ſincere, or that we can be even fully aſſured of our own ſincerity in the protection of thoſe who ſhall riſk their lives for the reſtoration of monarchy in France, when the world ſees, that thoſe who are the natural, legal, conſtitutional repreſentatives of that monarchy, if it has any, have not had their names ſo much as mentioned in any one publick act; that in no way whatever are their perſons brought forward, that their rights have not been expreſsly or implicitly allowed, and that they have not been in the leaſt conſulted on the important intereſts they have at ſtake. On the contrary, they are kept in a ſtate of obſcurity and contempt, and in a degree of indigence at times bordering on beggary. They are, in fact, little leſs priſoners in the village of Hanau, than the royal captives who are locked up in the tower of the Temple. What is this, according to the common indications which guide the judgment of mankind, but, under the pretext of protecting the crown of France, in reality to uſurp it?

I am alſo very apprehenſive, that there are other circumſtances which muſt tend to weaken the force of our declarations. No partiality to the allied powers, can prevent great doubts on the fairneſs of our intentions as ſupporters of the crown of France, or of the true principles of legitimate government in oppoſition to jacobiniſm, when it is viſible

viſible that the two leading orders of the ſtate of France, who are now the victims, and who muſt always be the true and ſole ſupports of monarchy in that country, are, at beſt, in ſome of their deſcriptions, conſidered only as objects of charity, and others are, when employed, employed only as mercenary ſoldiers; that they are thrown back out of all reputable ſervice, are in a manner diſowned, conſidered as nothing in their own cauſe, and never once conſulted in the concerns of their king, their country, their laws, their religion, and their property! We even affect to be aſhamed of them. In all our proceedings we carefully avoid the appearance of being of a party with them. In all our ideas of treaty we do not regard them as what they are, the two leading orders of the kingdom. If we do not conſider them in that light, we muſt recogniſe the ſavages by whom they have been ruined, and who have declared war upon Europe, whilſt they diſgrace and perſecute human nature, and openly defy the God that made them, as real proprietors of France.

I am much afraid, too, that we ſhall ſcarcely be believed fair ſupporters of lawful monarchy againſt jacobiniſm, ſo long as we continue to make and to obſerve cartels with the jacobins, and on fair terms exchange priſoners with them, whilſt the royaliſts, invited to our ſtandard, and employed under our publick faith, againſt the jacobins, if taken

taken by that ſavage faction, are given up to the executioner without the leaſt attempt whatſoever at repriſal. For this, we are to look at the king of Pruſſia's conduct, compared with his manifeſtoes about a twelvemonth ago. For this we are to look at the capitulations of Mentz and Valenciennes, made in the courſe of the preſent campaign. By theſe two capitulations, the Chriſtian royaliſts were excluded from any participation in the cauſe of the combined powers. They were conſidered as the outlaws of Europe. Two armies were in effect ſent againſt them. One of thoſe armies (that which ſurrendered Mentz) was very near overpowering the Chriſtians of Poitou, and the other (that which ſurrendered at Valenciennes) has actually cruſhed the people whom oppreſſion and deſpair had driven to reſiſtance at Lyons, has maſſacred ſeveral thouſands of them in cold blood, pillaged the whole ſubſtance of the place, and purſued their rage to the very houſes, condemning that noble city to deſolation, in the unheard-of manner we have ſeen it devoted.

It is then plain by a conduct which overturns a thouſand declarations, that we take the royaliſts of France only as an inſtrument of ſome convenience in a temporary hoſtility with the jacobins, but that we regard thoſe atheiſtick and murderous barbarians as the bonâ fide poſſeſſors of the ſoil of France. It appears at leaſt, that we conſider them as a fair

government

government *de facto*, if not *de jure;* a reſiſtance to which in favour of the king of France, by any man who happened to be born within that country, might equitably be conſidered, by other nations, as the crime of treaſon.

For my part, I would ſooner put my hand into the fire than ſign an invitation to oppreſſed men to fight under my ſtandard, and then on every ſiniſter event of war, cruelly give them up to be puniſhed as the baſeſt of traitors, as long as I had one of the common enemy in my hands to be put to death in order to ſecure thoſe under my protection, and to vindicate the common honour of ſovereigns. We hear nothing of this kind of ſecurity in favour of thoſe whom we invite to the ſupport of our cauſe. Without it, I am not a little apprehenſive that the proclamations of the combined powers might (contrary to their intention no doubt) be looked upon as frauds, and cruel traps laid for their lives.

So far as to the correſpondence between our declarations and our conduct: let the declaration be worded as it will, the conduct is the practical comment by which, and which alone it can be underſtood. This conduct acting on the declaration, leaves a monarchy without a monarch; and without any repreſentative or truſtee for the monarch, and the monarchy. It ſuppoſes a kingdom without ſtates and orders; a territory without proprietors; and faithful ſubjects, who are to be left to the fate of rebels and traitors.

The

The affair of the eſtabliſhment of a government is a very difficult undertaking for foreign powers to act in as *principals*; though as *auxiliaries and mediators*, it has been not at all unuſual, and may be a meaſure full of policy and humanity, and true dignity.

The firſt thing we ought to do, ſuppoſing us not giving the law as conquerors, but acting as friendly powers applied to for counſel and aſſiſtance in the ſettlement of a diſtracted country, is well to conſider the compoſition, nature, and temper of its objects, and particularly of thoſe who actually do, or who ought to exerciſe power in that ſtate. It is material to know who they are, and how conſtituted, whom we conſider *as the people of France?*

The next conſideration is, through whom our arrangements are to be made, and on what principles the government we propoſe is to be eſtabliſhed.

The firſt queſtion on the people is this, Whether we are to conſider the individuals *now actually in France, numerically taken and arranged into jacobin clubs*, as the body politick, conſtituting the nation of France? or, Whether we conſider the original individual proprietors of lands, expelled ſince the revolution, and the ſtates and the bodies politick, ſuch as the colleges of juſtice called parliaments, the corporations noble and not noble of bailliages, and towns, and cities, the biſhops and the clergy, as the true conſtituent parts of the

nation, and forming the legally organized parts of the people of France?

In this ſerious concern it is very neceſſary that we ſhould have the moſt diſtinct ideas annexed to the terms we employ; becauſe it is evident, that an abuſe of the term *people*, has been the original fundamental cauſe of thoſe evils, the cure of which, by war and policy, is the preſent object of all the ſtates of Europe.

If we conſider the acting power in France in any legal conſtruction of publick law, as the people, the queſtion is decided in favour of the republick one and indiviſible. But we have decided for monarchy. If ſo, we have a king and ſubjects; and that king and ſubjects have rights and privileges which ought to be ſupported at home; for I do not ſuppoſe that the government of that kingdom can, or ought to be regulated, by the arbitrary mandate of a foreign confederacy.

As to the faction exerciſing power, to ſuppoſe that monarchy can be ſupported by principled regicides, religion by profeſſed atheiſts, order by clubs of jacobins, property by committees of proſcription, and juriſprudence by revolutionary tribunals, is to be ſanguine in a degree of which I am incapable. On them I decide, for myſelf, that theſe perſons are not the legal corporation of France, and that it is not with them we can (if we would) ſettle the government of France.

Since,

Since, then, we have decided for monarchy in that kingdom, we ought alſo to ſettle who is to be the monarch, who is to be the guardian of a minor, and how the monarch and monarchy is to be modified and ſupported? If the monarch is to be elected, who the electors are to be: if hereditary, what order is eſtabliſhed correſponding with an hereditary monarchy, and fitted to maintain it? Who are to modify it in its exerciſe? Who are to reſtrain its powers where they ought to be limitted, to ſtrengthen them where they are to be ſupported, or to enlarge them, where the object, the time, and the circumſtances, may demand their extenſion? Theſe are things which, in the outline, ought to be made diſtinct and clear; for if they are not (eſpecially with regard to thoſe great points, who are the proprietors of the ſoil, and what is the corporation of the kingdom) there is nothing to hinder the complete eſtabliſhment of a jacobin republick, (ſuch as that formed in 1790 and 1791) under the name of a Democracie Royale. Jacobiniſm does not conſiſt in the having or not having, a certain pageant under the name of a king, but "in taking the people as "equal individuals, without any corporate name "or deſcription, without attention to property, "without diviſion of powers, and forming the "government of delegates from a number of men "ſo conſtituted; in deſtroying or confiſcating "property,

" property, and bribing the publick creditors, or " the poor, with the ſpoils, now of one part of " the community, now of another, without re- " gard to preſcription or poſſeſſion."

I hope no one can be ſo very blind as to imagine that monarchy can be acknowledged and ſupported in France upon any other baſis than that of its property, *corporate and individual*, or that it can enjoy a moment's permanence or ſecurity upon any ſcheme of things, which ſets aſide all the antient corporate capacities and diſtinctions of the kingdom, and ſubverts the whole fabrick of its antient laws and uſages, political, civil and religious, to introduce a ſyſtem founded on the ſuppoſed *rights of man, and the abſolute equality of the human race.* Unleſs, therefore, we declare clearly and diſtinctly in favour of the *reſtoration* of property, and confide to the hereditary property of the kingdom, the limitation and qualifications of its hereditary monarchy, the blood and treaſure of Europe is waſted for the eſtabliſhment ot jacobiniſm in France. There is no doubt that Danton and Robeſpierre, Chaumette and Barrere, that Condorcet, that Thomas Paine, that La Fayette, and the ex-biſhop of Autun, the abbé Gregoire, with all the gang of the Syeyes's, the Henriots, and the Santerres, if they could ſecure themſelves in the fruits of their rebellion and robbery, would be perfectly indifferent, whether the moſt

unhappy of all infants, whom by the leſſons of the ſhoe-maker, his governor and guardian, they are training up ſtudiouſly and methodically to be an idiot, or what is worſe, the moſt wicked and baſe of mankind, continues to receive his civick education in the Temple or the Thuilleries, whilſt they, and ſuch as they, really govern the kingdom.

It cannot be too often and too ſtrongly inculcated, that monarchy and property muſt, in France, go together; or neither can exiſt. To think of the poſſibility of the exiſtence of a permanent and hereditary royalty, *where nothing elſe is hereditary or permanent in point either of perſonal or corporate dignity*, is a ruinous chimera worthy of the abbé Syeyes and thoſe wicked fools his aſſociates, who uſurped power by the murders of the 19th of July and the 6th of October 1789, and who brought forth the monſter which they called Democracie Royale, or the Conſtitution.

I believe that moſt thinking men would prefer infinitely ſome ſober and ſenſible form of a republick, in which there was no mention at all of a king, but which held out ſome reaſonable ſecurity to property, life, and perſonal freedom, to a ſcheme of things like this democracie royale, founded on impiety, immorality, fraudulent currencies, the confiſcation of innocent individuals, and the pretended rights of man; and which, in effect, excluding the whole body of the nobility, clergy,

and

and landed property of a great nation, threw every thing into the hands of a deſperate ſet of obſcure adventurers, who led to every miſchief a blind and bloody band of ſans-culottes. At the head, or rather at the tail of this ſyſtem, was a miſerable pageant as its oſtenſible inſtrument, who was to be treated with every ſpecies of indignity, till the moment, when he was conveyed from the palace of contempt to the dungeon of horrour, and thence led by a brewer of his capital through the applauſes of an hired, frantick, drunken multitude, to loſe his head upon a ſcaffold.

This is the conſtitution, or democracie royale; and this is what infallibly would be again ſet up in France to run exactly the ſame round, if the predominant power ſhould ſo far be forced to ſubmit as to receive the name of a king, leaving it to the jacobins, (that is to thoſe who have ſubverted royalty and deſtroyed property) to modify the one, and to diſtribute the other as ſpoil. By the jacobins I mean indiſcriminately the Briſſotins and the Maratiſts, knowing no ſort of difference between them. As to any other party, none exiſts in that unhappy country. The royaliſts (thoſe in Poitou excepted) are baniſhed and extinguiſhed; and as to what they call the Conſtitutionaliſts, or *Democrats Royaux*, they never had an exiſtence of the ſmalleſt degree of power, conſideration or authority; nor, if they differ at all from the reſt of

the atheiſtick banditti (which from their actions and principles I have no reaſon to think) were they ever any other than the temporary tools and inſtruments of the more determined, able, and ſyſtematick regicides. Several attempts have been made to ſupport this chimerical domocracie royale —the firſt was by La Fayette—the laſt by Dumourier:—they tended only to ſhew, that this abſurd project had no party to ſupport it. The Girondiſts under Wimpfen, and at Bourdeaux, have made ſome ſtruggle. The conſtitutionaliſts never could make any; and for a very plain reaſon; they were *leaders in rebellion.* All their principles, and their whole ſcheme of government being republican, they could never excite the ſmalleſt degree of enthuſiaſm in favour of the unhappy monarch, whom they had rendered contemptible, to make him the executive officer in their new commonwealth. They only appeared as traitors to their own jacobin cauſe, not as faithful adherents to the king.

In an addreſs to France, in an attempt to treat with it, or in conſidering any ſcheme at all relative to it, it is impoſſible we ſhould mean the geographical, we muſt always mean the moral and political country. I believe we ſhall be in a great errour if we act upon an idea that there exiſts in that country any organized body of men who might be willing to treat on equitable terms, for the

the reſtoration of their monarchy; but who are nice in balancing thoſe terms, and who would accept ſuch as to them appeared reaſonable, but who would quietly ſubmit to the predominant power, if they were not gratified in the faſhion of ſome conſtitution which ſuited with their fancies.

I take the ſtate of France to be totally different, I know of no ſuch body, and of no ſuch party. So far from a combination of twenty men (always excepting Poitou) I never yet heard, that a *ſingle man* could be named of ſufficient force or influence to anſwer for another man, much leſs for the ſmalleſt diſtrict in the country, or for the moſt incomplete company of ſoldiers in the army. We ſee every man that the jacobins chuſe to apprehend, taken up in his village, or in his houſe, and conveyed to priſon without the leaſt ſhadow of reſiſtance; *and this indifferently*, whether he is ſuſpected of royaliſm, or federaliſm, moderantiſm, democracy royal, or any other of the names of faction which they ſtart by the hour. What is much more aſtoniſhing, (and if we did not carefully attend to the genius and circumſtances of this revolution, muſt indeed appear incredible) all their moſt accredited military men, from a generaliſſimo to a corporal, may be arreſted, (each in the midſt of his camp, and covered with the laurels of accumulated victories) tied neck and heels, thrown

No individual influence, civil or military

into a cart, and ſent to Paris to be diſpoſed of at the pleaſure of the revolutionary tribunals.

No corporations of juſtice, commerce, or police.

As no individuals have power and influence, ſo there are no corporations, whether of lawyers or burghers, exiſting. The aſſembly called Conſtituent, deſtroyed all ſuch inſtitutions very early. The primary and ſecondary aſſemblies, by their original conſtitution, were to de diſſolved when they anſwered the purpoſe of electing the magiſtrates; and were expreſsly diſqualified from performing any corporate act whatſoever. The tranſient magiſtrates have been almoſt all removed before the expiration of their terms, and new have been lately impoſed upon the people, without the form or ceremony of an election: theſe magiſtrates during their exiſtence are put under, as all the executive authorities are from firſt to laſt, the popular ſocieties (called Jacobin Clubs) of the ſeveral countries, and this by an expreſs order of the national convention: it is even made a caſe of death to oppoſe or attack thoſe clubs. They too have been lately ſubjected to an expurgatory ſcrutiny, to drive out from them every thing ſavouring of what they call the crime of *moderantiſm*, of which offence however few were guilty. But as people began to take refuge from their perſecutions—amongſt themſelves, they have driven them from that laſt aſylum.

The

The ſtate of France is perfectly ſimple. It conſiſts of but two deſcriptions—The oppreſſors and the oppreſſed.

The firſt has the whole authority of the ſtate in their hands; all the arms, all the revenues of the publick, all the confiſcations of individuals and corporations. They have taken the lower ſort from their occupations and have put them into pay, that they may form them into a body of Janiſaries to over-rule and awe property. The heads of theſe wretches they never ſuffered to cool. They ſupply them with a food for fury varied by the day—beſides the ſenſual ſtate of intoxication from which they are rarely free. They have made the prieſts and people formerly abjure the divinity; they have eſtranged them from every civil, moral, and ſocial, or even natural and inſtinctive ſentiment, habit, and practice, and have rendered them ſyſtematically ſavages, to make it impoſſible for them to be the inſtruments of any ſober and virtuous arrangement, or to be reconciled to any ſtate of order, under any name whatſoever.

The other deſcription, *the oppreſſed*—are people of ſome property; they are the ſmall relicks of the perſecuted landed intereſt; they are the burghers and the farmers. By the very circumſtance of their being of ſome property, though numerous in ſome points of view, they cannot be very conſiderable as a *number*. In cities the nature

of their occupations renders them domeſtick and feeble; in the country it confines them to their farm for ſubſiſtence. The national guards are all changed and reformed. Every thing ſuſpicious in the deſcription of which they were compoſed is rigorouſly diſarmed. Committees, called of vigilance and ſafety, are every where formed; a moſt ſevere and ſcrutiniſing inquiſition, far more rigid than any thing ever known or imagined. Two perſons cannot meet and confer without hazard to their liberty, and even to their lives. Numbers ſcarcely credible have been executed, and their property confiſcated. At Paris and in moſt other towns, the bread they buy is a daily dole —which they cannot obtain without a daily ticket delivered to them by their maſters. Multitudes of all ages and ſexes are actually impriſoned. I have reaſon to believe, that in France there are not, for various ſtate crimes, ſo few as twenty thouſand* actually in jail—a large proportion of people of property in any ſtate. If a father of a family ſhould ſhew any diſpoſition to reſiſt, or to withdraw himſelf from their power, his wife and children are cruelly to anſwer for it. It is by means of theſe hoſtages, that they keep the troops, which they force by maſſes (as they call it) into the field—true to their colours.

* Some accounts make them five times as many.

Another

Another of their reſources is not to be forgotten. They have lately found a way of giving a ſort of ubiquity to the ſupreme ſovereign authority, which no monarch has been able yet to give to any repreſentation of his.

The commiſſioners of the national convention, who are the members of the convention itſelf, and really exerciſe all its powers, make continual circuits through every province, and viſits to every army. There they ſuperſede all the ordinary authorities civil and military, and change and alter every thing at their pleaſure. So that in effect no deliberative capacity exiſts in any portion of the inhabitants.

Toulon, republican in principle, having taken its deciſion *in a moment under the guillotine*, and before the arrival of theſe commiſſioners, Toulon, being a place regularly fortified, and having in its boſom a navy in part highly diſcontented, has eſcaped, though by a ſort of miracle; and it would not have eſcaped, if two powerful fleets had not been at the door to give them not only ſtrong, but prompt and immediate ſuccour, eſpecially, as neither this nor any other ſea-port town in France can be depended on, from the peculiarly ſavage diſpoſitions, manners, and connexions, among the lower ſort of people in thoſe places. This I take to be the true ſtate of things in France; *ſo far as it regards any exiſting bodies, whether of legal or voluntary*

voluntary aſſociation, capable of acting or of treating in corps.

As to the oppreſſed *individuals*, they are many; and as diſcontented as men muſt be under the monſtrous and complicated tyranny of all ſorts, with which they are cruſhed. They want no ſtimulus to throw off this dreadful yoke; but they do want (not manifeſtoes, which they have had even to ſurfeit, but) real protection, force and ſuccour.

The diſputes and queſtions of men at their eaſe, do not at all affect their minds, or ever can occupy the minds of men in their ſituation. Theſe theories are long ſince gone by; they have had their day, and have done their miſchief. The queſtion is not between the rabble of ſyſtems, Fayetteiſm, Condorcetiſm, Monarchiſm, or Democratiſm or Federaliſm, on the one ſide, and the fundamental laws of France on the other—or between all theſe ſyſtems amongſt themſelves. It is a controverſy (weak indeed and unequal on the one part) between the proprietor and the robber; between the priſoner and the jailor; between the neck and the guillotine. Four-fifths of the French inhabitants would thankfully take protection from the emperour of Morocco, and would never trouble their heads about the abſtract principles of the power by which they were ſnatched from impriſonment, robbery, and murder. But then theſe men

men can do little or nothing for themſelves. They have no arms, nor magazines, nor chiefs, nor union, nor the poſſibility of theſe things within themſelves. On the whole therefore I lay it down as a certainty, that in the jacobins, no change of mind is to be expected—and that no others in the territory of France have an independent and deliberative exiſtence.

The truth is, that France is out of itſelf—The moral France is ſeparated from the geographical. The maſter of the houſe is expelled, and the robbers are in poſſeſſion. If we look for the *corporate people* of France exiſting as corporate in the eye and intention of publick law, (that corporate people, I mean, who are free to deliberate and to decide, and who have a capacity to treat and conclude) they are in Flanders, and Germany, in Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and England. There are all the princes of the blood, there are all the orders of the ſtate, there are all the parliaments of the kingdom.

This being, as I conceive, the true ſtate of France, as it exiſts *territorily*, and as it exiſts *morally*, the queſtion will be, with whom we are to concert our arrangements; and whom we are to uſe as our inſtruments in the reduction, in the pacification, and in the ſettlement of France. The work to be done muſt indicate the workmen. Suppoſing us to have rational objects, we have two

principal,

principal, and one ſecondary. They firſt two are ſo intimately connected as not to be ſeparated even in thought; the re-eſtabliſhment of royalty, and the re-eſtabliſhment of property. One would think it requires not a great deal of argument to prove, that the moſt ſerious endeavours to reſtore royalty will be made by royaliſts. Property will be moſt energetically reſtored by the antient proprietors of that kingdom.

When I ſpeak of royaliſts, I wiſh to be underſtood of thoſe who were always ſuch from principle. Every arm lifted up for royalty from the beginning, was the arm of a man ſo principled. I do not think there are ten exceptions.

The principled royaliſts are certainly not of force to effect theſe objects by themſelves. If they were, the operations of the preſent great combination would be wholly unneceſſary. What I contend for is, that they ſhould be conſulted with, treated with, and employed; and that no foreigners whatſoever are either in intereſt ſo engaged, or in judgment and local knowledge ſo competent, to anſwer all theſe purpoſes as the natural proprietors of the country.

Their number for an exiled party is alſo conſiderable. Almoſt the whole body of the landed proprietors of France, eccleſiaſtical and civil, have been ſteadily devoted to the monarchy. This body does not amount to leſs than ſeventy thou-

ſand—a very great number in the compoſition of the reſpectable claſſes in any ſociety.—I am ſure, that if half that number of the ſame deſcription were taken out of this country, it would leave hardly any thing that I ſhould call the people of England. On the faith of the emperour and the king of Pruſſia, a body of ten thouſand nobility on horſeback, with the king's two brothers at their head, ſerved with the king of Pruſſia in the campaign of 1792, and equipped themſelves with the laſt ſhilling of their ruined fortunes and exhauſted credit.* It is not now the queſtion how that great force came to be rendered uſeleſs and totally diſſipated. I ſtate it now, only to remark, that a great part of the ſame force exiſts, and would act if it were enabled. I am ſure every thing has ſhewn us that in this war with France, one Frenchman is worth twenty foreigners. La Vendee is a proof of this.

If we wiſh to make an impreſſion on the minds

* Before the revolution the French nobleſſe were ſo reduced in numbers, that they did not much exceed twenty thouſand, at leaſt of full grown men. As they have been very cruelly formed into entire corps of ſoldiers, it is eſtimated, that by the ſword, and diſtempers in the field, they have not loſt leſs than five thouſand men; and if this courſe is purſued, it is to be feared, that the whole body of the French nobility may be extinguiſhed. Several hundreds have alſo periſhed by famine and various accidents.

of

of any perſons in France, or to perſuade them to join our ſtandard, it is impoſſible that they ſhould not be more eaſily led, and more readily formed and diſciplined, (civilly and martially diſciplined) by thoſe who ſpeak their language, who are acquainted with their manners, who are converſant with their uſages and habits of thinking, and who have a local knowledge of their country, and ſome remains of antient credit and conſideration, than with a body congregated from all tongues and tribes. Where none of the reſpectable native intereſts are ſeen in the tranſaction, it is impoſſible that any declarations can convince thoſe that are within, or thoſe that are without, that any thing elſe than ſome ſort of hoſtility in the ſtyle of a conqueror is meant. At beſt it will appear to ſuch wavering perſons, (if ſuch there are) whom we mean to fix with us, a choice whether they are to continue a prey to domeſtick banditti, or to be fought for as a carrion carcaſs, and picked to the bone by all the crows and vultures of the ſky. They may take protection, (and they would I doubt not) but they can have neither alacrity nor zeal in ſuch a cauſe. When they ſee nothing but bands of Engliſh, Spaniards, Neapolitans, Sardinians, Pruſſians, Auſtrians, Hungarians, Bohemians, Sclavonians, Croatians, *acting as principals*, it is impoſſible they ſhould think we come with a beneficent deſign. Many of thoſe fierce and bar-

barous people have already given proofs how little they regard any French party whatſoever. Some of theſe nations the people of France are jealous of; ſuch are the Engliſh, and the Spaniards—others they deſpiſe; ſuch are the Italians—others they hate and dread; ſuch are the German and Danubian powers. At beſt ſuch interpoſition of antient enemies excites apprehenſion; but in this caſe, how can they ſuppoſe that we come to maintain their legitimate monarchy in a truly paternal French government, to protect their privileges, their laws, their religion, and their property, when they ſee us make uſe of no one perſon who has any intereſt in them, any knowledge of them, or any the leaſt zeal for them? On the contrary, they ſee, that we do not ſuffer any of thoſe who have ſhewn a zeal in that cauſe, which we ſeem to make our own, to come freely into any place in which the allies obtain any footing.

If we wiſh to gain upon any people, it is right to ſee what it is they expect. We have had a propoſal from the royaliſts of Poitou. They are well intitled, after a bloody war maintained for eight months againſt all the powers of anarchy, to ſpeak the ſentiments of the royaliſts of France. Do they deſire us to exclude their princes, their clergy, their nobility? The direct contrary. They earneſtly ſolicit that men of every one of theſe deſcriptions ſhould be ſent to them. They do not call

call for Engliſh, Auſtrian, or Pruſſian officers. They call for French emigrant officers. They call for the exiled prieſts. They have demanded the Compte d'Artois to appear at their head. Theſe are the demands, (quite natural demands) of thoſe who are ready to follow the ſtandard of monarchy.

The great means therefore of reſtoring the monarchy which we have made *the main object of the war*, is to aſſiſt the dignity, the religion, and the property of France, to repoſſeſs themſelves of the means of their natural influence. This ought to be the primary object of all our politicks, and all our military operations. Otherwiſe every thing will move in a prepoſterous order, and nothing but confuſion and deſtruction will follow.

I know that misfortune is not made to win reſpect from ordinary minds. I know that there is a leaning to proſperity however obtained, and a prejudice in its favour; I know there is a diſpoſition to hope ſomething from the variety and inconſtancy of villany, rather than from the tireſome uniformity of fixed principle. There have been, I admit, ſituations in which a guiding perſon or party might be gained over, and through him or them, the whole body of a nation. For the hope of ſuch a converſion, and of deriving advantage from enemies, it might be politick for a while to throw your friends into the ſhade. But examples drawn from hiſtory in occaſions like the preſent

preſent will be found dangerouſly to miſlead us. France has no reſemblance to other countries which have undergone troubles and been purified by them. If France, jacobiniſed as it has been for four full years, did contain any bodies of authority and diſpoſition to treat with you, (moſt aſſuredly ſhe does not) ſuch is the levity of thoſe who have expelled every thing reſpectable in their country, ſuch their ferocity, their arrogance, their mutinous ſpirit, their habits of defying every thing human and divine, that no engagement would hold with them for three months; nor indeed could they cohere together for any purpoſe of civilized ſociety, if left as they now are. There muſt be a means not only of breaking their ſtrength within themſelves, but of *civilizing* them; and theſe two things muſt go together, before we can poſſibly treat with them, not only as a nation, but with any diviſion of them. Deſcriptions of men of their own race, but better in rank, ſuperiour in property and decorum, of honourable, decent and orderly habits, are abſolutely neceſſary to bring them to ſuch a frame as to qualify them ſo much as to come into contact with a civilized nation. A ſet of thoſe ferocious ſavages with arms in their hands, left to themſelves in one part of the country, whilſt you proceed to another, would break forth into outrages at leaſt as bad as their former. They muſt, as faſt as gained (if ever they are

gained) be put under the guide, direction and government of better Frenchmen than themſelves, or they will inſtantly relapſe into a fever of aggravated jacobiniſm.

We muſt not judge of other parts of France by the temporary ſubmiſſion of Toulon, with two vaſt fleets in its harbour, and a garriſon far more numerous than all the inhabitants able to bear arms. If they were left to themſelves, I am quite ſure they would not retain their attachment to monarchy of any name, for a ſingle week.

To adminiſter the only cure for the unheard-of diſorders of that undone country, I think it infinitely happy for us, that God has given into our hands, more effectual remedies than human contrivance could point out. We have in our boſom, and in the boſom of other civilized ſtates, nearer forty than thirty thouſand perſons, providentially preſerved not only from the cruelty and violence, but from the contagion of the horrid practices, ſentiments and language of the Jacobins, and even ſacredly guarded from the view of ſuch abominable ſcenes. If we ſhould obtain in any conſiderable diſtrict, a footing in France, we poſſeſs an immenſe body of phyſicians and magiſtrates of the mind, whom we now know to be the moſt diſcreet, gentle, well-tempered, conciliatory, virtuous, and pious perſons, who in any order probably exiſted in the world. You will have a miſſioner of peace

and

and order in every pariſh. Never was a wiſer national œconomy than in the charity of the Engliſh and of other countries. Never was money better expended than in the maintenance of this body of civil troops for re-eſtabliſhing order in France, and for thus ſecuring its civilization to Europe. This means, if properly uſed, is of value ineſtimable.

Nor is this corps of inſtruments of civilization confined to the firſt order of that ſtate, I mean the clergy. The allied powers poſſeſs alſo, an exceedingly numerous, well-informed, ſenſible, ingenious, high principled and ſpirited body of cavaliers in the expatriated landed intereſt of France, as well qualified at leaſt, as I, (who have been taught by time and experience to moderate my calculation of the expectancy of human abilities) ever expected to ſee in the body of any landed gentlemen and ſoldiers by their birth. France is well winnowed and ſifted. Its virtuous men are, I believe, amongſt the moſt virtuous, as its wicked are amongſt the moſt abandoned upon earth. Whatever in the territory of France may be found to be in the middle between theſe, muſt be attracted to the better part. This will be compaſſed, when every gentleman, every where being reſtored to his landed eſtate, each on his patrimonial ground, may join the clergy in reanimating the loyalty, fidelity and religion of the people; that

theſe gentlemen proprietors of land, may ſort that people according to the truſt they ſeverally merit, that they may arm the honeſt and well affected, and diſarm and diſable the factious and ill diſpoſed. No foreigner can make this diſcrimination nor theſe arrangements. The ancient corporations of burghers according to their ſeveral modes ſhould be reſtored; and placed (as they ought to be) in the hands of men of gravity and property in the cities or bailliages, according to the proper conſtitutions of the commons or third eſtate of France. They will reſtrain and regulate the ſeditious rabble there, as the gentlemen will on their own eſtates. In this way, and *in this way alone*, the country (once broken in upon by foreign force well directed) may be gained and ſettled. It muſt be gained and ſettled by *itſelf*, and through the medium of its *own* native dignity and property. It is not honeſt, it is not decent, ſtill leſs is it politick, for foreign powers themſelves to attempt any thing in this minute, eternal, local detail, in which they could ſhew nothing but ignorance, imbecility, confuſion and oppreſſion. As to the prince who has a juſt claim to exerciſe the regency of France, like other men he is not without his faults and his defects. But faults or defects (always ſuppoſing them faults of common human infirmity) are not what in any country deſtroy a legal title to government. Theſe princes are kept in a poor obſcure

obſcure country town of the king of Pruſſia's. Their reputation is entirely at the mercy of every calumniator. They cannot ſhew themſelves, they cannot explain themſelves, as princes ought to do. After being well informed, as any man here can be, I do not find, that theſe blemiſhes in this eminent perſon, are at all conſiderable, or that they at all affect a character, which is full of probity, honour, generoſity, and real goodneſs. In ſome points he has but too much reſemblance to his unfortunate brother; who, with all his weakneſſes, had a good underſtanding and many parts of an excellent man, and a good king. But Monſieur, without ſuppoſing the other deficient, (as he was not) excels him in general knowledge, and in a ſharp and keen obſervation, with ſomething of a better addreſs, and an happier mode of ſpeaking and of writing. His converſation is open, agreeable and informed, his manners gracious and princely. His brother the comte d'Artois ſuſtains ſtill better the repreſentation of his place. He is eloquent, lively, engaging in the higheſt degree, of a decided character, full of energy and activity. In a word he is a brave, honourable, and accompliſhed cavalier. Their brethren of royalty, if they were true to their own cauſe and intereſt, inſtead of relegating theſe illuſtrious perſons to an obſcure town, would bring them forward in their courts and camps, and exhibit them to, what they

would ſpeedily obtain, the eſteem, reſpect, and affection of mankind.

Objection made to the Regent's endeavour to go to Spain.

As to their knocking at every door, (which ſeems to give offence) can any thing be more natural? Abandoned, deſpiſed, rendered in a manner outlaws by all the powers of Europe, who have treated their unfortunate brethren with all the giddy pride, and improvident inſolence of blind unfeeling proſperity; who did not even ſend them a compliment of condolence on the murder of their brother and ſiſter; in ſuch a ſtate is it to be wondered at, or blamed, that they tried every way, likely or unlikely, well or ill choſen, to get out of the horrible pit into which they are fallen, and that in particular they tried whether the princes of their own blood, might at length be brought to think the cauſe of kings, and of kings of their race, wounded in the murder and exile of the branch of France, of as much importance as the killing of a brace of partridges? If they were abſolutely idle, and only eat in ſloth their bread of ſorrow and dependence, they would be forgotten, or at beſt thought of as wretches unworthy of their pretenſions which they had done nothing to ſupport. If they err from *our* intereſts, what care has been taken to keep them in thoſe intereſts? or what deſire has ever been ſhewn to employ them in any other way than as inſtruments of their own degradation, ſhame, and ruin?

The

The parliament of Paris, by whom the title of the regent is to be recogniſed (not made) according to the laws of the kingdom, is ready to recogniſe it, and to regiſter it, if a place of meeting was given to them, which might be within their own juriſdiction, ſuppoſing that only locality was required for the exerciſe of their functions: for it is one of the advantages of monarchy, to have no local ſeat. It may maintain its rights out of the ſphere of its territorial juriſdiction, if other powers will ſuffer it.

I am well appriſed, that the little intriguers, and whiſperers, and ſelf-conceited thoughtleſs babblers, worſe than either, run about to depreciate the fallen virtue of a great nation. But whilſt they talk, we muſt make our choice—they or the jacobins. We have no other option. As to thoſe, who in the pride of a proſperity, not obtained by their wiſdom, valour, or induſtry, think ſo well of themſelves, and of their own abilities and virtues, and ſo ill of other men; truth obliges me to ſay, that they are not founded in their preſumption concerning themſelves, nor in their contempt of the French princes, magiſtrates, nobility, and clergy. Inſtead of inſpiring me with diſlike and diſtruſt of the unfortunate, engaged with us in a common cauſe againſt our jacobin enemy, they take away all my eſteem for their own characters, and all my deference to their judgment.

There are ſome few French gentlemen indeed who talk a language not wholly different from this jargon. Thoſe whom I have in my eye, I reſpect as gallant ſoldiers, as much as any one can do, but on their political judgment, and prudence, I have not the ſlighteſt reliance, nor on their knowledge of their own country, or of its laws and conſtitution. They are, if not enemies, at leaſt not friends to the orders of their own ſtate; not to the princes, the clergy, or the nobility; they poſſeſs only an attachment to the monarchy, or rather to the perſons of the late king and queen. In all other reſpects their converſation is jacobin. I am afraid they, or ſome of them, go into the cloſets of miniſters, and tell them that the affairs of France will be better arranged by the allied powers than by the landed proprietors of the kingdom, or by the princes who have a right to govern; and that if any French are at all to be employed in the ſettlement of their country, it ought to be only thoſe who have never declared any decided opinion, or taken any active part in the revolution.*

I ſuſpect that the authors of this opinion are mere ſoldiers of fortune, who though men of integrity and honour, would as gladly receive military rank from Ruſſia, or Auſtria, or Pruſſia, as from the regent of France. Perhaps their not

* This was the language of the miniſterialiſts.

having

having as much importance at his court as they could wiſh may incline them to this ſtrange imagination. Perhaps having no property in old France, they are more indifferent about its reſtoration. Their language is certainly flattering to all miniſters in all courts. We all are men; we all love to be told of the extent of our own power and our own faculties. If we love glory, we are jealous of partners, and afraid even of our own inſtruments. It is of all modes of flattery the moſt effectual to be told, that you can regulate the affairs of another kingdom better than its hereditary proprietors. It is formed to flatter the principle of conqueſt ſo natural to all men. It is this principle which is now making the partition of Poland. The powers concerned have been told by ſome perfidious Poles, and perhaps they believe, that their uſurpation is a great benefit to the people, eſpecially to the common people. However this may turn out with regard to Poland, I am quite ſure that France could not be ſo well under a foreign direction as under that of the repreſentatives of its own king, and its own ancient eſtates.

I think I have myſelf ſtudied France, as much as moſt of thoſe whom the allied courts are likely to employ in ſuch a work. I have likewiſe of myſelf as partial and as vain an opinion as men commonly have of themſelves. But if I could command the whole military arm of Europe, I am ſure,

ſure, that a bribe of the beſt province in that kingdom, would not tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except in perfect concurrence and concert with the natural legal intereſts of the country, compoſed of the eccleſiaſtical, the military, the ſeveral corporate bodies of juſtice, and of burgherſhip, making under a monarch (I repeat it again and again) *the French nation according to its fundamental conſtitution.* No conſiderate ſtateſman would undertake to meddle with it upon any other condition.

The government of that kingdom is fundamentally monarchical. The publick law of Europe has never recogniſed in it any other form of government. The potentates of Europe have by that law, a right, an intereſt, and a duty to know with what government they are to treat, and what they are to admit into the federative ſociety, or in other words into the diplomatick republick of Europe. This right is clear and indiſputable.

What other and further interference they have a right to the interiour of the concerns of another people, is a matter on which, as on every political ſubject, no very definite or poſitive rule can well be laid down. Our neighbours are men; and who will atempt to dictate the laws, under which it is allowable or forbidden to take a part in the concerns of men, whether they are conſidered individually or in a collective capacity, whenever

whenever charity to them, or a care of my own ſafety, calls forth my activity. Circumſtances perpetually variable, directing a moral prudence and diſcretion, the *general* principles of which never vary, muſt alone preſcribe a conduct fitting on ſuch occaſions. The lateſt caſuiſts of publick law are rather of a republican caſt, and in my mind, by no means ſo averſe as they ought to be to a right in the people (a word which ill defined is of the moſt dangerous uſe) to make changes at their pleaſure in the fundamental laws of their country. Theſe writers, however, when a country is divided, leave abundant liberty for a neighbour to ſupport any of the parties according to his choice.* This interference muſt indeed always be a right, whilſt the privilege of doing good to others, and of averting from them every ſort of evil, is a right: circumſtances may render that right a duty. It depends wholly on this, whether it be a *bonâ fide* charity to a party, and a prudent precaution with regard to yourſelf, or whether under the pretence of aiding one of the parties in a nation, you act in ſuch a manner as to aggravate its calamities, and accompliſh its final deſtruction. In truth it is not the interfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous intermeddling, or treacherous inaction, which is praiſed or blamed by the deciſion of an equitable judge.

* Vattel.

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It will be a juſt and irreſiſtible preſumption againſt the fairneſs of the interpoſing power, that he takes with him no party or deſcription of men in the divided ſtate. It is not probable, that theſe parties ſhould all, and all alike, be more adverſe to the true intereſts of their country, and leſs capable of forming a judgment upon them, than thoſe who are abſolute ſtrangers to their affairs, and to the character of the actors in them, and have but a remote, feeble, and ſecondary ſympathy with their intereſt. Sometimes a calm and healing arbiter may be neceſſary; but, he is to compoſe differences, not to give laws. It is impoſſible that any one ſhould not feel the full force of that preſumption. Even people, whoſe politicks for the ſuppoſed good of their own country, lead them to take advantage of the diſſenſions of a neighbouring nation in order to ruin it, will not directly propoſe to exclude the natives, but they will take that mode of conſulting and employing them, which moſt nearly approaches to an excluſion. In ſome particulars they propoſe what amounts to that excluſion, in others they do much worſe. They recommend to miniſtry, "that no French-"man who has given a decided opinion, or acted "a decided part in this great revolution, for or "againſt it, ſhould be countenanced, brought for-"ward, truſted or employed, even in the ſtricteſt "ſubordination to the miniſters of the allied

"powers." Although one would think that this advice would ſtand condemned on the firſt propoſition, yet as it has been made popular, and has been proceeded upon practically, I think it right to give it a full conſideration.

And firſt, I have aſked myſelf who theſe Frenchmen are, that, in the ſtate their own country has been for theſe laſt five years, of all the people of Europe, have alone not been able to form a decided opinion, or have been unwilling to act a decided part?

Looking over all the names I have heard of in this great revolution in all human affairs, I find no man of any diſtinction who has remained in that more than ſtoical apathy, but the prince de Conti. This mean, ſtupid, ſelfiſh, ſwiniſh, and cowardly animal, univerſally known and deſpiſed as ſuch, has indeed, except in one abortive attempt to elope, been perfectly neutral. However his neutrality, which it ſeems would qualify him for truſt, and on a competition muſt ſet aſide the prince de Condé, can be of no ſort of ſervice. His moderation has not been able to keep him from a jail. The allied powers muſt draw him from that jail, before they can have the full advantage of the exertions of this great neutraliſt.

Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or talents, who by his ſpeeches or his votes, by his pen or by his ſword, has not been active on this ſcene.

ſcene. The time indeed could admit no neutrality in any perſon worthy of the name of man. There were originally two great diviſions in France; the one is that which overturned the whole of the government in church and ſtate, and erected a republick on the baſis of atheiſm. Their grand engine was the jacobin club, a ſort of ſeceſſion from which, but exactly on the ſame principles, begat another ſhort-lived one, called the Club of Eighty-Nine *, which was chiefly guided by the court rebels, who, in addition to the crimes of which they were guilty in common with the others, had the merit of betraying a gracious maſter, and a kind benefactor. Subdiviſions of this faction, which ſince we have ſeen, do not in the leaſt differ from each other in their principles, their diſpoſitions, or the means they have employed. Their only quarrel has been about power: in that quarrel, like wave ſucceeding wave, one faction has got the better and expelled the other. Thus La Fayette for a while got the better of Orleans; and Orleans afterwards prevailed over La Fayette. Briſſot overpowered Orleans; Barrere and Robeſpierre, and their faction, maſtered them both and cut off their heads. All who were not royaliſts have been liſted in ſome

* The firſt object of this club was the propagation of jacobin principles.

or other of theſe diviſions. If it were of any uſe to ſettle a precedence, the elder ought to have his rank. The firſt authors, plotters, and contrivers of this monſtrous ſcheme, ſeem to me entitled to the firſt place in our diſtruſt and abhorrence. I have ſeen ſome of thoſe who are thought the beſt amongſt the original rebels; and I have not neglected the means of being informed concerning the others. I can very truly ſay, that I have not found by obſervation, or inquiry, that any ſenſe of the evils produced by their projects has produced in them, or any *one* of them, the ſmalleſt degree of repentance. Diſappointment and mortification undoubtedly they feel: but to them, repentance is a thing impoſſible. They are atheiſts. This wretched opinion, by which they are poſſeſſed even to the height of fanaticiſm, leading them to exclude from their ideas of a commonwealth, the vital principle of the phyſical, the moral, and the political world, engages them in a thouſand abſurd contrivances to fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious repoſe, or honourable action, or wiſe ſpeculation, in the lurking holes of a foreign land, into which (in a common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads amongſt the innocent victims of their madneſs, they are at this very hour, as buſy in the confection of the dirt-pyes of their imaginary conſtitutions, as if they

they had not been quite freſh from deſtroying by their impious and deſperate vagaries, the fineſt country upon earth.

It is however, out of theſe, or of ſuch as theſe, guilty and impenitent, deſpiſing the experience of others, and their own, that ſome people talk of chooſing their negociators with thoſe jacobins, who they ſuppoſe may be recovered to a ſounder mind. They flatter themſelves, it ſeems, that the friendly habits formed during their original partnerſhip of iniquity, a ſimilarity of character, and a conformity in the ground-work of their principles, might facilitate their converſion, and gain them over to ſome recognition of royalty. But ſurely this is to read human nature very ill. The ſeveral ſectaries in this ſchiſm of the jacobins, are the very laſt men in the world to truſt each other. Fellowſhip in treaſon, is a bad ground of confidence. The laſt quarrels are the foreſt; and the injuries received or offered by your own aſſociates, are ever the moſt bitterly reſented. The people of France of every name and deſcription, would a thouſand times ſooner liſten to the prince de Condé or to the archbiſhop of Aix, or the biſhop of St. Pol, or to monſieur de Cazalès, than to La Fayette, or Dumourier, or the vicomte de Noailles, or the biſhop of Autun, or Necker, or his diſciple Lally Tolendal. Againſt the firſt deſcription they have

have not the ſmalleſt animoſity beyond that of a merely political diſſenſion. The others they regard as traitors.

The firſt deſcription is that of the chriſtian royaliſts, men who as earneſtly wiſhed for reformation, as they oppoſed innovation in the fundamental parts of their church and ſtate. *Their* part has been *very decided.* Accordingly they are to be ſet aſide in the reſtoration of church and ſtate. It is an odd kind of diſqualification where the reſtoration of religion and monarchy is the queſtion. If England ſhould (God forbid it ſhould) fall into the ſame misfortune with France, and that the court of Vienna ſhould undertake the reſtoration of our monarchy, I think it would be extraordinary to object to the admiſſion of Mr. Pitt, or lord Grenville, or Mr. Dundas, into any ſhare in the management of that buſineſs, becauſe in a day of trial they have ſtood up firmly and manfully, as I truſt they always will do, and with diſtinguiſhed powers, for the monarchy and the legitimate conſtitution of their country. I am ſure if I were to ſuppoſe myſelf at Vienna at ſuch a time, I ſhould, as a man, as an Engliſhman, and as a royaliſt, proteſt in that caſe, as I do in this, againſt a weak and ruinous principle of proceeding, which can have no other tendency, than to make thoſe who wiſh to ſupport the crown, meditate too profoundly on the conſequences of the part they

take—and conſider whether for their open and forward zeal in the royal cauſe, they may not be thruſt out from any ſort of confidence and employment, where the intereſt of crowned heads is concerned.

Theſe are the *parties*. I have ſaid, and ſaid truly, that I know of no neutrals. But as a general obſervation on this general principle of chuſing neutrals on ſuch occaſions as the preſent, I have this to ſay—that it amounts to neither more nor leſs than this ſhocking propoſition—that we ought to exclude men of honour and ability from ſerving theirs and our cauſe; and to put the deareſt intereſts of ourſelves and our poſterity into the hands of men of no decided character, without judgment to chooſe, and without courage to profeſs any principle whatſoever.

Such men can ſerve no cauſe, for this plain reaſon—they have no cauſe at heart. They can at beſt work only as mere mercenaries. They have not been guilty of great crimes; but it is only becauſe they have not energy of mind to riſe to any height of wickedneſs. They are not hawks or kites; they are only miſerable fowls whoſe flight is not above their dunghill or henrooſt. But they tremble before the authors of theſe horrours. They admire them at a ſafe and reſpectful diſtance. There never was a mean and abject mind that did not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In

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the bottom of their hearts they believe ſuch hardy miſcreants to be the only men qualified for great affairs: if you ſet them to tranſact with ſuch perſons, they are inſtantly ſubdued. They dare not ſo much as look their antagoniſt in the face. They are made to be their ſubjects, not to be their arbiters or controllers.

Theſe men to be ſure can look at atrocious acts without indignation, and can behold ſuffering virtue without ſympathy. Therefore they are conſidered as ſober diſpaſſionate men. But they have their paſſions, though of another kind, and which are infinitely more likely to carry them out of the path of their duty. They are of a tame, timid, languid, inert temper wherever the welfare of *others* is concerned. In ſuch cauſes, as they have no motives to action, they never poſſeſs any real ability, and are totally deſtitute of all reſource.

Believe a man who has ſeen much, and obſerved ſomething. I have ſeen in the courſe of my life a great many of that family of men. They are generally choſen, becauſe they have no opinion of their own; and as far as they can be got in good earneſt to embrace any opinion, it is that of whoever happens to employ them (neither longer nor ſhorter, narrower nor broader) with whom they have no diſcuſſion or conſultation. The only thing which occurs to ſuch a man when he has got a buſineſs for others into his hands, is how to make

his own fortune out of it. The perſon he is to treat with, is not, with him an adverſary over whom he is to prevail, but a new friend he is to gain; therefore he always ſyſtematically betrays ſome part of his truſt. Inſtead of thinking how he ſhall defend his ground to the laſt, and if forced to retreat, how little he ſhall give up, this kind of man conſiders how much of the intereſt of his employer he is to ſacrifice to his adverſary. Having nothing but himſelf in view, he knows, that in ſerving his principal with zeal, he muſt probably incur ſome reſentment from the oppoſite party. His object is to obtain the good will of the perſon with whom he contends, that when an agreement is made, he may join in rewarding him. I would not take one of theſe as my arbitrator in a diſpute for ſo much as a fiſh-pond—for if he reſerved the mud to me, he would be ſure to give the water that fed the pool, to my adverſary. In a great cauſe I ſhould certainly wiſh, that my agent ſhould poſſeſs conciliating qualities; that he ſhould be of a frank, open, and candid diſpoſition, ſoft in his nature, and of a temper to ſoften animoſities and to win confidence. He ought not to be a man odious to the perſon he treats with, by perſonal injury, by violence, or by deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his cauſe in any former tranſactions. But I would be ſure that my negotiator ſhould be *mine*, that he ſhould be as earneſt in the cauſe

cauſe as myſelf, and known to be ſo; that he ſhould not be looked upon as a ſtipendiary advocate, but as a principled partiſan. In all treaty it is a great point that all idea of gaining your agent is hopeleſs. I would not truſt the cauſe of royalty with a man, who profeſſing neutrality is half a republican. The enemy has already a great part of his ſuit without a ſtruggle—and he contends with advantage for all the reſt. The common principle allowed between your adverſary and your agent, gives your adverſary the advantage in every diſcuſſion.

Before I ſhut up this diſcourſe about neutral agency (which I conceive is not to be found, or if found, ought not to be uſed) I have a few other remarks to make on the cauſe, which I conceive gives riſe to it.

In all that we do, whether in the ſtruggle or after it, it is neceſſary that we ſhould conſtantly have in our eye, the nature and character of the enemy we have to contend with. The jacobin revolution is carried on by men of no rank, of no conſideration, of wild ſavage minds, full of levity, arrogance and preſumption, without morals, without probity, without prudence. What have they then to ſupply their innumerable defects, and to make them terrible even to the firmeſt minds? *One* thing, and *one* thing only—but that one thing is worth a thouſand—they have *energy*. In France,

all things being put into an univerſal ferment, in the decompoſition of ſociety, no man comes forward but by his ſpirit of enterpriſe and the vigour of his mind. If we meet this dreadful and portentous energy, reſtrained by no conſideration of God or man, that is always vigilant, always on the attack, that allows itſelf no repoſe, and ſuffers none to reſt an hour with impunity; if we meet this energy with poor common-place proceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old ſaws, with doubts, fears, and ſuſpicions, with a languid, uncertain heſitation, with a formal, official ſpirit, which is turned aſide by every obſtacle from its purpoſe, and which never ſees a difficulty but to yield to it, or at beſt to evade it; down we go to the bottom of the abyſs—and nothing ſhort of Omnipotence can ſave us. We muſt meet a vicious and diſtempered energy with a manly and rational vigour. As virtue is limited in its reſources—we are doubly bound to uſe all that, in the circle drawn about us by our morals, we are able to command.

I do not contend againſt the advantages of diſtruſt. In the world we live in it is but too neceſſary. Some of old call it the very ſinews of diſcretion. But what ſignify common-places, that always run parallel and equal? Diſtruſt is good or it is bad, according to our poſition and our purpoſe. Diſtruſt is a defenſive principle. They who have much to loſe have much to fear. But in

France

France we hold nothing. We are to break in upon a power in poſſeſſion; we are to carry every thing by ſtorm, or by ſurpriſe, or by intelligence, or by all. Adventure therefore, and not caution, is our policy. Here to be too preſuming is the better errour.

The world will judge of the ſpirit of our proceeding in thoſe places of France which may fall into our power, by our conduct in thoſe that are already in our hands. Our wiſdom ſhould not be vulgar. Other times, perhaps other meaſures: but in this awful hour our politicks ought to be made up of nothing but courage, deciſion, manlineſs, and rectitude. We ſhould have all the magnanimity of good faith. This is a royal and commanding policy; and as long as we are true to it we may give the law. Never can we aſſume this command if we will not riſk the conſequences. For which reaſon we ought to be bottomed enough in principle not to be carried away upon the firſt proſpect of any ſiniſter advantage. For depend upon it, that if we once give way to a ſiniſter dealing, we ſhall teach others the game, and we ſhall be outwitted and overborne; the Spaniards, the Pruſſians, God knows who, will put us under contribution at their pleaſure; and inſtead of being at the head of a great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe, we ſhall, by our miſtakes, break up a great deſign into a thouſand little ſelfiſh

quarrels; the enemy will triumph, and we ſhall ſit down under the terms of unſafe and dependent peace, weakened, mortified, and diſgraced, whilſt all Europe, England included, is left open and defenceleſs on every part, to jacobin principles, intrigues, and arms. In the caſe of the king of France, declared to be our friend and ally, we will ſtill be conſidering ourſelves in the contradictory character of an enemy. This contradiction, I am afraid, will, in ſpite of us, give a colour of fraud to all our tranſactions, or at leaſt will ſo complicate our politicks, that we ſhall ourſelves be inextricably entangled in them.

I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite ſorrow I heard that in taking the king of France's fleet in truſt, we inſtantly unrigged and diſmaſted the ſhips, inſtead of keeping them in a condition to eſcape in caſe of diſaſter, and in order to fulfil our truſt, that is, to hold them for the uſe of the owner, and, in the mean time, to employ them for our common ſervice. Theſe ſhips are now ſo circumſtanced, that if we are forced to evacuate Toulon, they muſt fall into the hands of the enemy, or be burnt by ourſelves. I know this is by ſome conſidered as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians ought not to be better than the Engliſh, or Mr. Pitt leſs virtuous than Ariſtides.

Are we then ſo poor in reſources that we can do no better with eighteen or twenty ſhips of the line

line than to burn them? Had we ſent for French royaliſt naval officers, of which ſome hundreds are to be had, and made them ſelect ſuch ſeamen as they could truſt, and filled the reſt with our own and Mediterranean ſeamen, which are all over Italy to be had by thouſands, and put them under judicious Engliſh commanders in chief, and with a judicious mixture of our own ſubordinates, the Weſt Indies would at this day have been ours. It may be ſaid that theſe French officers would take them for the king of France, and that they would not be in our power. Be it ſo. The iſlands would not be ours, but they would not be jacobiniſed. This is however a thing impoſſible. They muſt in effect and ſubſtance be ours. But all is upon that falſe principle of diſtruſt, which, not confiding in ſtrength, can never have the full uſe of it. They that pay, and feed, and equip, muſt direct. But I muſt ſpeak plain upon this ſubject. The French iſlands, if they were all our own, ought not to be all kept. A fair partition only ought to be made of thoſe territories. This is a ſubject of policy very ſerious, which has many relations and aſpects. Juſt here I only hint at it as anſwering an objection, whilſt I ſtate the miſchievous conſequences which ſuffer us to be ſurpriſed into a virtual breach of faith, by confounding our ally with our enemy, becauſe they both belong to the ſame geographical territory.

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My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made, what we ſet out with, a royal French city. By the neceſſity of the caſe, it muſt be under the influence, civil and military, of the allies. But the only way of keeping that jealous and diſcordant maſs from tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding the loſs of the whole, is to put the place into the nominal government of the regent, his officers being approved by us. This, I ſay, is abſolutely neceſſary for a poiſe amongſt ourſelves. Otherwiſe is it to be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place with us in a ſort of partnerſhip contrary to our mutual intereſt, will ſee us abſolute maſters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one ſide, and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and compoſed mind, whilſt we do little leſs than declare that we are to take the whole Weſt Indies into our hands, leaving the vaſt, unwieldly, and feeble body of the Spaniſh dominions in that part of the world, abſolutely at our mercy, without any power to balance us in the ſmalleſt degree? Nothing is ſo fatal to a nation as an extreme of ſelf-partiality, and the total want of conſideration of what others will naturally hope or fear. Spain muſt think ſhe ſees, that we are taking advantage of the confuſions which reign in France, to diſable that country, and of courſe every country from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the Spaniſh monarchy into a province. If

ſhe ſaw things in a proper point of light, to be ſure, ſhe would not conſider any other plan of politicks as of the leaſt moment in compariſon of the extinction of jacobiniſm. But her miniſters (to ſay the beſt of them) are vulgar politicians. It is no wonder that they ſhould poſtpone this great point, or balance it, by conſiderations of the common politicks, that is, the queſtions of power between *ſtate and ſtate*. If we manifeſtly endeavour to deſtroy the balance, eſpecially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and the Weſt Indies, (the latter their fore and vulnerable part) from fear of what France may do for Spain, hereafter, is it to be wondered, that Spain, infinitely weaker than we are, (weaker indeed than ſuch a maſs of empire ever was,) ſhould feel the ſame fears from our uncontrolled power; that we give way to ourſelves from a ſuppoſed reſurrection of the antient power of France under a monarchy? It ſignifies nothing whether we are wrong or right in the abſtract; but in reſpect to our relation to Spain, with ſuch principles followed up in practice, it is abſolutely impoſſible that any cordial alliance can ſubſiſt between the two nations. If Spain goes, Naples will ſpeedily follow. Pruſſia is quite certain, and thinks of nothing but making a market of the preſent confuſions. Italy is broken and divided; Switzerland is jacobiniſed, I am afraid, completely. I have long ſeen with pain the progreſs

progreſs of French principles in that country. Things cannot go on upon the preſent bottom. The poſſeſſion of Toulon, which, well managed, might be of the greateſt advantage, will be the greateſt misfortune that ever happened to this nation. The more we multiply troops there, the more we ſhall multiply cauſes and means of quarrel amongſt ourſelves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which is to give a greater degree of ſimplicity to our politicks. Our ſituation does neceſſarily render them a good deal involved. And, to this evil, inſtead of increaſing it, we ought to apply all the remedies in our power.

See what is, in that place, the conſequence (to ſay nothing of every other) of this complexity. Toulon has, as it were, two gates, an Engliſh, and a Spaniſh. The Engliſh gate is, by our policy, faſt barred againſt the entrance of any royaliſts. The Spaniards open theirs, I fear, upon no fixed principle, and with very little judgment. By means, however, of this fooliſh, mean, and jealous policy on our ſide, all the royaliſts whom the Engliſh might ſelect as moſt practicable, and moſt ſubſervient to honeſt views, are totally excluded. Of thoſe admitted, the Spaniards are maſters. As to the inhabitants they are a neſt of jacobins which is delivered into our hands, not from principle, but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon may be deſcribed in a few words. It is *differtum nautis, cauponibus*

canponibus atque malignis. The reſt of the ſea-ports are of the ſame deſcription.

Another thing which I cannot account for is, the ſending for the biſhop of Toulon, and afterwards forbidding his entrance. This is as directly contrary to the declaration, as it is to the practice of the allied powers. The king of Pruſſia did better. When he took Verdun, he actually reinſtated the biſhop and his chapter. When he thought he ſhould be the maſter of Chalons, he called the biſhop from Flanders, to put him into poſſeſſion. The Auſtrians have reſtored the clergy wherever they obtained poſſeſſion. We have propoſed to reſtore religion as well as monarchy; and in Toulon we have reſtored neither the one nor the other. It is very likely that the jacobin ſans-culottes, or ſome of them, objected to this meaſure, who rather chooſe to have the atheiſtick buffoons of clergy they have got to ſport with, till they are ready to come forward, with the reſt of their worthy brethren, in Paris and other places, to declare that they are a ſet of impoſtors, that they never believed in God, and never will preach any ſort of religion. If we give way to our jacobins, in this point, it is fully and fairly putting the government, civil and eccleſiaſtical, not in the king of France, to whom as the protector and governor, and in ſubſtance the head of the Gallican church, the nomination to the biſhopricks belonged,

belonged, and who made the biſhop of Toulon; it does not leave it with him, or even in the hands of the king of England, or the king of Spain; but in the baſeſt jacobins of a low ſea-port, to exerciſe, *pro tempore*, the ſovereignty. If this point of religion is thus given up, the grand inſtrument for reclaiming France is abandoned. We cannot, if we would, delude ourſelves about the true ſtate of this dreadful conteſt. *It is a religious war.* It includes in its object undoubtedly every other intereſt of ſociety as well as this; but this is the principal and leading feature. It is through this deſtruction of religion that our enemies propoſe the accompliſhment of all their other views. The French revolution, impious at once and fanatical, had no other plan for domeſtick power and foreign empire. Look at all the proceedings of the national aſſembly from the firſt day of declaring itſelf ſuch in the year 1789, to this very hour, and you will find full half of their buſineſs to be directly on this ſubject. In fact it is the ſpirit of the whole. The religious ſyſtem, called the conſtitutional church, was on the face of the whole proceeding ſet up only as a mere temporary amuſement to the people, and ſo conſtantly ſtated in all their converſations, till the time ſhould come, when they might with ſafety caſt off the very appearance of all religion whatſoever, and perſecute chriſtianity throughout Europe with fire and ſword.

ſword. The conſtitutional clergy are not the miniſters of any religion: they are the agents and inſtruments of this horrible conſpiracy againſt all morals. It was from a ſenſe of this, that in the Engliſh addition to the articles propoſed at St. Domingo, tolerating all religions, we very wiſely refuſed to ſuffer that kind of traitors and buffoons.

This religious war is not a controverſy between ſect and ſect as formerly, but a war againſt all ſects and all religions. The queſtion is not whether you are to overturn the catholick, to ſet up the proteſtant. Such an idea in the preſent ſtate of the world is too contemptible. Our buſineſs is to leave to the ſchools the diſcuſſion of the controverted points, abating as much as we can the acrimony of diſputants on all ſides. It is for chriſtian ſtateſmen, as the world is now circumſtanced, to ſecure their common baſis, and not to riſk the ſubverſion of the whole fabrick by purſuing theſe diſtinctions with an ill-timed zeal. We have in the preſent grand alliance, all modes of government as well as all modes of religion. In government, we mean to reſtore that which, notwithſtanding our diverſity of forms, we are all agreed in as fundamental in government. The ſame principle ought to guide us in the religious part; conforming the mode, not to our particular ideas (for in that point we have no ideas in common), but to what will beſt promote the great general

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ends of the alliance. As ſtateſmen we are to ſee which of thoſe modes beſt ſuits with the intereſts of ſuch a commonwealth as we wiſh to ſecure and promote. There can be no doubt, but that the catholick religion, which is fundamentally the religion of France, muſt go with the monarchy of France; we know that the monarchy did not ſurvive the hierarchy, no not even in appearance, for many months; in ſubſtance, not for a ſingle hour. As little can it exiſt in future, if that pillar is taken away, or even ſhattered and impaired.

If it ſhould pleaſe God to give to the allies the means of reſtoring peace and order in that focus of war and confuſion, I would, as I ſaid in the beginning of this memorial, firſt replace the whole of the old clergy: becauſe we have proof more than ſufficient, that whether they err or not in the ſcholaſtick diſputes with us, they are not tainted with atheiſm, the great political evil of the time. I hope I need not apologize for this phraſe, as if I thought religion nothing but policy; it is far from my thoughts; and I hope it is not to be inferred from my expreſſions. But in the light of policy alone I am here conſidering the queſtion. I ſpeak of policy too in a large light; in which large light, policy too is a ſacred thing.

There are many, perhaps half a million or more, calling themſelves proteſtants, in the ſouth of France, and in other of the provinces. Some raiſe them

them to a much greater number, but I think this nearer to the mark. I am ſorry to ſay, that they have behaved ſhockingly ſince the very beginning of this rebellion, and have been uniformly concerned in its worſt and moſt atrocious acts. Their clergy are juſt the ſame atheiſts with thoſe of the conſtitutional catholicks; but ſtill more wicked and daring. Three of their number have met, from their republican aſſociates, the reward of their crimes.

As the antient catholick religion is to be reſtored for the body of France, the antient calviniſtick religion ought to be reſtored for the proteſtants with every kind of protection and privilege. But not one miniſter concerned in this rebellion ought to be ſuffered amongſt them. If they have not clergy of their own, men well recommended as untainted with jacobiniſm, by the ſynods of thoſe places where calviniſm prevails and French is ſpoken, ought to be ſought. Many ſuch there are. The preſbyterian diſcipline ought, in my opinion, to be eſtabliſhed in its vigour, and the people profeſſing it ought to be bound to its maintenance. No man, under the falſe and hypocritical pretence of liberty of conſcience, ought to be ſuffered to have no conſcience at all. The king's commiſſioner ought alſo to ſit in their ſynods as before the revocation of the edict of Nantz. I am conſcious, that this diſcipline diſpoſes men to republicaniſm: but it is ſtill a diſcipline, and it is a cure (ſuch as it

is) for the perverſe and undiſciplined habits which for ſome time have prevailed. Republicaniſm repreſſed may have its uſe in the compoſition of a ſtate. Inſpection may be practicable, and reſponſibility in the teachers and elders may be eſtabliſhed in ſuch an hierarchy as the preſbyterian. For a time like ours, it is a great point gained, that people ſhould be taught to meet, to combine, and to be claſſed and arrayed in ſome other way than in clubs of jacobins. If it be not the beſt mode of proteſtantiſm under a monarchy, it is ſtill an orderly chriſtian church, orthodox in the fundamentals, and, what is to our point, capable enough of rendering men uſeful citizens. It was the impolitick abolition of their diſcipline which expoſed them to the wild opinions and conduct, that have prevailed amongſt the hugonots. The toleration in 1787 was owing to the good diſpoſition of the late king; but it was modified by the profligate folly of his atheiſtick miniſter the Cardinal de Lomenie. This miſchievous miniſter did not follow, in the edict of toleration, the wiſdom of the edict of Nantz. But his toleration was granted to *non-catholicks*—a dangerous word, which might ſignify any thing, and was but too expreſſive of a fatal indifference with regard to all piety. I ſpeak for myſelf: I do not wiſh any man to be converted from his ſect. The diſtinctions which we have reformed from animoſity to emulation may be even uſeful to the cauſe of religion. By ſome moderate

contention they keep alive zeal. Whereas people who change, except under ſtrong conviction (a thing now rather rare) the religion of their early prejudices, eſpecially if the converſion is brought about by any political machine, are very apt to degenerate into indifference, laxity, and often downright atheiſm.

Another political queſtion ariſes about the mode of government which ought to be eſtabliſhed. I think the proclamation (which I read before I had proceeded far in this memorial) puts it on the beſt footing, by poſtponing that arrangement to a time of peace.

When our politicks lead us to enterpriſe a great, and almoſt total political revolution in Europe, we ought to look ſeriouſly into the conſequences of what we are about to do. Some eminent perſons diſcover an apprehenſion that the monarchy, if reſtored in France, may be reſtored in too great ſtrength for the liberty and happineſs of the natives, and for the tranquillity of other ſtates. They are therefore of opinion that terms ought to be made for the modification of that monarchy. They are perſons too conſiderable from the powers of their mind, and from their ſituation, as well as from the real reſpect I have for them, who ſeem to entertain theſe apprehenſions, to let me paſs them by unnoticed.

As to the power of France, as a ſtate, and in its

exteriour relations, I confeſs my fears are on the part of its extreme reduction. There is undoubtedly ſomething in the vicinity of France, which makes it naturally and properly an object of our watchfulneſs and jealouſy, whatever form its government may take. But the difference is great between a plan for our own ſecurity, and a ſcheme for the utter deſtruction of France. If there were no other countries in the political map but theſe two, I admit that policy might juſtify a wiſh to lower our neighbour to a ſtandard which would even render her in ſome meaſure, if not wholly, our dependent. But the ſyſtem of Europe is extenſive and extremely complex. However formidable to us as taken in this one relation, France is not equally dreadful to all other ſtates. On the contrary my clear opinion is, that the liberties of Europe cannot poſſibly be preſerved, but by her remaining a very great and preponderating power. The deſign at preſent evidently purſued by the combined potentates, or of the two who lead, is totally to deſtroy her as ſuch a power. For Great Britain reſolves that ſhe ſhall have no colonies, no commerce, and no marine. Auſtria means to take away the whole frontier from the borders of Switzerland, to Dunkirk. It is their plan alſo to render the interiour government lax and feeble, by preſcribing by force of the arms of rival and jealous nations, and without conſulting the natural

intereſts

intereſts of the kingdom, ſuch arrangements as in the actual ſtate of jacobiniſm in France, and the unſettled ſtate in which property muſt remain for a long time, will inevitably produce ſuch diſtraction and debility in government, as to reduce it to nothing, or to throw it back into its old confuſion. One cannot conceive ſo frightful a ſtate of a nation. A maritime country, without a marine, and without commerce; a continental country without a frontier, and for a thouſand miles ſurrounded with powerful, warlike, and ambitious neighbours! It is poſſible, that ſhe might ſubmit to loſe her commerce and her colonies; her ſecurity ſhe never can abandon. If, contrary to all expectations, under ſuch a diſgraced and impotent government, any energy ſhould remain in that country, ſhe will make every effort to recover her ſecurity, which will involve Europe for a century in war and blood. What has it coſt to France to make that frontier? What will it coſt to recover it? Auſtria thinks that without a frontier ſhe cannot ſecure the *Netherlands*. But without her frontier France cannot ſecure *herſelf*. Auſtria has been however ſecure for an hundred years in thoſe very Netherlands, and has never been diſpoſſeſſed of them by the chance of war, without a moral certainty of receiving them again on the reſtoration of peace. Her late dangers have ariſen not from the power or ambition of the king of France.

They aroſe from her own ill policy, which diſmantled all her towns, and diſcontented all her ſubjects by jacobinical innovations. She diſmantles her own towns, and then ſays, Give me the frontier of France. But let us depend upon it, whatever tends, under the name of ſecurity, to aggrandize Auſtria, will diſcontent and alarm Pruſſia. Such a length of frontier on the ſide of France, ſeparated from itſelf, and ſeparated from the maſs of the Auſtrian country, will be weak, unleſs connected at the expence of the elector of Bavaria (the elector Palatine) and other leſſer princes, or by ſuch exchanges as will again convulſe the empire.

Take it the other way, and let us ſuppoſe that France ſo broken in ſpirit as to be content to remain naked and defenceleſs by ſea and by land, is ſuch a country no prey? Have other nations no views? Is Poland the only country of which it is worth while to make a partition? We cannot be ſo childiſh as to imagine, that ambition is local, and that no others can be infected with it but thoſe who rule within certain parallels of latitude and longitude. In this way I hold war equally certain. But I can conceive that both theſe principles may operate, ambition on the part of Auſtria, to cut more and more from France, and French impatience under her degraded and unſafe condition. In ſuch a conteſt will the other powers ſtand by? Will not Pruſſia call for indemnity as well

well as Auſtria and England? Is ſhe ſatisfied with her gains in Poland? By no means. Germany muſt pay; or we ſhall infallibly ſee Pruſſia leagued with France and Spain, and poſſibly with other powers, for the reduction of Auſtria; and ſuch may be the ſituation of things, that it will not be ſo eaſy to decide what part England may take in ſuch a conteſt.

I am well aware how invidious a taſk it is to oppoſe any thing which tends to the apparent aggrandizement of our own country. But I think no country can be aggrandized whilſt France is jacobiniſed. This poſt removed, it will be a ſerious queſtion how far her further reduction will contribute to the general ſafety which I always conſider as included. Among precautions againſt ambition, it may not be amiſs to take one precaution againſt our *own*. I muſt fairly ſay, I dread our *own* power, and our *own* ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to ſay we are not men; and that, as men, we ſhall never wiſh to aggrandize ourſelves in ſome way or other. Can we ſay, that even at this very hour we are not invidiouſly aggrandized? We are already in poſſeſſion of almoſt all the commerce of the world. Our empire in India is an awful thing. If we ſhould come to be in a condition not only to have all this aſcendant in commerce, but to be abſolutely able, without the leaſt controul, to hold

the commerce of all other nations totally dependent upon our good pleaſure, we may ſay that we ſhall not abuſe this aſtoniſhing, and hitherto unheard-of power. But every other nation will think we ſhall abuſe it. It is impoſſible but that, ſooner or later, this ſtate of things muſt produce a combination againſt us which may end in our ruin.

As to France, I muſt obſerve that for a long time ſhe has been ſtationary. She has, during this whole century, obtained far leſs by conqueſt or negotiation than any of the three great continental powers. Some part of Lorraine excepted, I recollect nothing ſhe has gained; no not a village. In truth, this Lorraine acquiſition does little more than ſecure her barrier. In effect and ſubſtance it was her own before.

However that may be, I conſider theſe things at preſent chiefly in one point of view, as obſtructions to the war on jacobiniſm, which *muſt* ſtand as long as the powers think its extirpation but a *ſecondary* object, and think of taking advantage under the name of *indemnity* and *ſecurity* to make war upon the whole nation of France royal, and jacobin, for the aggrandizement of the allies on the ordinary principles of intereſt, as if no jacobiniſm exiſted in the world.

So far is France from being formidable to its neighbours for its domeſtick ſtrength, that I conceive

ceive it will be as much as all its neighbours can do, by a ſteady guarantee, to keep that monarchy at all upon its baſis. It will be their buſineſs to nurſe France, not to exhauſt it. France, ſuch as it is, is indeed highly formidable. Not formidable, however, as a great republick; but as the moſt dreadful gang of robbers and murderers that ever was embodied. But this diſtempered ſtrength of France, will be the cauſe of proportionable weakneſs on its recovery. Never was a country ſo completely ruined; and they who calculate the reſurrection of her power by former examples have not ſufficiently conſidered what is the preſent ſtate of things. Without detailing the inventory of what organs of government have been deſtroyed, together with the very materials of which alone they can be recompoſed, I wiſh it to be conſidered what an operoſe affair the whole ſyſtem of taxation is in the old ſtates of Europe. It is ſuch as never could be made but in a long courſe of years. In France, all taxes are aboliſhed. The preſent powers reſort to the capital; and to the capital in kind. But a ſavage undiſciplined people ſuffer a *robbery* with more patience than an *impoſt*. The former is in their habits and their diſpoſitions. They conſider it as tranſient, and as what, in their turn, they may exerciſe. But the terrours of the preſent power are ſuch as no regular government can poſſibly employ. They who

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enter into France do not ſucceed to *their* reſources. They have not a ſyſtem to reform, but a ſyſtem to begin. The whole eſtate of government is to be reacquired.

What difficulties this will meet with in a country exhauſted by the taking of the capital, and, among a people, in a manner new principled, trained, and actually diſciplined to anarchy, rebellion, diſorder, and impiety, may be conceived by thoſe who know what jacobin France is, and who may have occupied themſelves by revolving in their thoughts, what they were to do if it fell to their lot to re-eſtabliſh the affairs of France. What ſupport, or what limitations the reſtored monarchy muſt have, may be a doubt, or how it will pitch and ſettle at laſt: But one thing I conceive to be far beyond a doubt: that the ſettlement cannot be immediate; but that it muſt be preceded by ſome ſort of power, equal at leaſt in vigour, vigilance, promptitude and deciſion to a military government. For ſuch a *preparatory* government, no ſlow-paced, methodical, formal, lawyer-like ſyſtem, ſtill leſs that of a ſhewy, ſuperficial, trifling, intriguing court, guided by cabals of ladies, or of men like ladies; leaſt of all, a philoſophick, theoretick, diſputatious ſchool of ſophiſtry. None of theſe ever will, or ever can lay the foundations of an order that can laſt. Whoever claims a right by birth to govern there,

muſt

muſt find in his breaſt, or muſt conjure up in it, an energy not to be expected, perhaps not always to be wiſhed for, in well ordered ſtates. The lawful prince muſt have, in every thing but crime, the character of an uſurper. He is gone, if he imagines himſelf the quiet poſſeſſor of a throne. He is to contend for it as much after an apparent conqueſt as before. His taſk is to win it; he muſt leave poſterity to enjoy and to adorn it. No velvet cuſhions for him. He is to be always (I ſpeak nearly to the letter) on horſeback. This opinion is the reſult of much patient thinking on the ſubject, which I conceive no event is likely to alter.

A valuable friend of mine, who I hope will conduct theſe affairs ſo far as they fall to his ſhare, with great ability, aſked me what I thought of acts of general indemnity and oblivion, as a means of ſettling France, and reconciling it to monarchy. Before I venture upon any opinion of my own in this matter, I totally diſclaim the interference of foreign powers in a buſineſs that properly belongs to the government which we have declared legal. That government is likely to be the beſt judge of what is to be done towards the ſecurity of that kingdom, which it is their duty and their intereſt to provide for by ſuch meaſures of juſtice or of lenity, as at the time they ſhould find beſt. But if we weaken it, not only by arbitrary

bitrary limitations of our own, but preſerve ſuch perſons in it as are diſpoſed to diſturb its future peace, as they have its paſt. I do not know how a more direct declaration can be made of a diſpoſition to perpetual hoſtility againſt a government. The perſons ſaved from the juſtice of the native magiſtrate, by foreign authority, will owe nothing to his clemency. He will, and muſt, look to thoſe to whom he is indebted for the power he has of diſpenſing it. A jacobin faction, conſtantly foſtered with the nouriſhment of foreign protection, will be kept alive.

This deſire of ſecuring the ſafety of the actors in the preſent ſcene is owing to more laudable motives. Miniſters have been made to conſider the brothers of the late merciful king, and the nobility of France, who have been faithful to their honour and duty, as a ſet of inexorable and remorſeleſs tyrants. How this notion has been infuſed into them, I cannot be quite certain. I am ſure it is not juſtified by any thing they have done. Never were the two princes guilty, in the day of their power, of a ſingle hard or ill-natured act. No one inſtance of cruelty on the part of the gentlemen ever came to my ears. It is true that the *Engliſh* jacobins (the natives have not thought of it), as an excuſe for their infernal ſyſtem of murder, have ſo repreſented them. It is on this principle, that the maſſacres in the month

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of September 1792 were juſtified by a writer in the Morning Chronicle. *He* ſays, indeed, that "the whole French nation is to be given up to "the hands of an irritated and revengeful no-"bleſſe:"—and judging of others by himſelf and his brethren, he ſays, "Whoever ſucceeds in a "civil war, will be cruel. But here the emigrants "flying to revenge in the cars of military vic-"tory, will almoſt inſatiably call for their victims "and their booty; and a body of emigrant trai-"tors were attending the king of Pruſſia, and "the duke of Brunſwick, to ſuggeſt the moſt "ſanguinary counſels." So ſays this wicked jacobin; but ſo cannot ſay the king of Pruſſia nor the duke of Brunſwick, who never did receive any ſanguinary counſel; nor did the king's brothers, or that great body of gentlemen who attended thoſe princes, commit one ſingle cruel action, or hurt the perſon or property of one individual. It would be right to quote the inſtance. It is like the military luxury attributed to theſe unfortunate ſufferers in our common cauſe.

If theſe princes had ſhewn a tyrannick diſpoſition, it would be much to be lamented. We have no others to govern France. If we ſcreened the body of murderers from their juſtice, we ſhould only leave the innocent in future to the mercy of men of fierce and ſanguinary diſpoſitions, of which in ſpite of all our intermeddling in their conſtitution,

tion, we could not prevent the effects. But as we have much more reaſon to fear their feeble lenity than any blameable rigour, we ought, in my opinion, to leave the matter to themſelves.

If however I were aſked to give an advice merely as ſuch—here are my ideas. I am not for a total indemnity, nor a general puniſhment. And firſt, the body and maſs of the people never ought to be treated as criminal. They may become an object of more or leſs conſtant watchfulneſs and ſuſpicion, as their preſervation may beſt require, but they can never become an object of puniſhment. This is one of the few fundamental and unalterable principles of politicks.

To puniſh them capitally would be to make maſſacres. Maſſacres only increaſe the ferocity of men, and teach them to regard their own lives and thoſe of others as of little value; whereas the great policy of government is to teach the people to think both of great importance in the eyes of God and the ſtate, and never to be ſacrificed or even hazarded to gratify their paſſions, or for any thing but the duties preſcribed by the rules of morality, and under the direction of publick law and publick authority. To puniſh them with leſſer penalties would be to debilitate the commonwealth, and make the nation miſerable, which it is the buſineſs of government to render happy and flouriſhing.

As to crimes too, I would draw a ſtrong line of limitation. For no one offence, *politically an offence of rebellion*, by council, contrivance, perſuaſion or compulſion, for none properly a *military offence of rebellion*, or any thing done by open hoſtility in the field, ſhould any man at all be called in queſtion; becauſe ſuch ſeems to be the proper and natural death of civil diſſenſions. The offences of war are obliterated by peace.

Another claſs will of courſe be included in the indemnity, namely, all thoſe who by their activity in reſtoring lawful government ſhall obliterate their offences. The offence previouſly known, the acceptance of ſervice is a pardon for crimes. I fear that this claſs of men will not be very numerous.

So far as to indemnity. But where are the objects of juſtice, and of example, and of future ſecurity to the publick peace? They are naturally pointed out, not by their having outraged political and civil laws, nor their having rebelled againſt the ſtate, as a ſtate, but by their having rebelled againſt the law of nature, and outraged man as man. In this liſt, all the regicides in general, all thoſe who laid ſacrilegious hands on the king, who without any thing in their own rebellious miſſion to the convention to juſtify them, brought him to his trial and unanimouſly voted him guilty; all thoſe who had a ſhare in the cruel murder of the queen, and the deteſtable proceed-

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ings with regard to the young king, and the unhappy princeſſes; all thoſe who committed cold-blooded murder any where, and particularly in their revolutionary tribunals, where every idea of natural juſtice and of their own declared rights of man, have been trod under foot with the moſt inſolent mockery; all men concerned in the burning and demolition of houſes or churches, with audacious and marked acts of ſacrilege and ſcorn offered to religion; in general, all the leaders of jacobin clubs;—not one of theſe ſhould eſcape a puniſhment ſuitable to the nature, quality and degree of their offence, by a ſteady but a meaſured juſtice.

In the firſt place, no man ought to be ſubject to any penalty, from the higheſt to the loweſt, but by a trial according to the courſe of law, carried on with all that caution and deliberation which has been uſed in the beſt times and precedents of the French juriſprudence, the criminal law of which country, faulty to be ſure in ſome particulars, was highly laudable and tender of the lives of men. In reſtoring order and juſtice, every thing like retaliation, ought to be religiouſly avoided; and an example ought to be ſet of a total alienation from the jacobin proceedings in their accurſed revolutionary tribunals. Every thing like lumping men in maſſes, and of forming tables of proſcription, ought to be avoided.

In all theſe puniſhments, any thing which can be

be alleged in mitigation of the offence ſhould be fully conſidered. Mercy is not a thing oppoſed to juſtice. It is an eſſential part of it; as neceſſary in criminal caſes, as in civil affairs equity is to law. It is only for the jacobins never to pardon. They have not done it in a ſingle inſtance. A council of mercy ought therefore to be appointed, with powers to report on each caſe, to ſoften the penalty, or entirely to remit it, according to circumſtances.

With theſe precautions, the very firſt foundation of ſettlement muſt be to call to a ſtrict account thoſe bloody and mercileſs offenders. Without it government cannot ſtand a year. People little conſider the utter impoſſibility of getting thoſe who having emerged from very low, ſome from the loweſt claſſes, of ſociety, have exerciſed a power ſo high, and with ſuch unrelenting and bloody a rage, quietly to fall back into their old ranks, and become humble, peaceable, laborious and uſeful members of ſociety. It never can be. On the other hand is it to be believed, that any worthy and virtuous ſubject, reſtored to the ruins of his houſe, will with patience ſee the cold-blooded murderer of his father, mother, wife, or children, or perhaps all of theſe relations, (ſuch things have been) noſe him in his own village, and inſult him with the riches acquired from the plunder of his goods, ready again to head a ja-

cobin faction to attack his life? He is unworthy of the name of man who would ſuffer it. It is unworthy of the name of a government, which, taking juſtice out of the private hand, will not exerciſe it for the injured by the publick arm.

I know it ſounds plauſible, and is really adopted by thoſe who have little ſympathy with the ſufferings of others, to wiſh to jumble the innocent and guilty into one maſs, by a general indemnity. This cruel indifference dignifies itſelf with the name of humanity.

It is extraordinary that as the wicked arts of this regicide and tyrannous faction increaſe in number, variety, and atrocity, the deſire of puniſhing them becomes more and more faint, and the talk of an indemnity towards them, every day ſtronger and ſtronger. Our ideas of juſtice appear to be fairly conquered and overpowered by guilt when it is grown gigantick. It is not the point of view in which we are in the habit of viewing guilt. The crimes we every day puniſh are really below the penalties we inflict. The criminals are obſcure and feeble. This is the view in which we ſee ordinary crimes and criminals. But when guilt is ſeen, though but for a time, to be furniſhed with the arms and to be inveſted with the robes of power, it ſeems to aſſume another nature, and to get, as it were, out of our juriſdiction.

juriſdiction. This I fear is the caſe with many. But there is another cauſe full as powerful towards this ſecurity to enormous guilt, the deſire which poſſeſſes people who have once obtained power, to enjoy it at their eaſe. It is not humanity, but lazineſs and inertneſs of mind which produces the deſire of this kind of indemnities. This deſcription of men love general and ſhort methods. If they puniſh, they make a promiſcuous maſſacre; if they ſpare, they make a general act of oblivion. This is a want of diſpoſition to proceed laboriouſly according to the caſes, and according to the rules and principles of juſtice on each caſe; a want of diſpoſition to aſſort criminals, to diſcriminate the degrees and modes of guilt, to ſeparate accomplices from principals, leaders from followers, ſeducers from the ſeduced, and then, by following the ſame principles in the ſame detail, to claſs puniſhments, and to fit them to the nature and kind of the delinquency. If that were once attempted, we ſhould ſoon ſee that the taſk was neither infinite, nor the execution cruel. There would be deaths, but, for the number of criminals, and the extent of France, not many. There would be caſes of tranſportation; caſes of labour to reſtore what has been wickedly deſtroyed; caſes of impriſonment, and caſes of mere exile. But be this as it may, I am ſure that if juſtice is not done there, there can be

neither peace nor juſtice there, nor in any part of Europe.

Hiſtory is reſorted to for other acts of indemnity in other times. The princes are deſired to look back to Henry the Fourth. We are deſired to look to the reſtoration of king Charles. Theſe things, in my opinion, have no reſemblance whatſoever. They were caſes of a civil war; in France more ferocious, in England more moderate than common. In neither country were the orders of ſociety ſubverted; religion and morality deſtroyed on principle, or property totally annihilated. In England, the government of Cromwell was to be ſure ſomewhat rigid, but for a new power, no ſavage tyranny. The country was nearly as well in his hands as in thoſe of Charles the Second, and in ſome points much better. The laws in general had their courſe, and were admirably adminiſtered. The king did not in reality grant an act of indemnity; the prevailing power, then in a manner the nation, in effect granted an indemnity to *him*. The idea of a preceding rebellion was not at all admitted in that convention and that parliament. The regicides were a common enemy, and as ſuch given up.

Among the ornaments of their place which eminently diſtinguiſh them, few people are better acquainted with the hiſtory of their own country than

than the illuſtrious princes now in exile; but I caution them not to be led into errour by that which has been ſuppoſed to be the guide of life. I would give the ſame caution to all princes. Not that I derogate from the uſe of hiſtory. It is a great improver of the underſtanding, by ſhewing both men and affairs in a great variety of views. From this ſource much political wiſdom may be learned; that is, may be learned as habit, not as precept; and as an exerciſe to ſtrengthen the mind, as furniſhing materials to enlarge and enrich it, not as a repertory of caſes and precedents for a lawyer: if it were, a thouſand times better would it be that a ſtateſman had never learned to read—*vellem neſcirent literas.* This method turns their underſtanding from the object before them, and from the preſent exigencies of the world, to compariſons with former times, of which, after all, we can know very little and very imperfectly; and our guides, the hiſtorians, who are to give us their true interpretation, are often prejudiced, often ignorant, often fonder of ſyſtem than of truth. Whereas if a man with reaſonable good parts and natural ſagacity, and not in the leading-ſtrings of any maſter, will look ſteadily on the buſineſs before him, without being diverted by retroſpect and compariſon, he may be capable of forming a reaſonable good judgment of what is to be done. There are ſome funda-

mental points in which nature never changes—but they are few and obvious, and belong rather to morals than to politicks. But ſo far as regards political matter, the human mind and human affairs are ſuſceptible of infinite modifications, and of combinations wholly new and unlooked for. Very few, for inſtance, could have imagined that property, which has been taken for natural dominion, ſhould, through the whole of a vaſt kingdom, loſe all its importance and even its influence. This is what hiſtory or books of ſpeculation could hardly have taught us. How many could have thought, that the moſt complete and formidable revolution in a great empire ſhould be made by men of letters, not as ſubordinate inſtruments and trumpeters of ſedition, but as the chief contrivers and managers, and in a ſhort time as the open adminiſtrators and ſovereign rulers?—Who could have imagined that atheiſm could produce one of the moſt violently operative principles of fanaticiſm? Who could have imagined that, in a commonwealth in a manner cradled in war, and in an extenſive and dreadful war, military commanders ſhould be of little or no account? That the convention ſhould not contain one military man of name? That adminiſtrative bodies in a ſtate of the utmoſt confuſion, and of but a momentary duration, and compoſed of men with not one impoſing part of character,

character, ſhould be able to govern the country and its armies, with an authority which the moſt ſettled ſenates, and the moſt reſpected monarchs ſcarcely ever had in the ſame degree? This, for one, I confeſs I did not foreſee, though all the reſt was preſent to me very early, and not out of my apprehenſion even for ſeveral years.

I believe very few were able to enter into the effects of mere *terrour*, as a principle not only for the ſupport of power in given hands or forms, but in thoſe things in which the ſoundeſt political ſpeculators were of opinion, that the leaſt appearance of force would be totally deſtructive, —ſuch is the market, whether of money, proviſion, or commodities of any kind. Yet for four years we have ſeen loans made, treaſuries ſupplied, and armies levied and maintained, more numerous than France ever ſhewed in the field, by the *effects of fear alone.*

Here is a ſtate of things of which, in its totality, if hiſtory furniſhes any examples at all, they are very remote and feeble. I therefore am not ſo ready as ſome are, to tax with folly or cowardice, thoſe who were not prepared to meet an evil of this nature. Even now, after the events, all the cauſes may be ſomewhat difficult to aſcertain. Very many are however traceable. But theſe things hiſtory and books of ſpeculation (as I have already ſaid) did not teach men to foreſee,

and of courſe to reſiſt. Now that they are no longer a matter of ſagacity, but of experience, of recent experience, of our own experience, it would be unjuſtifiable to go back to the records of other times, to inſtruct us to manage what they never enabled us to foreſee.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS FROM VATTELL'S LAW OF NATIONS

[The Titles, marginal Abſtracts and Notes, are by Mr. Burke, excepting ſuch of the Notes as are here diſtinguiſhed.]

CASES OF INTERFERENCE WITH INDEPENDENT POWERS.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. § 53.

IF then there is any where a nation of a *reſtleſs and miſchievous* diſpoſition, always ready to *injure others, to traverſe their deſigns, and to raiſe domeſtick troubles,** it is not to be doubted, that all have a right to join *in order to repreſs, chaſtiſe, and put it ever after out of its power* to injure them. Such ſhould be the juſt fruits of the policy which Machiavel praiſes in Cæſar Borgia. The conduct followed by Philip II. king of Spain, *was adapted to unite all Europe againſt him;* and it was from juſt reaſons that Henry the Great formed the de-

* This is the caſe of France—Semonville at Turin—Jacobin clubs—Liegois meeting—Flemiſh meeting—La Fayette's anſwer—Cloot's embaſſy—Avignon.

ſign

ſign of humbling a power, *formidable by its forces, and pernicious by its maxims.*

§ 70. Let us apply to the unjuſt, what we have ſaid above (§ 53), of a miſchievous, or maleficent nation. If there be any that makes an open profeſſion *of trampling juſtice under foot, of deſpiſing and violating the right of others,** whenever it finds an opportunity, *the intereſt of human ſociety will authorize all others to unite, in order to humble and chaſtiſe it.* We do not here forget the maxim eſtabliſhed in our preliminaries, that it does not belong to nations to uſurp the power of being judges of each other. In particular caſes, liable to the leaſt doubt, it ought to be ſuppoſed, that each of the parties may have ſome right: and the injuſtice of that which has committed the injury, may proceed from errour, and not from a general contempt of juſtice. *But if, by conſtant maxims, and by a continued conduct,* one nation ſhews, that it has evidently this pernicious diſpoſition, and that it conſiders no right as ſacred, the ſafety of the human race requires that it ſhould be ſuppreſſed. To form and ſupport an unjuſt pretenſion, is to do an injury *not only to him who is intereſted in this pretenſion, but to mock at juſtice in general, and to injure all nations.*

To ſuccour againſt Tyranny.

§ 56. If the prince, attacking the fundamental laws, gives his ſubjects a legal right to reſiſt him;

* The French acknowledge no power not directly emanating from the people.

if

if tyranny, *becoming inſupportable*, obliges the nation to riſe in their defence; every foreign power has a right to ſuccour an oppreſſed people who implore their aſſiſtance. The Engliſh juſtly complained of James the Second. *The nobility, and the moſt diſtinguiſhed patriots*, reſolved to put a check on his enterprizes, which manifeſtly tended to overthrow the conſtitution, and to deſtroy the liberties and the religion of the people; *and therefore applied for aſſiſtance to the United Provinces.* The authority of the prince of Orange had, doubtleſs, an influence on the deliberations of the ſtates-general; but it did not make them commit injuſtice; for when a people, from good reaſons, take up arms againſt an oppreſſor, *juſtice and generoſity require, that brave men ſhould be aſſiſted in the defence of their liberties.* Whenever, therefore, a civil war is kindled in a ſtate, foreign powers may aſſiſt that party which appears to them to have juſtice on their ſide. *He who aſſiſts an odious* tyrant; *he who declares* FOR AN UNJUST AND REBELLIOUS PEOPLE, *offends againſt his duty.* When the bands of the political ſociety are broken, or at leaſt ſuſpended between the ſovereign and his people, they may then be conſidered as two diſtinct powers; and ſince each is independent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right; and each of thoſe who grant their aſſiſtance may believe that he ſupports a good cauſe.

Caſe of Engliſh Revolution.

Caſe of Civil War.

An odious Tyrant. Rebellious people.

Sovereign and his people when diſtinct powers.

cauſe. It follows then, in virtue of the voluntary laws of nations, (ſee Prelim. § 21) that the two parties may act as having an equal right, and behave accordingly, till the deciſion of the affair.

Not to be purſued to an extreme.

But we ought not to abuſe this maxim for authorizing odious proceedings againſt the tranquillity of ſtates.

Endeavour to perſuade ſubjects to a revolt.

It is a violation of the law of nations *to perſuade thoſe ſubjects to revolt who actually obey their ſovereign, though they complain of his government.*

The practice of nations is conformable to our maxims. When the German proteſtants came to the aſſiſtance of the reformed in France, the court never undertook to treat them otherwiſe than as common enemies, and according to the laws of war. France at the ſame time aſſiſted the Netherlands, which took up arms againſt Spain, and did not pretend that her troops ſhould be conſidered upon any other footing than as auxiliaries in a regular war.

Attempt to excite ſubjects to revolt.

But no *power avoids complaining of an atrocious injury, if any one attempts by his emiſſaries to excite his ſubjects to revolt.*

Tyrants.

As to thoſe monſters who, under the title of ſovereigns, render themſelves the ſcourges and horrour of the human race; theſe are ſavage beaſts, from which every brave man may juſtly purge the earth. All antiquity has praiſed Hercules for delivering the world from an Antæus, a Buſiris, and a Diomedes.

Book

Book 4. Chap. 2. § 14. After ſtating, that nations have no right to interfere in domeſtick concerns, he proceeds—"But this rule does not preclude them from eſpouſing the quarrel of a dethroned king, and aſſiſting him, if he appears to have juſtice on his ſide. They then declare themſelves enemies to the nation who has acknowledged his rival, as when two *different nations* are at war they are at liberty to aſſiſt that whoſe quarrel they think has the faireſt appearance."

CASE OF ALLIANCES.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. § 196.

It is aſked if that alliance ſubſiſts with the king, and the royal family, when by ſome revolution they are deprived of their crown? We have lately remarked, (§ 194) that a perſonal alliance expires with the reign of him who contracted it: but that is to be underſtood of an alliance with the ſtate, limited as to its duration, to the reign of the contracting king. This of which we are here ſpeaking, is of another nature. For though it binds the ſtate, ſince it is bound by all the publick acts of its ſovereign, it is made directly in favour of the king and his family; it would therefore be abſurd for it to terminate at the moment when they *have need of it, and at an event againſt which it was made.*

When an alliance to preſerve a King takes place.

Beſides,

King does not lose his quality by the loss of his kingdom.

Besides, the king does not lose his quality merely by the loss of his kingdom. * *If he is stripped of it unjustly by an usurper, or by rebels, he preserves his rights, in the number of which are* his alliances.

But who shall judge, if the king be dethroned lawfully or by violence? An independent nation

* By the seventh Article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, between France, England, and Holland, signed at the Hague, in the year 1717, it is stipulated, "that if the kingdoms, coun-" tries, or provinces, of any of the allies, are disturbed by in-" testine quarrels, or *by rebellions, on account of the said successions,* " [the protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain, and "the succession to the throne of France, as settled by the treaty " of Utrecht] or *under any other pretext whatever*, the ally thus " in trouble shall have full right to demand of his allies the suc-" cours abovementioned;" that is to say, the same succours as in the case of an invasion from any foreign power; 8000 foot and 2000 horse to be furnished by France or England, and 4000 foot and 1000 horse by the States General.

By the fourth Article of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE, between England, France, Holland, and the Emperour of Germany, signed in the year 1718, the contracting powers " promise and oblige themselves that they will and ought to " maintain, guarantee, and defend the right and succession to " the kingdom of France, according to the tenour of the treaties " made at Utrecht the 11th day of April, 1713; and this they " shall perform *against all persons whatsoever who may presume* " *to disturb the order of the said succession,* in contradiction to " the previous acts and treaties subsequent thereon."

The above treaties have been revived and confirmed by every subsequent treaty of peace between Great Britain and France.—EDIT.

acknowledges no judge. If the body of the nation declares the king deprived of his rights by the abuſe he has made of them, and depoſes him, it may juſtly do it *when its grievances are well founded*, and no other power has a right to cenſure it. The perſonal ally of this king, ought not then to aſſiſt him againſt the nation that has made uſe of its right in depoſing him: if he attempts it, he injures that nation. England declared war againſt Louis the XIV. in the year 1688, for ſupporting the intereſt of James the Second, who was depoſed in form by the nation. The ſame country declared war againſt him a ſecond time, at the beginning of the preſent century, becauſe that prince acknowledged the ſon of the depoſed James, under the name of James the Third. In doubtful caſes, and *when the body of the nation has not pronounced* OR HAS NOT PRONOUNCED FREELY, a ſovereign may naturally ſupport and defend an ally, and it is then that the voluntary law of nations ſubſiſts between different ſtates. The party that has driven out the king, pretends to have right on its ſide: this unhappy king and his ally, flatter themſelves with having the ſame advantage, and as they have no common judge upon earth, they have no other method to take but to apply to arms to terminate the diſpute: they therefore engage in a formal war.

Caſe wherein aid may be given to a depoſed King.

In ſhort, when the foreign prince has faithfully fulfilled

Not obliged to purſue his right beyond a certain point.

fulfilled his engagements towards an unfortunate monarch, when he has done in his defence, or to procure his reſtoration, all he was obliged to perform in virtue of the alliance; if his efforts are ineffectual, the dethroned prince cannot require him to ſupport an endleſs war in his favour, or expect that he will eternally remain the enemy of the nation, or of the ſovereign who has deprived him of the throne. He muſt think of peace, abandon the ally, and conſider him as having himſelf abandoned his right, through neceſſity. Thus Louis XIV. was obliged to abandon James the Second, and to acknowledge king William, though he had at firſt treated him as a uſurper.

Caſe of defence againſt ſubjects.

The ſame queſtion preſents itſelf in real alliances, and in general, in all alliances made with the ſtate, and not in particular with a king for the defence of his perſon. An ally ought, doubtleſs, to be defended againſt every invaſion, againſt every foreign violence, *and even againſt his rebellious ſubjects; in the ſame manner a republick ought to be defended againſt the enterprizes of one who attempts to deſtroy the publick liberty.* But it ought to be remembered, that an ally of the ſtate, or the nation, is not its judge. If the nation has depoſed its king in form; if the people of a republick have driven out their magiſtrates and ſet themſelves at liberty, or acknowledged the authority of an uſurper, either expreſsly or tacitly;

tacitly; to oppoſe theſe domeſtick regulations, by diſputing their juſtice or validity, would be to interfere in the government of the nation and to do it an injury, (ſee § 54, and following of this book). The ally remains the ally of the ſtate, notwithſtanding the change that has happened in it. *However, when this change renders the alliance uſeleſs, dangerous or diſagreeable, it may renounce it: for it may ſay, upon a good foundation, that it would not have entered into an alliance with that nation, had it been under the preſent form of government.*

Caſe where real alliances may be renounced.

We may ſay here, what we have ſaid on a perſonal alliance: however juſt the cauſe of that king may be, who is driven from the throne, either by his ſubjects or by a foreign uſurper; his allies are not obliged to ſupport *an eternal war* in his favour. After having made ineffectual efforts to reſtore him, they muſt at length give peace to their people, and come to an accommodation with the uſurper, and for that purpoſe treat with him as with a lawful ſovereign. Louis XIV. exhauſted by a bloody and unſucceſsful war, offered at Gertruydenburg to abandon his grandſon, whom he had placed on the throne of Spain: and when affairs had changed their appearance, Charles of Auſtria, the rival of Philip, ſaw himſelf, in his turn, abandoned by his allies. They grew weary of exhauſting their ſtates, in order to give him the poſſeſſion of a crown, which they

Not an eternal war.

believed to be his due, but which, to all appearance, they ſhould never be able to procure for him.

DANGEROUS POWER.

BOOK III. CHAP. III. § 45.

All nations may join.

It is ſtill eaſier to prove, that ſhould this formidable power betray any unjuſt and ambitious diſpoſitions, by doing the leaſt injuſtice to another, every nation may avail themſelves of the occaſion, and join their forces to thoſe of the party injured, in order to reduce that ambitious power, and diſable it from ſo eaſily oppreſſing its neighbours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear. For an injury gives a nation a right to provide for its future ſafety, by taking away from the violator the means of oppreſſion. It is lawful, and even praiſe-worthy, to aſſiſt thoſe who are oppreſſed, or unjuſtly attacked.

SYSTEM OF EUROPE.

§ 47. Europe forms a political ſyſtem, a body, where the whole is connected by the relations and different intereſts of nations inhabiting this part of the world. It is not, as antiently, a confuſed heap of detached pieces, each of which thought itſelf very little concerned in the fate of others, and ſeldom regarded things which did not immediately relate

relate to it. The continual attention of ſovereigns to what is on the carpet, the conſtant reſidence of miniſters, and the *perpetual negotiations, make Europe a kind of a republick, the members of which, though independent, unite, through the ties of common intereſt, for the maintenance of order and liberty.* Hence aroſe that famous ſcheme of the political equilibrium, or balance of power; by which is underſtood ſuch a diſpoſition of things, as no power is able abſolutely to predominate, or to preſcribe laws to others.

Europe a republick to preſerve order and liberty.

§ 49. Confederacies would be a ſure way of preſerving the equilibrium, and ſupporting the liberty of nations, did all princes thoroughly underſtand their true intereſts, and regulate all their ſteps for the good of the ſtate.

CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY.

BOOK III. CHAP. IX. § 165.

Inſtead of the pillage of the country, and defenceleſs places, a cuſtom has been ſubſtituted more humane and more advantageous to the ſovereign making war: I mean that of contributions. Whoever carries *on a juſt war,** *has a*

* Contributions raiſed by the Duke of Brunſwick in France. Compare theſe with the contributions raiſed by the French in the Netherlands.—EDIT.

right of making the enemy's country contribute to the ſupport of the army, and towards defraying all the charges of the war. Thus he obtains a part of what is due to him, and the ſubjects of the enemy, on ſubmitting to this impoſition, are ſecured from pillage, and the country is preſerved: but a general who would not ſully his reputation, is to moderate his contributions, and proportion them to thoſe on whom they are impoſed. An exceſs in this point, is not without the reproach of cruelty and inhumanity: if it ſhews leſs ferocity than ravage and deſtruction, it glares with avarice.

To be moderate.

ASYLUM.

BOOK I. CHAP. XIX. § 232.

If an exile or baniſhed man is driven from his country for any crime, it does *not* belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge to puniſh him for a fault committed in a foreign country. For nature gives to mankind and to nations the right of puniſhing only for their defence and ſafety; whence it follows that he can only be puniſhed by thoſe whom he has offended.

§ 233. But this reaſon ſhews, that if the juſtice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the puniſhment of crimes committed within its own territories, we ought to except from this

rule the villains who, by the quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public ſecurity, and declare themſelves the enemies of the human race. Poiſoners, aſſaſſins, and incendiaries by profeſſion, may be exterminated wherever they are ſeized; for they attack and injure all nations, by trampling under foot the foundations of the common ſafety. Thus pirates are brought to the gibbet, by the firſt into whoſe hands they fall. If the ſovereign of the country where thoſe crimes have been committed re-claims the authors of them, in order to bring them to puniſhment, they ought to be reſtored to him, as one who is *principally* intereſted in puniſhing them in an exemplary manner: and it being proper to convict the guilty, and to try them according to ſome form of law; this is a *ſecond* [not ſole] reaſon, why malefactors are uſually delivered up at the deſire of the ſtate where their crimes have been committed.

Ibid. § 230. Every nation has a right of refuſing to admit a ſtranger into the country, when he cannot enter into it without putting it into evident danger, or without doing it a remarkable prejudice.*

* The third article of the treaty of triple alliance, and the latter part of the fourth article of the treaty of quadruple alliance ſtipulate, that no kind of refuge or protection ſhall be given to rebellious ſubjects of the contracting powers. —EDIT.

FOREIGN MINISTERS.

BOOK IV. CHAP. 5. § 66.

The obligation does not go ſo far as to ſuffer at all times, perpetual miniſters, who are deſirous of reſiding with a ſovereign, though they have nothing to negociate. It is natural, indeed, and very agreeable to the ſentiments which nations owe to each other, that theſe reſident miniſters, when there is *nothing to be feared from their ſtay*, ſhould be friendly received; but if there be any ſolid reaſon againſt this, what is for the good of the ſtate ought unqueſtionably to be preferred; and the foreign ſovereign cannot take it amiſs if his miniſter, who has concluded the affairs of his commiſſion, and has no other affairs to negotiate, be deſired to depart.* The cuſtom of keeping every where miniſters continually reſident, is now ſo ſtrongly eſtabliſhed, that the refuſal of a conformity to it would, without *very good reaſons*, give offence. Theſe reaſons may ariſe from *particular* conjunctures; but there are alſo common reaſons always ſubſiſting, and ſuch as relate to the conſtitution of *a government, and the ſtate of a nation.* The republicks have often very good reaſons of the latter kind, to excuſe themſelves from continually ſuffering foreign miniſters, who

* Diſmiſſion of M. Chauvelin.—EDIT.

corrupt

corrupt the citizens, in order to gain them over to their maſters, to the great prejudice of the republick, and fomenting of the parties, &c. And ſhould they only diffuſe among a nation, formerly plain, frugal, and virtuous, a taſte for luxury, avidity for money, and the manners of courts, theſe would be more than ſufficient for wiſe and provident rulers to diſmiſs them.

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY,

PARTICULARLY IN THE

LAST SESSION OF PARLIAMENT;

ADDRESSED TO

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND

AND

LORD FITZWILLIAM.

1793.

LETTER

TO HIS GRACE

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY DEAR LORD,

THE paper which I take the liberty of ſending to your Grace, was, for the greater part, written during the laſt ſeſſion. A few days after the prorogation ſome few obſervations were added. I was however reſolved to let it lie by me for a conſiderable time; that in viewing the matter at a proper diſtance, and when the ſharpneſs of recent impreſſions had been worn off, I might be better able to form a juſt eſtimate of the value of my firſt opinions.

I have juſt now read it over very coolly and deliberately. My lateſt judgment owns my firſt ſentiments and reaſonings, in their full force, with regard both to perſons and things.

During a period of four years, the ſtate of the world, except for ſome few and ſhort intervals, has filled me with a good deal of ſerious inquietude. I conſidered a general war againſt jacobins and jacobiniſm, as the only poſſible chance of ſaving Europe (and England as included in Europe) from a truly frightful revolution. For this

this I have been cenſured, as receiving, through weakneſs, or ſpreading, through fraud and artifice, a falſe alarm. Whatever others may think of the matter, that alarm, in my mind, is by no means quieted. The ſtate of affairs *abroad* is not ſo much mended, as to make me, for one, full of confidence. At *home*, I ſee no abatement whatſoever in the zeal of the partiſans of jacobiniſm towards their cauſe, nor any ceſſation in their efforts to do miſchief. What is doing by Lord Lauderdale on the firſt ſcene of Lord George Gordon's actions, and in his ſpirit, is not calculated to remove my apprehenſions. They purſue their firſt object with as much eagerneſs as ever, but with more dexterity. Under the plauſible name of peace, by which they delude or are deluded, they would deliver us unarmed, and defenceleſs, to the confederation of jacobins, whoſe center is indeed in France, but whoſe rays proceed in every direction throughout the world. I underſtand that Mr. Coke, of Norfolk, has been lately very buſy in ſpreading a diſaffection to this war (which we carry on for our being) in the county in which his property gives him ſo great an influence. It is truly alarming to ſee ſo large a part of the ariſtocratick intereſt engaged in the cauſe of the new ſpecies of democracy, which is openly attacking, or ſecretly undermining, the ſyſtem of property by which mankind has hitherto been governed.

But

But we are not to delude ourſelves. No man can be connected with a party, which profeſſes publickly to admire, or may be juſtly ſuſpected of ſecretly abetting, this French revolution, who muſt not be drawn into its vortex, and become the inſtrument of its deſigns.

What I have written is in the manner of apology. I have given it that form, as being the moſt reſpectful; but I do not ſtand in need of any apology for my principles, my ſentiments, or my conduct. I with the paper I lay before your Grace, to be conſidered as my moſt deliberate, ſolemn, and even teſtamentary proteſt, againſt the proceedings and doctrines which have hitherto produced ſo much miſchief in the world, and which will infallibly produce more, and poſſibly greater. It is my proteſt againſt the deluſion, by which ſome have been taught to look upon this jacobin conteſt at home, as an ordinary party ſquabble about place or patronage; and to regard this jacobin war abroad as a common war about trade or territorial boundaries, or about a political balance of power among rival or jealous ſtates: above all, it is my proteſt againſt that miſtake or perverſion of ſentiment, by which they who agree with us in our principles, may on collateral conſiderations be regarded as enemies; and thoſe who, in this perilous criſis of all human affairs, differ from us fundamentally and practically, as

our

our beſt friends. Thus perſons of great importance may be made to turn the whole of their influence to the deſtruction of their principles.

I now make it my humble requeſt to your Grace, that you will not give any ſort of anſwer to the paper I ſend, or to this letter, except barely to let me know that you have received them. I even wiſh that at preſent you may not read the paper which I tranſmit; lock it up in the drawer of your library table; and when a day of compulſory reflection comes, then be pleaſed to turn it. Then remember that your Grace had a true friend, who had, comparatively with men of your deſcription, a very ſmall intereſt in oppoſing the modern ſyſtem of morality and policy; but who under every diſcouragement, was faithful to publick duty and to private friendſhip. I ſhall then probably be dead. I am ſure I do not wiſh to live to ſee ſuch things. But whilſt I do live, I ſhall purſue the ſame courſe; although my merits ſhould be taken for unpardonable faults, and as ſuch avenged, not only on myſelf, but on my poſterity.

Adieu, my dear Lord; and do me the juſtice to believe me ever, with moſt ſincere reſpect, veneration, and affectionate attachment,

Your Grace's moſt faithful friend,

and moſt obedient humble ſervant,

EDMUND BURKE.

Beaconsfield, Sept. 29, 1793.

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

APPROACHING towards the cloſe of a long period of publick ſervice, it is natural I ſhould be deſirous to ſtand well (I hope I do ſtand tolerably well) with that publick, which, with whatever fortune, I have endeavoured faithfully and zealouſly to ſerve.

I am alſo not a little anxious for ſome place in the eſtimation of the two perſons to whom I addreſs this paper. I have always acted with them, and with thoſe whom they repreſent. To my knowledge I have not deviated, no not in the minuteſt point, from their opinions and principles. Of late, without any alteration in their ſentiments, or in mine, a difference of a very unuſual nature, and which, under the circumſtances, it is not eaſy to deſcribe, has ariſen between us.

In my journey with them through life, I met Mr. Fox in my road; and I travelled with him very cheerfully as long as he appeared to me to purſue the ſame direction with thoſe in whoſe company I ſet out. In the latter ſtage of our progreſs, a new ſcheme of liberty and equality was produced in the world, which either dazzled his imagination,

imagination, or was ſuited to ſome new walks of ambition, which were then opened to his view. The whole frame and faſhion of his politicks appear to have ſuffered about that time a very material alteration. It is about three years ſince, in conſequence of that extraordinary change, that, after a pretty long preceding period of diſtance, coolneſs, and want of confidence, if not total alienation on his part, a compleat publick ſeparation has been made between that gentleman and me. Until lately the breach between us appeared reparable. I truſted that time and reflection, and a deciſive experience of the miſchiefs which have flowed from the proceedings and the ſyſtem of France, on which our difference had ariſen, as well as the known ſentiments of the beſt and wiſeſt of our common friends upon that ſubject, would have brought him to a ſafer way of thinking. Several of his friends ſaw no ſecurity for keeping things in a proper train after this excurſion of his, but in the re-union of the party on its old grounds, under the Duke of Portland. Mr. Fox, if he pleaſed, might have been comprehended in that ſyſtem, with the rank and conſideration to which his great talents entitle him, and indeed muſt ſecure to him in any party arrangement that *could* be made. The Duke of Portland knows how much I wiſhed for, and how earneſtly I laboured that re-union, and upon terms that might every

way

way be honourable and advantageous to Mr. Fox. His conduct in the laſt ſeſſion has extinguiſhed theſe hopes for ever.

Mr. Fox has lately publiſhed in print, a defence of his conduct. On taking into conſideration that defence, a ſociety of gentlemen, called the Whig Club, thought proper to come to the following reſolution—"That their confidence in Mr. Fox is confirmed, ſtrengthened, and encreaſed, by the calumnies againſt him."

To that reſolution my two noble friends, the Duke of Portland and Lord Fitzwilliam, have given their concurrence.

The calumnies ſuppoſed in that reſolution, can be nothing elſe than the objections taken to Mr. Fox's conduct in this ſeſſion of Parliament; for to them, and to them alone, the reſolution refers. I am one of thoſe who have publickly and ſtrongly urged thoſe objections. I hope I ſhall be thought only to do what is neceſſary to my juſtification, thus publickly, ſolemnly, and heavily cenſured by thoſe whom I moſt value and eſteem, when I firmly contend, that the objections which I with many others of the friends to the Duke of Portland, have made to Mr. Fox's conduct, are not *calumnies*, but founded on truth; that they are not *few*, but many; and that they are not *light and trivial*, but in a very high degree, ſerious and important.

That I may avoid the imputation of throwing

out, even privately, any looſe random imputations againſt the publick conduct of a gentleman, for whom I once entertained a very warm affection, and whoſe abilities I regard with the greateſt admiration, I will put down diſtinctly and articulately, ſome of the matters of objection which I feel to his late doctrines and proceedings, truſting that I ſhall be able to demonſtrate to the friends, whoſe good opinion I would ſtill cultivate, that not levity, nor caprice, not leſs defenſible motives, but that very grave reaſons influenced my judgment. I think that the ſpirit of his late proceedings is wholly alien to our national policy, and to the peace, to the proſperity, and to the legal liberties of this nation, *according to our ancient domeſtick and appropriated mode of holding them.*

Viewing things in that light, my confidence in him is not encreaſed, but totally deſtroyed by thoſe proceedings. I cannot conceive it a matter of honour or duty (but the direct contrary) in any member of parliament to continue ſyſtematick oppoſition for the purpoſe of putting government under difficulties, until Mr. Fox (with all his preſent ideas) ſhall have the principal direction of affairs placed in his hands; and until the preſent body of adminiſtration (with their ideas and meaſures) is of courſe overturned and diſſolved.

To come to particulars:

1. The laws and conſtitution of the kingdom, entruſt

entruſt the ſole and excluſive right of treating with foreign potentates, to the king. This is an undiſputed part of the legal prerogative of the crown. However, notwithſtanding this, Mr. Fox, without the knowledge or participation of any one perſon in the houſe of commons, with whom he was bound by every party principle, in matters of delicacy and importance, confidentially to communicate, thought proper to ſend Mr. Adair, as his repreſentative, and with his cypher, to St. Peterſburgh, there to fruſtrate the objects for which the miniſter from the crown was authorized to treat. He ſucceeded in this his deſign, and did actually fruſtrate the king's miniſter in ſome of the objects of his negociation.

This proceeding of Mr. Fox does not (as I conceive) amount to abſolute high treaſon; Ruſſia, though on bad terms, not having been then declaredly at war with this kingdom. But ſuch a proceeding is, in law, not very remote from that offence, and is undoubtedly a moſt unconſtitutional act, and an high treaſonable miſdemeanor.

The legitimate and ſure mode of communication between this nation and foreign powers, is rendered uncertain, precarious, and treacherous, by being divided into two channels, one with the government, one with the head of a party in oppoſition to that government; by which means the foreign powers can never be aſſured of the real

authority or validity of any publick tranſaction whatſoever.

On the other hand, the advantage taken of the diſcontent which at that time prevailed in parliament and in the nation, to give to an individual an influence directly againſt the government of his country, in a foreign court, has made a highway into England for the intrigues of foreign courts in our affairs. This is a ſore evil; an evil from which, before this time, England was more free than any other nation. Nothing can preſerve us from that evil—which connects cabinet factions abroad with popular factions here,—but the keeping ſacred the crown, as the only channel of communication with every other nation.

This proceeding of Mr. Fox has given a ſtrong countenance and an encouraging example to the doctrines and practices of the Revolution and Conſtitutional Societies, and of other miſchievous ſocieties of that deſcription, who, without any legal authority, and even without any corporate capacity, are in the habit of propoſing, and to the beſt of their power, of forming leagues and alliances with France.

This proceeding, which ought to be reprobated on all the general principles of government, is, in a more narrow view of things, not leſs reprehenſible. It tends to the prejudice of the whole of the Duke of Portland's late party, by diſcrediting the

the principles upon which they ſupported Mr. Fox in the Ruſſian buſineſs, as if they, of that party alſo, had proceeded in their parliamentary oppoſition, on the ſame miſchievous principles which actuated Mr. Fox in ſending Mr. Adair on his embaſſy.

2. Very ſoon after his ſending this embaſſy to Ruſſia, that is, in the ſpring of 1792, a covenanting club or aſſociation was formed in London, calling itſelf by the ambitious and invidious title of "*The Friends of the People.*" It was compoſed of many of Mr. Fox's own moſt intimate, perſonal, and party friends, joined to a very conſiderable part of the members of thoſe miſchievous aſſociations called the Revolution Society, and the Conſtitutional Society. Mr. Fox muſt have been well apprized of the progreſs of that ſociety, in every one of its ſteps; if not of the very origin of it. I certainly was informed of both, who had no connection with the deſign, directly or indirectly. His influence over the perſons who compoſed the leading part in that aſſociation, was, and is unbounded. I hear, that he expreſſed ſome diſapprobation of this club in one caſe, (that of Mr. St. John) where his conſent was formally aſked; yet he never attempted ſeriouſly to put a ſtop to the aſſociation, or to diſavow it, or to controul, check, or modify it in any way whatſoever. If he had pleaſed, without difficulty, he might

have ſuppreſſed it in its beginning. However, he did not only not ſuppreſs it in its beginning, but encouraged it in every part of its progreſs, at that particular time, when jacobin clubs (under the very ſame, or ſimilar titles) were making ſuch dreadful havock in a country not thirty miles from the coaſt of England, and when every motive of moral prudence called for the diſcouragement of ſocieties formed for the encreaſe of popular pretenſions to power and direction.

3. When the proceedings of this ſociety of the friends of the people, as well as others acting in the ſame ſpirit, had cauſed a very ſerious alarm in the mind of the Duke of Portland, and of many good patriots, he publickly, in the houſe of commons, treated their apprehenſions and conduct with the greateſt aſperity and ridicule. He condemned and vilified, in the moſt inſulting and outrageous terms, the proclamation iſſued by government on that occaſion—though he well knew, that it had paſſed through the Duke of Portland's hands, that it had received his fulleſt approbation, and that it was the reſult of an actual interview between that noble Duke and Mr. Pitt. During the diſcuſſion of its merits in the houſe of commons, Mr. Fox countenanced and juſtified the chief promoters of that aſſociation; and he received in return, a publick aſſurance from them of an inviolable adherence to him, ſingly and perſonally.

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On account of this proceeding, a very great number (I preſume to ſay not the leaſt grave and wiſe part) of the Duke of Portland's friends in parliament, and many out of parliament, who are of the ſame deſcription, have become ſeparated from that time to this from Mr. Fox's particular cabal; very few of which cabal are, or ever have, ſo much as pretended to be attached to the Duke of Portland, or to pay any reſpect to him or his opinions.

4. At the beginning of this ſeſſion, when the ſober part of the nation was a ſecond time generally and juſtly alarmed at the progreſs of the French arms on the continent, and at the ſpreading of their horrid principles and cabals in England, Mr. Fox did not (as had been uſual in caſes of far leſs moment) call together any meeting of the Duke of Portland's friends in the houſe of commons, for the purpoſe of taking their opinion on the conduct to be purſued in parliament at that critical juncture. He concerted his meaſures (if with any perſons at all) with the friends of Lord Lanſdowne, and thoſe calling themſelves Friends of the People, and others not in the ſmalleſt degree attached to the Duke of Portland; by which conduct he wilfully gave up (in my opinion) all pretenſions to be conſidered as of that party, and much more to be conſidered as the leader and mouth of it in the houſe of commons. This could not give much encourage-

ment to thoſe who had been ſeparated from Mr. Fox, on account of his conduct on the firſt proclamation, to rejoin that party.

5. Not having conſulted any of the Duke of Portland's party in the houſe of commons; and not having conſulted them, becauſe he had reaſon to know, that the courſe he had reſolved to purſue would be highly diſagreeable to them, he repreſented the alarm, which was a ſecond time given and taken, in ſtill more invidious colours than thoſe in which he painted the alarms of the former year. He deſcribed thoſe alarms in this manner, although the cauſe of them was then grown far leſs equivocal, and far more urgent. He even went ſo far as to treat the ſuppoſition of the growth of a jacobin ſpirit in England as a libel on the nation. As to the danger from *abroad*, on the firſt day of the ſeſſion, he ſaid little or nothing upon the ſubject. He contented himſelf with defending the ruling factions in France, and with accuſing the publick councils of this kingdom of every ſort of evil deſign on the liberties of the people; declaring diſtinctly, ſtrongly, and preciſely, that the whole danger of the nation was from the growth of the power of the crown. The policy of this declaration was obvious. It was in ſubſervience to the general plan of diſabling us from taking any ſteps againſt France. To counteract the alarm given by the

progreſs

progreſs of jacobin arms and principles, he endeavoured to excite an oppoſite alarm concerning the growth of the power of the crown. If that alarm ſhould prevail, he knew that the nation never would be brought by arms to oppoſe the growth of the jacobin empire; becauſe it is obvious that war does, in its very nature, neceſſitate the commons conſiderably to ſtrengthen the hands of government; and if that ſtrength ſhould itſelf be the object of terrour, we could have no war.

6. In the extraordinary and violent ſpeeches of that day, he attributed all the evils which the publick had ſuffered, to the proclamation of the preceding ſummer; though he ſpoke in preſence of the Duke of Portland's own ſon, the marquis of Titchfield, who had ſeconded the addreſs on that proclamation; and in the preſence of the Duke of Portland's brother, Lord Edward Bentinck, and ſeveral others of his beſt friends and neareſt relations.

7. On that day, that is, on the 13th of December, 1792, he propoſed an amendment to the addreſs, which ſtands on the journals of the houſe, and which is, perhaps, the moſt extraordinary record which ever did ſtand upon them. To introduce this amendment, he not only ſtruck out the part of the propoſed addreſs which alluded to inſurrections, upon the ground of the objections

jections which he took to the legality of calling together parliament, (objections which I muſt ever think litigious and ſophiſtical) but he likewiſe ſtruck out that *part which related to the cabals and conſpiracies of the French faction in England,* although their practices and correſpondences were of publick notoriety. Mr. Cooper and Mr. Watt had been deputed from Mancheſter to the jacobins. Theſe ambaſſadors were received by them as Britiſh repreſentatives. Other deputations of Engliſh had been received at the bar of the national aſſembly. They had gone the length of giving ſupplies to the jacobin armies; and they in return had received promiſes of military aſſiſtance to forward their deſigns in England. A regular correſpondence for fraternizing the two nations had alſo been carried on by ſocieties in London with a great number of the jacobin ſocieties in France. This correſpondence had alſo for its object the pretended improvement of the Britiſh conſtitution.—What is the moſt remarkable, and by much the more miſchievous part of his proceedings that day, Mr. Fox likewiſe ſtruck out every thing in the addreſs which *related to the tokens of ambition given by France, her aggreſſions upon our allies, and the ſudden and dangerous growth of her power upon every ſide;* and inſtead of all thoſe weighty, and at that time, neceſſary matters, by which the houſe of commons was (in a criſis,

criſis, ſuch as perhaps Europe never ſtood) to give aſſurances to our allies, ſtrength to our government, and a check to the common enemy of Europe, he ſubſtituted nothing but a criminal charge on the conduct of the Britiſh government for calling parliament together, and an engagement to enquire into that conduct.

8. If it had pleaſed God to ſuffer him to ſucceed in this his project, for the amendment to the addreſs, he would for ever have ruined this nation, along with the reſt of Europe. At home all the jacobin ſocieties, formed for the utter deſtruction of our conſtitution, would have lifted up their heads, which had been beaten down by the two proclamations. Thoſe ſocieties would have been infinitely ſtrengthened and multiplied in every quarter; their dangerous foreign communications would have been left broad and open; the crown would not have been authorized to take any meaſure whatever for our immediate defence by ſea or land. The cloſeſt, the moſt natural, the neareſt, and, at the ſame time, from many internal as well as external circumſtances, the weakeſt of our allies, Holland, would have been given up, bound hand and foot, to France, juſt on the point of invading that republick. A general conſternation would have ſeized upon all Europe; and all alliance with every other power, except France, would have been for ever rendered impracticable

impracticable to us. I think it impoſſible for any man, who regards the dignity and ſafety of his country, or indeed the common ſafety of mankind, ever to forget Mr. Fox's proceedings in that tremendous criſis of all human affairs.

9. Mr. Fox very ſoon had reaſon to be appriſed of the general diſlike of the Duke of Portland's friends to this conduct. Some of thoſe who had even voted with him, the day after their vote expreſſed their abhorrence of his amendment, their ſenſe of its inevitable tendency, and their total alienation from the principles and maxims upon which it was made; yet, the very next day, that is, on Friday the 14th of December, he brought on what in effect was the very ſame buſineſs, and on the ſame principles, a *ſecond* time.

10. Although the Houſe does not uſually ſit on Saturday, he a *third* time brought on another propoſition, in the ſame ſpirit, and purſued it with ſo much heat and perſeverance as to ſit into Sunday; a thing not known in parliament for many years.

11. In all theſe motions and debates he wholly departed from all the political principles relative to France, (conſidered merely as a ſtate, and independent of its jacobin form of government) which had hitherto been held fundamental in this country, and which he had himſelf held more

ſtrongly than any man in parliament. He at that time ſtudiouſly ſeparated himſelf from thoſe to whoſe ſentiments he uſed to profeſs no ſmall regard, although thoſe ſentiments were publickly declared. I had then no concern in the party, having been for ſome time, with all outrage, excluded from it; but, on general principles, I muſt ſay, that a perſon who aſſumes to be leader of a party compoſed of freemen and of gentlemen, ought to pay ſome degree of deference to their feelings, and even to their prejudices. He ought to have ſome degree of management for their credit and influence in their country. He ſhewed ſo very little of this delicacy, that he compared the alarm raiſed in the minds of the Duke of Portland's party, (which was his own) an alarm in which they ſympathized with the greater part of the nation, to the panick produced by the pretended popiſh plot in the reign of Charles the Second—deſcribing it to be, as that was, a contrivance of knaves, and believed only by well-meaning dupes and madmen.

12. The Monday following, (the 17th of December) he purſued the ſame conduct. The means uſed in England to co-operate with the jacobin army in politicks, agreed with their modes of proceeding; I allude to the miſchievous writings circulated with much induſtry and ſucceſs, as well as the ſeditious clubs, which at that

that time, added not a little to the alarm taken by obſerving and well-informed men. The writings and the clubs were two evils which marched together. Mr. Fox diſcovered the greateſt poſſible diſpoſition to favour and countenance the one as well as the other of theſe two grand inſtruments of the French ſyſtem. He would hardly conſider any political writing whatſoever, as a libel, or as a fit object of proſecution. At a time in which the preſs has been the grand inſtrument of the ſubverſion of order, of morals, of religion, and I may ſay of human ſociety itſelf, to carry the doctrines of its liberty higher than ever it has been known by its moſt extravagant aſſertors even in France, gave occaſion to very ſerious reflections. Mr. Fox treated the aſſociations for proſecuting theſe libels, as tending to prevent the improvement of the human mind, and as a mobbiſh tyranny. He thought proper to compare them with the riotous aſſemblies of Lord George Gordon in 1780, declaring that he had adviſed his friends in Weſtminſter, to ſign the aſſociations whether they agreed to them or not, in order that they might avoid deſtruction to their perſons or their houſes, or a deſertion of their ſhops. This inſidious advice tended to confound thoſe who wiſhed well to the object of the aſſociation, with the ſeditious, againſt whom the aſſociation was directed. By this ſtratagem,

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the confederacy intended for preſerving the Britiſh conſtitution, and the publick peace, would be wholly defeated. The magiſtrates, utterly incapable of diſtinguiſhing the friends from the enemies of order, would in vain look for ſupport when they ſtood in the greateſt need of it.

13. Mr. Fox's whole conduct, on this occaſion, was without example. The very morning after theſe violent declamations in the houſe of commons againſt the aſſociation, (that is on Tueſday the 18th) he went himſelf to a meeting of St. George's pariſh, and there ſigned an aſſociation of the nature and tendency of thoſe he had the night before ſo vehemently condemned; and ſeveral of his particular and moſt intimate friends, inhabitants of that pariſh, attended and ſigned along with him.

14. Immediately after this extraordinary ſtep, and in order perfectly to defeat the ends of that aſſociation againſt jacobin publications, (which, contrary to his opinions, he had promoted and ſigned) a miſchievous ſociety was formed under his auſpicies, called, the *Friends of the liberty of the preſs*. Their title groundleſsly inſinuated, that the freedom of the preſs had lately ſuffered, or was now threatened with ſome violation. This ſociety was only, in reality, another modification of the ſociety calling itſelf the *Friends of the People*, which, in the preceding ſummer had

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cauſed ſo much uneaſineſs in the Duke of Portland's mind, and in the minds of ſeveral of his friends. This new ſociety was compoſed of many, if not moſt of the members of the club of the *Friends of the People*, with the addition of a vaſt multitude of others (ſuch as Mr. Horne Tooke) of the worſt and moſt ſeditious diſpoſitions that could be found in the whole kingdom. In the firſt meeting of this club, Mr. Erſkine took the lead, and directly (without any diſavowal ever ſince on Mr. Fox's part) *made uſe of his name and authority in favour of its formation and purpoſes.* In the ſame meeting Mr. Erſkine had thanks for his defence of *Paine*, which amounted to a complete avowal of that jacobin incendiary; elſe it is impoſſible to know how Mr. Erſkine ſhould have deſerved ſuch marked applauſes for acting merely as a lawyer for his fee, in the ordinary courſe of his profeſſion.

15. Indeed Mr. Fox appeared the general patron of all ſuch perſons and proceedings. When Lord Edward Fitzgerald, and other perſons, for practices of the moſt dangerous kind, in Paris and in London, were removed from the king's guards, Mr. Fox took occaſion, in the houſe of commons, heavily to cenſure that act as unjuſt and oppreſſive, and tending to make officers bad citizens. There were few, however, who did not call for ſome ſuch meaſures on the part of government,

government, as of abſolute neceſſity for the king's perſonal ſafety, as well as that of the publick; and nothing but the miſtaken lenity (with which ſuch practices were rather diſcountenanced than puniſhed) could poſſibly deſerve reprehenſion in what was done with regard to thoſe gentlemen.

16. Mr. Fox, regularly and ſyſtematically, and with a diligence long unuſual to him, did every thing he could to countenance the ſame principle of fraternity and connexion with the jacobins abroad, and the national convention of France, for which theſe officers had been removed from the Guards. For when a bill (feeble and lax indeed, and far ſhort of the vigour required by the conjuncture) was brought in for removing out of the kingdom the emiſſaries of France, Mr. Fox oppoſed it with all his might. He purſued a vehement and detailed oppoſition to it, through all its ſtages, deſcribing it as a meaſure contrary to the exiſting treaties between Great Britain and France; as a violation of the law of nations, and as an outrage on the great charter itſelf.

17. In the ſame manner, and with the ſame heat, he oppoſed a bill, which, (though aukward and inartificial in its conſtruction) was right and wiſe in its principle, and was precedented in the beſt times, and abſolutely neceſſary at that juncture,—I mean the Traiterous Correſpondence

Bill. By theſe means the enemy, rendered infinitely dangerous by the links of real faction and pretended commerce, would have been (had Mr. Fox ſucceeded) enabled to carry on the war againſt us by our own reſources. For this purpoſe that enemy would have had his agents and traitors in the midſt of us.

18. When at length war was actually declared, by the uſurpers in France, againſt this kingdom, and declared whilſt they were pretending a negotiation through Dumourier with lord Auckland, Mr. Fox ſtill continued, through the whole of the proceedings, to diſcredit the national honour and juſtice, and to throw the entire blame of the war on parliament, and on his own country, as acting with violence, haughtineſs, and want of equity. He frequently aſſerted, both at the time and ever ſince, that the war, though declared by France, was provoked by us, and that it was wholly unneceſſary, and fundamentally unjuſt.

19. He has loſt no opportunity of railing, in the moſt virulent manner, and in the moſt unmeaſured language, at every foreign power with whom we could now, or at any time, contract any uſeful or effectual alliance againſt France, declaring that he hoped no alliance with thoſe powers was made, or was in a train of being made.

made*. He always expreſſed himſelf with the utmoſt horrour concerning ſuch alliances, ſo did all his phalanx. Mr. Sheridan in particular, after one of his invectives againſt thoſe powers, ſitting by him, ſaid, with manifeſt marks of his approbation, that if we muſt go to war, he had rather go to war alone than with ſuch allies.

20. Immediately after the French declaration of war againſt us, parliament addreſſed the king in ſupport of the war againſt them, as juſt and neceſſary, and provoked as well as formally declared againſt Great Britain. He did not divide the houſe upon this meaſure; yet he immediately followed this our ſolemn parliamentary engagement to the king, with a motion propoſing a ſet of reſolutions, the effect of which was, that the two houſes were to load themſelves with every kind of reproach for having made the addreſs, which they had juſt carried to the throne. He commenced this long ſtring of criminatory reſolutions againſt his country, (if king, lords and commons of Great Britain, and a decided majority without doors are his country) *with a declaration againſt intermeddling in the interiour concerns of France.* The purport of this reſolution of non-interference, is a thing unexampled in

* It is an exception, that in one of his laſt ſpeeches, (but not before) Mr. Fox ſeemed to think an alliance with Spain might be proper.

the hiſtory of the world, when one nation has been actually at war with another. The beſt writers on the law of nations, give no ſort of countenance to his doctrine of non-interference, in the extent and manner in which he uſed it, *even when there is no war*. When the war exiſts, not one authority is againſt it in all its latitude. His doctrine is equally contrary to the enemy's uniform practice, who, whether in peace or in war, makes it his great aim not only to change the government, but to make an entire revolution in the whole of the ſocial order in every country.

The object of the laſt of this extraordinary ſtring of reſolutions moved by Mr. Fox, was to adviſe the crown not to enter into ſuch an engagement with any foreign power, ſo as to hinder us from making a *ſeparate* peace with France, or which might tend to enable any of thoſe powers to introduce a government in that country, other than ſuch as thoſe perſons whom he calls the people of France, ſhall chooſe to eſtabliſh. In ſhort, the whole of theſe reſolutions appeared to have but one drift—namely, the ſacrifice of our own domeſtick dignity and ſafety, and the independency of Europe, to the ſupport of this ſtrange mixture of anarchy and tyranny which prevails in France, and which Mr. Fox and his party were pleaſed to call a government. The immediate conſequences of theſe meaſures was (by an example, the ill effects

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of which, on the whole world, are not to be calculated) to ſecure the robbers of the innocent nobility, gentry, and eccleſiaſticks of France, in the enjoyment of the ſpoil they have made of the eſtates, houſes, and goods of their fellow-citizens.

21. Not ſatisfied with moving theſe reſolutions, tending to confirm this horrible tyranny and robbery, and with actually dividing the houſe on the firſt of the long ſtring which they compoſed, in a few days afterwards he encouraged and ſupported Mr. Grey in producing the very ſame ſtring in a new form, and in moving under the ſhape of an addreſs of parliament to the crown, another virulent libel on all its own proceedings in this ſeſſion, in which not only all the ground of the reſolutions was again travelled over, but much new inflammatory matter was introduced. In particular, a charge was made, that Great Britain had not interpoſed to prevent the laſt partition of Poland. On this head the party dwelt very largely, and very vehemently. Mr. Fox's intention, in the choice of this extraordinary topick, was evident enough. He well knows two things; firſt, that no wiſe or honeſt man can approve of that partition, or can contemplate it without prognoſticating great miſchief from it to all countries at ſome future time. Secondly, he knows quite as well, that, let our opinions on that partition be what they will, England, by itſelf, is not in a ſituation

to afford to Poland any aſſiſtance whatſoever. The purpoſe of the introduction of Poliſh politicks into this diſcuſſion, was not for the ſake of Poland; it was to throw an odium upon thoſe who are obliged to decline the cauſe of juſtice from their impoſſibility of ſupporting a cauſe which they approve; as if we, who think more ſtrongly on this ſubject than he does, were of a party againſt Poland, becauſe we are obliged to act with ſome of the authors of that injuſtice, againſt our common enemy, France. But the great and leading purpoſe of this introduction of Poland into the debates on the French war, was to divert the publick attention from what was in our power, that is, from a ſteady co-operation againſt France, to a quarrel with the allies for the ſake of a Poliſh war, which for any uſeful purpoſe to Poland, he knew it was out of our power to make. If England can touch Poland ever ſo remotely, it muſt be through the medium of alliances. But by attacking all the combined powers together for their ſuppoſed unjuſt aggreſſion upon France, he bound them by a new common intereſt, not ſeparately to join England for the reſcue of Poland. The propoſition could only mean to do what all the writers of his party in the Morning Chronicle have aimed at perſuading the publick to, through the whole of the laſt autumn and winter, and to this hour; that is, to an alliance with the jacobins of France,

France, for the pretended purpoſe of ſuccouring Poland. This curious project would leave to Great Britain no other ally in all Europe, except its old enemy, France.

22. Mr. Fox, after the firſt day's diſcuſſion on the queſtion for the addreſs, was at length driven to admit—(to admit rather than to urge, and that very faintly) that France had diſcovered ambitious views, which none of his partiſans, that I recollect, (Mr. Sheridan excepted) did, however, either urge or admit. What is remarkable enough, all the points admitted againſt the jacobins, were brought to bear in their favour as much as thoſe in which they were defended. For when Mr. Fox admitted that the conduct of the jacobins did diſcover ambition, he always ended his admiſſion of their ambitious views by an apology for them, inſiſting, that the univerſally hoſtile diſpoſition ſhewn to them, rendered their ambition a ſort of defenſive policy. Thus, on whatever roads he travelled, they all terminated in recommending a recognition of their pretended republick, and in the plan of ſending an ambaſſador to it. This was the burthen of all his ſong—"Every thing which "we could reaſonably hope from war, would be "obtained from treaty." It is to be obſerved, however, that in all theſe debates, Mr. Fox never once ſtated to the houſe upon what ground it was he conceived, that all the objects of the French

ſyſtem of united fanaticiſm and ambition would inſtantly be given up whenever England ſhould think fit to propoſe a treaty. On propoſing ſo ſtrange a recognition, and ſo humiliating an embaſſy as he moved, he was bound to produce his authority, if any authority he had. He ought to have done this the rather, becauſe Le Brun, in his firſt propoſitions, and in his anſwers to Lord Grenville, defended, *on principle, not on temporary convenience*, every thing which was objected to France, and ſhewed not the ſmalleſt diſpoſition to give up any one of the points in diſcuſſion. Mr. Fox muſt alſo have known, that the convention had paſſed to the order of the day, on a propoſition to give ſome ſort of explanation or modification to the hoſtile decree of the 19th of November, for exciting inſurrections in all countries; a decree known to be peculiarly pointed at Great Britain. The whole proceeding of the French adminiſtration was the moſt remote that could be imagined from furniſhing any indication of a pacifick diſpoſition: for at the very time in which it was pretended that the jacobins entertained thoſe boaſted pacifick intentions, at the very time in which Mr. Fox was urging a treaty with them, not content with refuſing a modification of the decree for inſurrections, they publiſhed their ever memorable decree of the 15th of December, 1792, for diſorganizing every country in Europe,

into which they ſhould on any occaſion ſet their foot; and on the 25th and the 30th of the ſame month, they ſolemnly, and on the laſt of theſe days, practically confirmed that decree.

23. But Mr. Fox had himſelf taken good care in the negotiation he propoſed, that France ſhould not be obliged to make any very great conceſſions to her preſumed moderation—for he had laid down one general comprehenſive rule, with him (as he ſaid) conſtant and inviolable. This rule, in fact, would not only have left to the faction in France, all the property and power they had uſurped at home, but moſt, if not all, of the conqueſts which by their atrocious perfidy and violence, they had made abroad. The principle laid down by Mr. Fox, is this, "*That every ſtate, in* "*the concluſion of a war, has a right to avail* "*itſelf of its conqueſts towards an indemnifica-* "*tion.*" This principle (true or falſe) is totally contrary to the policy which this country has purſued with France, at various periods, particularly at the treaty of Ryſwick, in the laſt century, and at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in this. Whatever the merits of his rule may be, in the eyes of neutral judges, it is a rule which no ſtateſman before him ever laid down in favour of the adverſe power with whom he was to negotiate. The adverſe party himſelf, may ſafely be truſted to take care of his *own* aggrandizement. But (as

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if the black boxes of the ſeveral parties had been exchanged) Mr. Fox's Engliſh ambaſſador by ſome odd miſtake, would find himſelf charged with the concerns of France. If we were to leave France as ſhe ſtood at the time when Mr. Fox propoſed to treat with her, that formidable power muſt have been infinitely ſtrengthened, and almoſt every other power in Europe as much weakened, by the extraordinary baſis which he laid for a treaty. For Avignon muſt go from the Pope; Savoy (at leaſt) from the king of Sardinia, if not Nice. Liege, Mentz, Salm, Deux-Ponts, and Bâle, muſt be ſeparated from Germany. On this ſide of the Rhine, Liege (at leaſt) muſt be loſt to the empire, and added to France. Mr. Fox's general principle fully covered all this. How much of theſe territories came within his rule, he never attempted to define. He kept a profound ſilence as to Germany. As to the Netherlands he was ſomething more explicit. He ſaid, (if I recollect right) that France on that ſide, might expect ſomething towards ſtrengthening her frontier. As to the remaining parts of the Netherlands, which he ſuppoſed France might conſent to ſurrender, he went ſo far as to declare that England ought not to permit the Emperour to be repoſſeſſed of the remainder of the ten Provinces, but that *the people* ſhould chooſe ſuch a form of independent government as they liked. This propoſition of

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Mr. Fox was juſt the arrangement which the uſurpation in France had all along propoſed to make. As the circumſtances were at that time, and have been ever ſince, his propoſition fully indicated what government the Flemings *muſt* have in the ſtated extent of what was left to them. A government ſo ſet up in the Netherlands, whether compulſory, or by the choice of the ſans-culottes, (who he well knew were to be the real electors, and the ſole electors) in whatever name it was to exiſt, muſt evidently depend for its exiſtence, as it has done for its original formation, on France. In reality, it muſt have ended in that point, to which, piece by piece, the French were then actually bringing all the Netherlands; that is, an incorporation with France, as a body of new departments, juſt as Savoy and Liege, and the reſt of their pretended independent popular ſovereignties, have been united to their republick. Such an arrangement muſt have deſtroyed Auſtria; it muſt have left Holland always at the mercy of France; it muſt totally and for ever cut off all political communication between England and the continent. Such muſt have been the ſituation of Europe, according to Mr. Fox's ſyſtem of politicks, however laudable his perſonal motives may have been in propoſing ſo complete a change in the whole ſyſtem of Great Britain, with regard to all the continental powers.

24. After it had been generally ſuppoſed that all

all publick buſineſs was over for the ſeſſion, and that Mr. Fox had exhauſted all the modes of preſſing this French ſcheme, he thought proper to take a ſtep beyond every expectation, and which demonſtrated his wonderful eagerneſs and perſeverance in his cauſe, as well as the nature and true character of the cauſe itſelf. This ſtep was taken by Mr. Fox immediately after his giving his aſſent to the grant of ſupply voted to him by Mr. Serjeant Adair and a committee of gentlemen, who aſſumed to themſelves to act in the name of the publick. In the inſtrument of his acceptance of this grant, Mr. Fox took occaſion to aſſure them, that he would always perſevere *in the ſame conduct* which had procured to him ſo honourable a mark of the publick approbation. He was as good as his word.

25. It was not long before an opportunity was found, or made, for proving the ſincerity of his profeſſions, and demonſtrating his gratitude to thoſe who have given publick and unequivocal marks of their approbation of his late conduct. One of the moſt virulent of the jacobin faction, Mr. Gurney, a banker of Norwich, had all along diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his French politicks. By the means of this gentleman, and of his aſſociates of the ſame deſcription, one of the moſt inſidious and dangerous hand-bills that ever was ſeen, had been circulated at Norwich againſt the war, drawn

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up in an hypocritical tone of compaſſion for the poor. This addreſs to the populace of Norwich was to play in concert with an addreſs to Mr. Fox; it was ſigned by Mr. Gurney and the higher part of the French fraternity in that town. In this paper Mr. Fox is applauded for his conduct throughout the ſeſſion, and requeſted, before the prorogation, to make a motion for an immediate peace with France.

26. Mr. Fox did not revoke to this ſuit; he readily and thankfully undertook the taſk aſſigned to him. Not content, however, with merely falling in with their wiſhes, he propoſed a taſk on his part to the gentlemen of Norwich, which was, *that they ſhould move the people without doors to petition againſt the war*. He ſaid, that without ſuch aſſiſtance, little good could be expected from any thing he might attempt within the walls of the houſe of commons. In the mean time, to animate his Norwich friends in their endeavours to beſiege parliament, he ſnatched the firſt opportunity to give notice of a motion, which he very ſoon after made, namely, to addreſs the crown to make peace with France. The addreſs was ſo worded as to co-operate with the hand-bill in bringing forward matter calculated to inflame the manufacturers throughout the kingdom.

27. In ſupport of his motion, he declaimed in the moſt virulent ſtrain, even beyond any of his former

former invectives, againſt every power with whom we were then, and are now, acting againſt France. In the *moral* forum, ſome of theſe powers certainly deſerve all the ill he ſaid of them; but the *political* effect aimed at, evidently was to turn our indignation from France, with whom we were at war, upon Ruſſia, or Pruſſia, or Auſtria, or Sardinia, or all of them together. In conſequence of his knowledge that we *could* not effectually do *without* them, and his reſolution that we *ſhould* not act *with* them, he propoſed, that having, as he aſſerted, "obtained the only avowed object of the war "(the evacuation of Holland), we ought to con- "clude an inſtant peace."

28. Mr. Fox could not be ignorant of the miſtaken baſis upon which his motion was grounded. He was not ignorant, that, though the attempt of Dumourier on Holland (ſo very near ſucceeding), and the navigation of the Scheld (a part of the ſame piece), were among the *immediate* cauſes, they were by no means the only cauſes alleged for parliament's taking that offence at the proceedings of France, for which the jacobins were ſo prompt in declaring war upon this kingdom. Other full as weighty cauſes had been alleged: They were, 1. The general overbearing and deſperate ambition of that faction. 2. Their actual attacks on every nation in Europe. 3. Their uſurpation of territories in the empire with the governments of which

which they had no pretence of quarrel. 4. Their perpetual and irrevocable conſolidation with their own dominions of every territory of the Netherlands, of Germany, and of Italy, of which they got a temporary poſſeſſion. 5. The miſchiefs attending the prevalence of their ſyſtem, which would make the ſucceſs of their ambitious deſigns a new and peculiar ſpecies of calamity in the world. 6. Their formal publick decrees, particularly thoſe of the 19th of November, and 15th and 25th of December. 7. Their notorious attempts to undermine the conſtitution of this country. 8. Their publick reception of deputations of traitors for that direct purpoſe. 9. Their murder of their ſovereign, declared by moſt of the members of the convention, who ſpoke with their vote (without a diſavowal from any) to be perpetrated, as an example to *all* kings, and a precedent for, *all* ſubjects to follow. All theſe, and not the Scheld alone, or the invaſion of Holland, were urged by the miniſter, and by Mr. Windham, by myſelf, and by others who ſpoke in thoſe debates, as cauſes for bringing France to a ſenſe of her wrong in the war which ſhe declared againſt us. Mr. Fox well knew, that not one man argued for the neceſſity of a vigorous reſiſtance to France, who did not ſtate the war as being for the very exiſtence of the ſocial order here, and in every part of Europe; who did not ſtate his opinion, that this war was not

not at all a foreign war of empire, but as much for our liberties, properties, laws, and religion, and even more ſo, than any we had ever been engaged in. This was the war, which, according to Mr. Fox and Mr. Gurney, we were to abandon before the enemy had felt, in the ſlighteſt degree, the impreſſion of our arms.

29. Had Mr. Fox's diſgraceful propoſal been complied with, this kingdom would have been ſtained with a blot of perfidy hitherto without an example in our hiſtory, and with far leſs excuſe than any act of perfidy which we find in the hiſtory of any other nation. The moment, when by the incredible exertions of Auſtria (very little through our's) the temporary deliverance of Holland (in effect our own deliverance) had been atchieved, he adviſed the houſe inſtantly to abandon her to that very enemy, from whoſe arms ſhe had freed ourſelves, and the cloſeſt of our allies.

30. But we are not to be impoſed on by forms of language. We muſt act on the ſubſtance of things. To abandon Auſtria in this manner, was to abandon Holland itſelf. For ſuppoſe France, encouraged and ſtrengthened as ſhe muſt have been by our treacherous deſertion, ſuppoſe France, I ſay, to ſucceed againſt Auſtria, (as ſhe had ſucceeded the very year before) England would, after its diſarmament, have nothing in the world but

but the inviolable faith of jacobiniſm, and the ſteady politicks of anarchy to depend upon, againſt France's renewing the very ſame attempts upon Holland, and renewing them (conſidering what Holland was and is) with much better proſpects of ſucceſs. Mr. Fox muſt have been well aware, that if we were to break with the greater continental powers, and particularly to come to a rupture with them, in the violent and intemperate mode in which he would have made the breach, the defence of Holland againſt a foreign enemy, and a ſtrong domeſtick faction, muſt hereafter reſt ſolely upon England, without the chance of a ſingle ally, either on that or on any other occaſion. So far as to the pretended ſole object of the war, which Mr. Fox ſuppoſed to be ſo completely obtained, (but which then was not at all, and at this day is not completely obtained,) as to leave us nothing elſe to do than to cultivate a peaceful, quiet correſpondence with thoſe quiet, peaceable and moderate people, the jacobins of France.

31. To induce us to this, Mr. Fox laboured hard to make it appear, that the powers with whom we acted, were full as ambitious and as perfidious as the French. This might be true as to *other* nations. They had not, however, been ſo to *us* or to Holland. He produced no proof of active ambition and ill faith againſt Auſtria. But ſuppoſing the combined powers had been all thus

faithleſs, and been all alike ſo, there was one circumſtance which made an eſſential difference between them and France. I need not therefore be at the trouble of conteſting this point, which, however, in this latitude, and as at all affecting Great Britain and Holland, I deny utterly: be it ſo. But the great monarchies have it in their power to keep their faith *if they pleaſe*, becauſe they are governments of eſtabliſhed and recogniſed authority at home and abroad. France had, in reality, no government. The very factions who exerciſed power, had no ſtability. The French convention had no powers of peace or war. Suppoſing the convention to be free (moſt aſſuredly it was not) they had ſhewn no diſpoſition to abandon their projects. Though long driven out of Liege, it was not many days before Mr. Fox's motion, that they ſtill continued to claim it as a country, which their principles of fraternity bound them to protect, that is, to ſubdue and to regulate at their pleaſure. That party which Mr. Fox inclined moſt to favour and truſt, and from which he muſt have received his aſſurances (if any he did receive) that is, the *Briſſotins*, were then either priſoners or fugitives. The party which prevailed over them (that of Dauton and Marat) was itſelf in a tottering condition, and was diſowned by a very great part of France. To ſay nothing of the royal party who were powerful and growing, and

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who had full as good a right to claim to be the legitimate government as any of the Pariſian factions with whom he propoſed to treat—or rather (as it ſeemed to me) to ſurrender at diſcretion.

32. But when Mr. Fox began to come from his general hopes of the moderation of the jacobins, to particulars, he put the caſe, that they might not perhaps be willing to ſurrender Savoy. He certainly was not willing to conteſt that point with them; but plainly and explicitly (as I underſtood him) propoſed to let them keep it; though he knew (or he was much worſe informed than he would be thought) that England had, at the very time, agreed on the terms of a treaty with the king of Sardinia, of which the recovery of Savoy was the *caſus federis*. In the teeth of this treaty, Mr. Fox propoſed a direct and moſt ſcandalous breach of our faith, formally and recently given. But to ſurrender Savoy, was to ſurrender a great deal more than ſo many ſquare acres of land, or ſo much revenue. In its conſequences, the ſurrender of Savoy, was to make a ſurrender to France of Switzerland and Italy, of both which countries, Savoy is the key—as it is known to ordinary ſpeculators in politicks, though it may not be known to the weavers in Norwich, who, it ſeems are, by Mr. Fox, called to be the judges in this matter.

33. A ſure way indeed, to encourage France

not to make a ſurrender of this key of Italy and Switzerland, or of Mentz, the key of Germany, or of any other object whatſoever which ſhe holds, is to let her ſee, *that the people of England raiſe a clamour againſt the war before terms are ſo much as propoſed on any ſide.* From that moment, the jacobins would be maſters of the terms.—They would know, that parliament, at all hazards, would force the king to a ſeparate peace. The crown could not, in that caſe, have any uſe of its judgment. Parliament could not poſſeſs more judgment than the crown, when beſieged (as Mr. Fox propoſed to Mr. Gurney) by the cries of the manufacturers. This deſcription of men, Mr. Fox endeavoured in his ſpeech, by every method, to irritate and inflame. In effect, his two ſpeeches were, through the whole, nothing more than an amplification of the Norwich hand-bill. He reſted the greateſt part of his arguments on the diſtreſs of trade, which he attributed to the war; though it was obvious to any tolerably good obſervation, and much more muſt have been clear to ſuch an obſervation as his, that the then difficulties of the trade and manufacture could have no ſort of connection with our ſhare in it. The war had hardly begun. We had ſuffered neither by ſpoil, nor by defeat, nor by diſgrace of any kind. Publick credit was ſo little impaired, that inſtead of being ſupported by any extraordinary

dinary aids from individuals, it advanced a credit to individuals to the amount of five millions, for the ſupport of trade and manufactures, under their temporary difficulties, a thing before never heard of;—a thing of which I do not commend the policy—but only ſtate it, to ſhew, that Mr. Fox's ideas of the effects of war were without any trace of foundation.

33. It is impoſſible not to connect the arguments and proceedings of a party with that of its leader—eſpecially when not diſavowed or controlled by him. Mr. Fox's partiſans declaim againſt all the powers of Europe, except the jacobins, juſt as he does; but not having the ſame reaſons for management and caution which he has, they ſpeak out. He ſatisfies himſelf merely with making his invectives, and leaves others to draw the concluſion. But they produce their Poliſh interpoſition, for the expreſs purpoſe of leading to a French alliance. They urge their French peace, in order to make a junction with the jacobins to oppoſe the powers, whom, in their language they call Deſpots, and their leagues, a combination of Deſpots. Indeed, no man can look on the preſent poſture of Europe with the leaſt degree of diſcernment, who will not be thoroughly convinced, that England muſt be the faſt friend or the determined enemy of France. There is no medium; and I do not

think Mr. Fox to be ſo dull as not to obſerve this. His peace would have involved us inſtantly in the moſt extenſive and moſt ruinous wars; at the ſame time that it would have made a broad highway (acroſs which no human wiſdom could put an effectual barrier) for a mutual intercourſe with the fraterniſing jacobins of both ſides. The conſequences of which, thoſe will certainly not provide againſt, who do not dread or diſlike them.

34. It is not amiſs in this place to enter a little more fully into the ſpirit of the principal arguments on which Mr. Fox thought proper to reſt this his grand and concluding motion, particularly ſuch as were drawn from the internal ſtate of our affairs. Under a ſpecious appearance (not uncommonly put on by men of unſcrupulous ambition) that of tenderneſs and compaſſion to the poor; he did his beſt to appeal to the judgments of the meaneſt and moſt ignorant of the people on the merits of the war. He had before done ſomething of the ſame dangerous kind in his printed letter. The ground of a political war is of all things that which the poor labourer and manufacturer are the leaſt capable of conceiving. This ſort of people know in general that they muſt ſuffer by war. It is a matter to which they are ſufficiently competent, becauſe it is a matter of feeling. The *cauſes* of a war are not matters of feeling, but of reaſon

reaſon and foreſight, and often of remote conſiderations, and of a very great combination of circumſtances, which *they* are utterly incapable of comprehending; and, indeed, it is not every man in the higheſt claſſes who is altogether equal to it. Nothing, in a general ſenſe, appears to me leſs fair and juſtifiable, (even if no attempt were made to inflame the paſſions) than to ſubmit a matter on diſcuſſion to a tribunal incapable of judging of more than *one ſide* of the queſtion. It is at leaſt as unjuſtifiable to inflame the paſſions of ſuch judges againſt *that ſide*, in favour of which they cannot ſo much as comprehend the arguments. Before the prevalence of the French ſyſtem (which as far as it has gone has extinguiſhed the ſalutary prejudice called our Country) nobody was more ſenſible of this important truth than Mr. Fox; and nothing was more proper and pertinent, or was more felt at the time, than his reprimand to Mr. Wilberforce for an inconſiderate expreſſion which tended to call in the judgment of the poor, to eſtimate the policy of war upon the ſtandard of the taxes they may be obliged to pay towards its ſupport.

35. It is fatally known, that the great object of the jacobin ſyſtem is to excite the loweſt deſcription of the people to range themſelves under ambitious men, for the pillage and deſtruction of the more eminent orders and claſſes of the commu-

nity. The thing, therefore, that a man not fanatically attached to that dreadful project, would moſt ſtudiouſly avoid, is, to act a part with the French *Propagandiſts*, in attributing (as they conſtantly do) all wars and all the conſequences of wars, to the pride of thoſe orders, and to their contempt of the weak and indigent part of the ſociety. The ruling jacobins inſiſt upon it, that even the wars which they carry on with ſo much obſtinacy againſt all nations, are made to prevent the poor from any longer being the inſtruments and victims of kings, nobles, and the ariſtocracy of burghers and rich men. They pretend that the deſtruction of kings, nobles, and the ariſtocracy of burghers and rich men, is the only means of eſtabliſhing an univerſal and perpetual peace. This is the great drift of all their writings from the time of the meeting of the ſtates of France, in 1789, to the publication of the laſt Morning Chronicle. They inſiſt that even the war which, with ſo much boldneſs they have declared againſt all nations, is to prevent the poor from becoming the inſtruments and victims of theſe perſons and deſcriptions. It is but too eaſy, if you once teach poor labourers and mechanicks to defy their prejudices, and as this has been done with an induſtry ſcarcely credible, to ſubſtitute the principles of fraternity in the room of that ſalutary prejudice called our Country; it is, I ſay, but too eaſy to

perſuade

perſuade them agreeably to what Mr. Fox hints in his publick letter, that this war is, and that the other wars have been, the wars of kings; it is eaſy to perſuade them that the terrours even of a foreign conqueſt are not terrours for *them*—It is eaſy to perſuade them that, for their part *they* have nothing to loſe; and that their condition is not likely to be altered for the worſe, whatever party may happen to prevail in the war. Under any circumſtances this doctrine is highly dangerous, as it tends to make ſeparate parties of the higher and lower orders, and to put their intereſts on a different bottom. But if the enemy you have to deal with ſhould appear, as France now appears, under the very name and title of the deliverer of the poor, and the chaſtiſer of the rich, the former claſs would readily become, not an indifferent ſpectator of the war, but would be ready to enliſt in the faction of the enemy; which they would conſider, though under a foreign name, to be more connected with them than an adverſe deſcription in the ſame land. All the props of ſociety would be drawn from us by theſe doctrines, and the very foundations of the publick defence would give way in an inſtant.

36. There is no point which the faction of fraternity in England have laboured more than to excite in the poor the horrour of any war with France upon any occaſion. When they found that

that their open attacks upon our conſtitution in favour of a French republick were for the preſent repelled—they put that matter out of ſight, and have taken up the more plauſible and popular ground of general peace, upon merely general principles, although theſe very men, in the correſpondence of their clubs with thoſe of France, had reprobated the neutrality which now they ſo earneſtly preſs. But, in reality, their maxim was and is "peace and alliance with France, and war " with the reſt of the world."

37. This laſt motion of Mr. Fox bound up the whole of his politicks during the ſeſſion. This motion had many circumſtances, particularly in the Norwich correſpondence, by which the miſchief of all the others, was aggravated beyond meaſure. Yet, this laſt motion, far the worſt of Mr. Fox's proceedings, was the beſt ſupported of any of them, except his amendment to the addreſs. The Duke of Portland had directly engaged to ſupport the war—here was a motion as directly made to force the crown to put an end to it before a blow had been ſtruck. The efforts of the faction have ſo prevailed that ſome of his grace's neareſt friends have actually voted for that motion: ſome, after ſhewing themſelves, went away, others did not appear at all. So it muſt be where a man is for any time ſupported from perſonal conſiderations, without reference to his publick conduct. Through

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the whole of this buſineſs, the ſpirit of fraternity appears to me to have been the governing principle. It might be ſhameful for any man, above the vulgar, to ſhew ſo blind a partiality even to his own country, as Mr. Fox appears, on all occaſions, this ſeſſion, to have ſhewn to France. Had Mr. Fox been a miniſter, and proceeded on the principles laid down by him, I believe there is little doubt he would have been conſidered as the moſt criminal ſtateſman that ever lived in this country. I do not know why a ſtateſman out of place is not to be judged in the ſame manner, unleſs we can excuſe him by pleading in his favour a total indifference to principle; and that he would act and think in quite a different way if he were in office. This I will not ſuppoſe. One may think better of him; and that in caſe of his power he might change his mind. But ſuppoſing, that from better or from worſe motives, he might change his mind on his acquiſition of the favour of the crown, I ſeriouſly fear that if the king ſhould to-morrow put power into his hands, and that his good genius would inſpire him with maxims very different from thoſe he has promulgated, he would not be able to get the better of the ill temper, and the ill doctrines, he has been the means of exciting and propagating throughout the kingdom. From the very beginning of their inhuman and unprovoked rebellion and tyrannick uſurpation, he has covered the

the predominant faction of France, and their adherents here, with the moſt exaggerated panegyricks; neither has he miſſed a ſingle opportunity of abuſing and vilifying thoſe, who in uniform concurrence with the Duke of Portland's and Lord Fitzwilliam's opinion, have maintained the true grounds of the revolution ſettlement in 1688. He lamented all the defeats of the French; he rejoiced in all their victories; even when theſe victories threatened to overwhelm the continent of Europe, and by facilitating their means of penetrating into Holland, to bring this moſt dreadful of all evils with irreſiſtible force to the very doors, if not into the very heart, of our country. To this hour he always ſpeaks of every thought of overturning the French jacobiniſm by force, on the part of any power whatſoever, as an attempt unjuſt and cruel, and which he reprobates with horrour. If any of the French jacobin leaders are ſpoken of with hatred or ſcorn, he falls upon thoſe who take that liberty, with all the zeal and warmth with which men of honour defend their particular and boſom friends, when attacked. He always repreſents their cauſe as a cauſe of liberty; and all who oppoſe it as partiſans of deſpotiſm. He obſtinately continues to conſider the great and growing vices, crimes and diſorders of that country, as only evils of paſſage, which are to produce a permanently happy ſtate of order and freedom.

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He repreſents theſe diſorders exactly in the ſame way, and with the ſame limitations which are uſed by one of the two great jacobin factions, I mean that of Petion and Briſſot. Like them he ſtudiouſly confines his horrour and reprobation only to the maſſacres of the 2d of September, and paſſes by thoſe of the 10th of Auguſt, as well as the impriſonment and depoſition of the king, which were the conſequences of that day, as indeed were the maſſacres themſelves to which he confines his cenſure, though they were not actually perpetrated till early in September. Like that faction, he condemns, not the depoſition, or the propoſed exile, or perpetual impriſonment, but only the murder of the king. Mr. Sheridan, on every occaſion, palliates all the maſſacres committed in every part of France, as the effects of a natural indignation at the exorbitances of deſpotiſm, and of the dread of the people of returning under that yoke.—He has thus taken occaſion to load, not the actors in this wickedneſs, but the government of a mild, merciful, beneficent and patriotick prince, and his ſuffering, faithful ſubjects, with all the crimes of the new anarchical tyranny, under which the one has been murdered, and the others are oppreſſed. Thoſe continual either praiſes or palliating apologies of every thing done in France, and thoſe invectives as uniformly vomited out upon all thoſe who venture to expreſs their diſapprobation of

ſuch,

ſuch proceedings, coming from a man of Mr. Fox's fame and authority, and one who is conſidered as the perſon to whom a great party of the wealthieſt men of the kingdom look up, have been the cauſe why the principle of French fraternity formally gained the ground which at one time it had obtained in this country. It will infallibly recover itſelf again, and in ten times a greater degree, if the kind of peace, in the manner which he preaches, ever ſhall be eſtabliſhed with the reigning faction in France.

38. So far as to the French practices with regard to France, and the other powers of Europe—as to their principles and doctrines, with regard to the conſtitution of ſtates, Mr. Fox ſtudiouſly, on all occaſions, and indeed when no occaſion calls for it, (as on the debate of the petition for Reform) brings forward and aſſerts their fundamental and fatal principle, pregnant with every miſchief and every crime, namely, that, "in "every country the people is the legitimate "ſovereign;" exactly conformable to the declaration of the French clubs and legiſlators,—"La "ſouveraineté eſt *une, indiviſible, inalienable, et* "*impreſcriptible* :—Elle appartient à la nation: "—Aucune *ſection* du peuple, ni aucun *individu* "ne peut s'en attribuer l'exerciſe." This confounds, in a manner equally miſchievous and ſtupid, the origin of a government from the people with its continuance in their hands. I believe,

believe, that no ſuch doctrine has ever been heard of in any publick act of any government whatſoever, until it was adopted (I think from the writings of Rouſſeau) by the French aſſemblies, who have made it the baſis of their conſtitution at home, and of the matter of their apoſtolate in every country. Theſe and other wild declarations of abſtract principle, Mr. Fox ſays, are in themſelves perfectly right and true; though in ſome caſes he allows the French draw abſurd conſequences from them. But I conceive he is miſtaken. The conſequences are moſt logically, though moſt miſchievouſly drawn from the premiſes and principles by that wicked and ungracious faction. The fault is in the foundation.

39. Before ſociety, in a multitude of men, it is obvious, that ſovereignty and ſubjection are ideas which cannot exiſt. It is the compact on which ſociety is formed that makes both. But to ſuppoſe the people, contrary to their compacts, both to give away and retain the ſame thing, is altogether abſurd. It is worſe, for it ſuppoſes in any ſtrong combination of men a power and right of always diſſolving the ſocial union; which power, however, if it exiſts, renders them again as little ſovereigns as ſubjects, but a mere unconnected multitude. It is not eaſy to ſtate for what good end, at a time like this, when the foundations of all antient and preſcriptive governments, ſuch as

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ours (to which people ſubmit, not becauſe they have choſen them, but becauſe they are born to them) are undermined by perilous theories, that Mr. Fox ſhould be ſo fond of referring to thoſe theories, upon all occaſions, even though ſpeculatively they might be true, which God forbid they ſhould! Particularly I do not ſee the reaſon why he ſhould be ſo fond of declaring, that the principles of the revolution have made the crown of Great Britain *elective*; why he thinks it ſeaſonable to preach up with ſo much earneſtneſs, for now three years together, the doctrine of reſiſtance and revolution at all; or to aſſert that our laſt revolution of 1688 ſtands on the ſame or ſimilar principles with that of France. We are not called upon by any circumſtance, that I know of, which can juſtify a revolt, or which demands a revolution, or can make an election of a ſucceſſor to the crown neceſſary, whatever latent right may be ſuppoſed to exiſt for effectuating any of theſe purpoſes.

40. Not the leaſt alarming of the proceedings of Mr. Fox and his friends in this ſeſſion, eſpecially taken in concurrence with their whole proceedings, with regard to France and its principles, is their eagerneſs at this ſeaſon, under pretence of parliamentary reforms (a project which had been for ſome time rather dormant) to diſcredit and diſgrace the houſe of commons. For this purpoſe

theſe gentlemen had found a way to inſult the houſe by ſeveral atrocious libels in the form of petitions. In particular they brought up a libel, or rather a complete digeſt of libellous matter, from the club called the Friends of the People. It is indeed at once the moſt audacious and the moſt inſidious of all the performances of that kind which have yet appeared. It is ſaid to be the penmanſhip of Mr. Tierney, to bring whom into parliament the Duke of Portland formerly had taken a good deal of pains, and expended, as I hear, a conſiderable ſum of money.

41. Among the circumſtances of danger from that piece, and from its precedent, it is obſervable that this is the firſt petition (if I remember right) *coming from a club or aſſociation, ſigned by individuals, denoting neither local reſidence, nor corporate capacity.* This mode of petition not being ſtrictly illegal or informal, though in its ſpirit in the higheſt degree miſchievous, may and will lead to other things of that nature, tending to bring theſe clubs and aſſociations to the French model, and to make them in the end anſwer French purpoſes: I mean, that without legal names, theſe clubs will be led to aſſume political capacities; that they may debate the forms of conſtitution; and that from their meetings they may inſolently dictate their will to the regular authorities of the kingdom, in the manner in which the jacobin clubs iſſue their man-

dates to the national aſſembly, or the national convention. The audacious remonſtrance, I obſerve, is ſigned by all of that aſſociation (the friends of the people) *who are not in parliament*, and it was ſupported moſt ſtrenuouſly by all the aſſociators *who are members*, with Mr. Fox at their head. He and they contended for referring this libel to a committee. Upon the queſtion of that reference, they grounded all their debate for a change in the conſtitution of parliament. The pretended petition is, in fact, a regular charge or impeachment of the houſe of commons, digeſted into a number of articles. This plan of reform is not a criminal impeachment, but a matter of prudence, to be ſubmitted to the publick wiſdom, which muſt be as well appriſed of the facts as petitioners can be. But thoſe accuſers of the houſe of commons have proceeded upon the principles of a criminal proceſs; and have had the effrontery to offer proof on each article.

42. This charge, the party of Mr. Fox maintained article by article, beginning with the firſt; namely, the interference of peers at elections, and their nominating in effect ſeveral of the members of the houſe of commons. In the printed liſt of grievances which they made out on the occaſion, and in ſupport of their charge, is found the borough, for which, under Lord Fitzwilliam's influence, I now ſit. By this remonſtrance, and its

object,

object, they hope to defeat the operation of property in elections, and in reality to diſſolve the connexion and communication of intereſts which makes the houſes of parliament a mutual ſupport to each other. Mr. Fox and the friends of the people are not ſo ignorant as not to know, that peers do not interfere in elections as peers, but as men of property—they well know that the houſe of lords is by itſelf the feebleſt part of the conſtitution; they know that the houſe of lords is ſupported only by its connexions with the crown, and with the houſe of commons; and that without this double connexion the lords could not exiſt a ſingle year. They know, that all theſe parts of our conſtitution, whilſt they are balanced as oppoſing intereſts, are alſo connected as friends; otherwiſe nothing but confuſion could be the reſult of ſuch a complex conſtitution. It is natural, therefore, that they who wiſh the common deſtruction of the whole, and of all its parts, ſhould contend for their total ſeparation. But as the houſe of commons is that link which connects both the other parts of the conſtitution (the crown and the lords) *with the maſs of the people*, it is to that link (as it is natural enough) that their inceſſant attacks are directed. That artificial repreſentation of the people being once diſcredited and overturned, all goes to pieces, and nothing but a

plain *French* democracy or arbitrary monarchy can poſſibly exiſt.

43. Some of theſe gentlemen who attacked the houſe of commons, lean to a repreſentation of the people by the head, that is, to *individual repreſentation.* None of them that I recollect, except Mr. Fox, directly rejected it. It is remarkable, however, that he only rejected it by ſimply declaring an opinion. He let all the argument go againſt his opinion. All the proceedings and arguments of his reforming friends lead to individual repreſentation and to nothing elſe. It deſerves to be attentively obſerved, *that this individual repreſentation is the only plan of their reform, which has been explicitly propoſed.* In the mean time, the conduct of Mr. Fox appears to be far more inexplicable, on any good ground, than theirs, who propoſe the individual repreſentation; for he neither propoſes any thing, nor even ſuggeſts, that he has any thing to propoſe, in lieu of the preſent mode of conſtituting the houſe of commons. On the contrary, he declares againſt all the plans which have yet been ſuggeſted, either from himſelf or others: yet, thus unprovided with any plan whatſoever, he preſſed forward this unknown reform with all poſſible warmth; and for that purpoſe, in a ſpeech of ſeveral hours, he urged the referring to a committee, the libellous impeachment of the houſe of

commons by the aſſociation of the friends of the people. But for Mr. Fox to diſcredit parliament *as it ſtands*, to countenance leagues, covenants, and aſſociations for its further diſcredit, to render it perfectly odious and contemptible, and at the ſame time to propoſe nothing at all in place of what he diſgraces, is worſe, if poſſible, than to contend for perſonal individual repreſentation, and is little leſs than demanding, in plain terms, to bring on plain anarchy.

44. Mr. Fox and theſe gentlemen have, for the preſent, been defeated; but they are neither converted nor diſheartened. They have ſolemnly declared, that they will perſevere until they ſhall have obtained their ends; perſiſting to aſſert, that the houſe of commons not only is not the true repreſentative of the people, but that it does not anſwer the purpoſe of ſuch repreſentation; moſt of them inſiſt that all the debts, the taxes, and the burthens of all kinds on the people, with every other evil and inconvenience, which we have ſuffered ſince the Revolution, have been owing ſolely to a houſe of commons which does not ſpeak the ſenſe of the people.

45. It is alſo not to be forgotten, that Mr. Fox, and all who hold with him, on this, as on all other occaſions of pretended reform, moſt bitterly reproach Mr. Pitt with treachery, in declining to ſupport the ſcandalous charges and indefinite

finite projects of this infamous libel from the Friends of the People. By the animosity with which they persecute all those who grow cold in this cause of pretended reform, they hope, that if through levity, inexperience, or ambition, any young person (like Mr. Pitt, for instance) happens to be once embarked in their design, they shall, by a false shame, keep him fast in it for ever. Many they have so hampered.

46. I know it is usual, when the peril and alarm of the hour appears to be a little overblown, to think no more of the matter. But for my part, I look back with horrour on what we have escaped; and am full of anxiety with regard to the dangers, which, in my opinion, are still to be apprehended both at home and abroad. This business has cast deep roots. Whether it is necessarily connected in theory with jacobinism is not worth a dispute. The two things are connected in fact. The partisans of the one are the partisans of the other. I know it is common with those who are favourable to the gentlemen of Mr. Fox's party, and to their leader, though not at all devoted to all their reforming projects, or their Gallican politicks, to argue in palliation of their conduct, that it is not in their power to do all the harm which their actions evidently tend to. It is said, that as the people will not support them, they may safely be indulged in those eccentrick fancies of reform,

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and thoſe theories which lead to nothing. This apology is not very much to the honour of thoſe politicians, whoſe intereſts are to be adhered to in defiance of their conduct. I cannot flatter myſelf that theſe inceſſant attacks on the conſtitution of parliament are ſafe. It is not in my power to deſpiſe the unceaſing efforts of a confederacy of about fifty perſons of eminence; men, for the far greater part, of very ample fortunes either in poſſeſſion or in expectancy; men of decided characters and vehement paſſions, men of very great talents of all kinds; of much boldneſs, and of the greateſt poſſible ſpirit of artifice, intrigue, adventure, and enterpriſe, all operating with unwearied activity and perſeverance. Theſe gentlemen are much ſtronger too without doors than ſome calculate. They have the more active part of the diſſenters with them; and the whole clan of ſpeculators of all denominations—a large and growing ſpecies. They have that floating multitude which goes with events, and which ſuffers the loſs or gain of a battle, to decide its opinions of right and wrong. As long as by every art this party keeps alive a ſpirit of diſaffection againſt the very conſtitution of the kingdom, and attributes, as lately it has been in the habit of doing, all the publick misfortunes to that conſtitution, it is abſolutely *impoſſible*, but that ſome moment muſt arrive, in which they will be enabled to produce a pretended reform and a

real revolution. If ever the body of this *compound conſtitution* of ours is ſubverted either in favour of unlimited monarchy, or of wild democracy, that ruin will *moſt certainly* be the reſult of this very ſort of machinations againſt the houſe of commons. It is not from a confidence in the views or intentions of any ſtateſman, that I think he is to be indulged in theſe perilous amuſements.

47. Before it is made the great object of any man's political life to raiſe another to power, it is right to conſider what are the real diſpoſitions of the perſon to be ſo elevated. We are not to form our judgment on theſe diſpoſitions from the rules and principles of a court of juſtice, but from thoſe of private diſcretion; not looking for what would ſerve to criminate another, but what is ſufficient to direct ourſelves. By a compariſon of a ſeries of the diſcourſes and actions of certain men, for a reaſonable length of time, it is impoſſible not to obtain ſufficient indication of the general tendency of their views and principles. There is no other rational mode of proceeding. It is true, that in ſome one or two, perhaps not well-weighed expreſſions, or ſome one or two unconnected and doubtful affairs, we may and ought to judge of the actions or words by our previous good or ill opinion of the man. But this allowance has its bounds. It does not extend to any regular courſe of ſyſtematical action, or of conſtant and

repeated diſcourſe. It is againſt every principle of common ſenſe and of juſtice to one's ſelf, and to the publick, to judge of a ſeries of ſpeeches and actions from the man, and not of the man from the whole tenour of his language and conduct. I have ſtated the above matters, not as inferring a criminal charge of evil intention. If I had meant to do ſo, perhaps they are ſtated with tolerable exactneſs—But I had no ſuch view. The intentions of theſe gentlemen may be very pure. I do not diſpute it. But I think they are in ſome great errour. If theſe things are done by Mr. Fox and his friends, with good intentions, they are not done leſs dangerouſly; for it ſhews theſe good intentions are not under the direction of ſafe maxims and principles.

48. Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, and the gentlemen who call themſelves the phalanx, have not been ſo very indulgent to others. They have thought proper to aſcribe to thoſe members of the houſe of commons, who, in exact agreement with the Duke of Portland and Lord Fitzwilliam, abhor and oppoſe the French ſyſtem, the baſeſt and moſt unworthy motives for their conduct;—as if none could oppoſe that atheiſtick, immoral, and impolitick project ſet up in France, ſo diſgraceful and deſtructive, as I conceive, to human nature itſelf, but with ſome ſiniſter intentions. They treat thoſe members on all occaſions with a ſort of lordly inſolence, though they are perſons that (whatever homage

homage they may pay to the eloquence of the gentlemen who chuſe to look down upon them with ſcorn), are not their inferiours in any particular which calls for and obtains juſt conſideration from the public; not their inferiours in knowledge of publick law, or of the conſtitution of the kingdom; not their inferiours in their acquaintance with its foreign and domeſtick intereſts; not their inferiours in experience or practice of buſineſs; not their inferiours in moral character; not their inferiours in the proofs they have given of zeal and induſtry in the ſervice of their country. Without denying to theſe gentlemen the reſpect and conſideration which, it is allowed, juſtly belongs to them, we ſee no reaſon why they ſhould not as well be obliged to defer ſomething to our opinions, as that we ſhould be bound blindly and ſervilely to follow thoſe of Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Grey, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Lambton, Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Taylor, and others. We are members of parliament and their equals. We never conſider ourſelves as their followers. Theſe gentlemen (ſome of them hardly born, when ſome of us came into parliament) have thought proper to treat us as deſerters, as if we had been liſted into their phalanx like ſoldiers, and had ſworn to live and die in their French principles. This inſolent claim of ſuperiority on their part, and of a ſort of vaſſalage to them on that of other

members,

members, is what no liberal mind will ſubmit to bear.

49. The ſociety of the liberty of the preſs, the whig club, and the ſociety for conſtitutional information, and (I believe) the friends of the people, as well as ſome clubs in Scotland, have indeed declared, "That their confidence in and attachment to Mr. Fox, has lately been confirmed, "ſtrengthened, and increaſed by the calumnies "(as they are called) againſt him." It is true, Mr. Fox and his friends have thoſe teſtimonies in their favour, againſt certain old friends of the Duke of Portland. Yet on a full, ſerious, and I think diſpaſſionate conſideration of the whole of what Mr. Fox and Mr. Sheridan and their friends have acted, ſaid and written, in this ſeſſion, inſtead of doing any thing which might tend to procure power, or any ſhare of it whatſoever, to them or to their phalanx (as they call it) or to increaſe their credit, influence, or popularity in the nation, I think it one of my moſt ſerious and important publick duties, in whatſoever ſtation I may be placed for the ſhort time I have to live, effectually to employ my beſt endeavours, by every prudent and every lawful means, to traverſe all their deſigns. I have only to lament, that my abilities are not greater, and that my probability of life is not better, for the more effectual purſuit of that object. But I truſt that neither the principles nor exertions

exertions will die with me. I am the rather confirmed in this my reſolution, and in this my wiſh of tranſmitting it, becauſe every ray of hope concerning a poſſible controul or mitigation of the enormous miſchiefs which the principles of theſe gentlemen, and which their connexions, full as dangerous as their principles, might receive from the influence of the Duke of Portland and Lord Fitzwilliam, on becoming their colleagues in office, is now entirely baniſhed from the mind of every one living.—It is apparent, even to the world at large, that ſo far from having a power to direct or to guide Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Grey, and the reſt, in any important matter, they have not through this ſeſſion, been able to prevail on them to forbear or to delay, or mitigate, or ſoften any one act, or any one expreſſion upon ſubjects on which they eſſentially differed.

50. Even if this hope of a poſſible controul did exiſt, yet the declared opinions and the uniform line of conduct conformable to thoſe opinions, purſued by Mr. Fox, muſt become a matter of ſerious alarm if he ſhould obtain a power either at court or in parliament, or in the nation at large; and for this plain reaſon—He muſt be the moſt active and efficient member in any adminiſtration of which he ſhall form a part. That a man, or ſet of men, are guided by ſuch not dubious, but delivered and avowed principles and maxims of policy

policy as to need a watch and check on them, in the exerciſe of the higheſt power, ought in my opinion, to make every man, who is not of the ſame principles, and guided by the ſame maxims, a little cautious how he makes himſelf one of the traverſes of a ladder, to help ſuch a man or ſuch a ſet of men, to climb up to the higheſt authority. A miniſter of this country is to be controlled by the houſe of commons. He is to be truſted, not *controlled*, by his colleagues in office; if he were to be controlled, government, which ought to be the ſource of order, would itſelf become a ſcene of anarchy. Beſides, Mr. Fox is a man of an aſpiring and commanding mind, made rather to controul than to be controlled, and he never will be, nor can be, in any adminiſtration, in which he will be guided by any of thoſe whom I have been accuſtomed to confide in. It is abſurd to think that he would or could. If his own opinions do not controul him, nothing can. When we conſider of an adherence to a man which leads to his power, we muſt not only ſee what the man is, but how he ſtands related. It is not to be forgotten that Mr. Fox acts in cloſe and inſeparable connexion with another gentleman of exactly the ſame deſcription as himſelf, and who, perhaps, of the two, is the leader. The reſt of the body are not a great deal more tractable; and

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over them if Mr. Fox and Mr. Sheridan have authority, moſt aſſuredly the Duke of Portland has not the ſmalleſt degree of influence.

51. One muſt take care, that a blind partiality to ſome perſons, and as blind an hatred to others, may not enter into our minds under a colour of inflexible publick principle. We hear, as a reaſon for clinging to Mr. Fox at preſent, that nine years ago Mr. Pitt got into power by miſchievous intrigues with the court, with the diſſenters, and with other factious people out of parliament, to the diſcredit and weakening of the power of the houſe of commons. His conduct nine years ago I ſtill hold to be very culpable. There are, however, many things very culpable that I do not know how to puniſh. My opinion, on ſuch matters, I muſt ſubmit to the good of the ſtate, as I have done on other occaſions; and particularly with regard to the authors and managers of the American war, with whom I have acted, both in office and in oppoſition, with great confidence and cordiality, though I thought many of their acts criminal and impeachable. Whilſt the miſconduct of Mr. Pitt and his aſſociates was yet recent, it was not poſſible to get Mr. Fox of himſelf to take a ſingle ſtep, or even to countenance others in taking any ſtep upon the ground of that miſconduct and falſe policy, though if the matters had been then

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taken up and purſued, ſuch a ſtep could not have appeared ſo evidently deſperate as now it is. So far from purſuing Mr. Pitt, I know that then, and for ſome time after, ſome of Mr. Fox's friends were actually, and with no ſmall earneſtneſs, looking out to a coalition with that gentleman. For years I never heard this circumſtance of Mr. Pitt's miſconduct on that occaſion mentioned by Mr. Fox, either in publick or in private, as a ground for oppoſition to that miniſter. All oppoſition, from that period to this very ſeſſion, has proceeded upon the ſeparate meaſures as they ſeparately aroſe, without any vindictive retroſpect to Mr. Pitt's conduct in 1784. My memory, however, may fail me. I muſt appeal to the printed debates, which (ſo far as Mr. Fox is concerned) are unuſually accurate.

52. Whatever might have been in our power, at an early period, at this day I ſee no remedy for what was done in 1784. I had no great hopes even at the time. I was therefore very eager to record a remonſtrance on the journals of the houſe of commons, as a caution againſt ſuch a popular deluſion in times to come; and this I then feared, and now am certain, is all that could be done. I know of no way of animadverting on the crown. I know of no mode of calling to account the houſe of lords, who threw out the India bill, in a way

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not much to their credit. As little, or rather leſs, am I able to coerce the people at large, who behaved very unwiſely and intemperately on that occaſion. Mr. Pitt was then accuſed, by me as well as others, of attempting to be miniſter, without enjoying the confidence of the houſe of commons, though he did enjoy the confidence of the crown. That houſe of commons, whoſe confidence he did not enjoy, unfortunately did not itſelf enjoy the confidence (though we well deſerved it) either of the crown or of the publick. For want of that confidence, the then houſe of commons did not ſurvive the conteſt. Since that period Mr. Pitt has enjoyed the confidence of the crown, and of the lords, and *of the houſe of commons*, through two ſucceſſive parliaments; and I ſuſpect that he has ever ſince, and that he does ſtill, enjoy as large a portion, at leaſt, of the confidence of the people without doors, as his great rival. Before whom, then, is Mr. Pitt to be impeached, and by whom? The more I conſider the matter, the more firmly I am convinced, that the idea of proſcribing Mr. Pitt *indirectly*, when you cannot *directly puniſh* him, is as chimerical a project, and as unjuſtifiable, as it would be to have proſcribed Lord North. For ſuppoſing, that by indirect ways of oppoſition, by oppoſition upon meaſures which do not relate to the buſineſs of

1784, but which on other grounds might prove unpopular, you were to drive him from his ſeat, this would be no example whatever of puniſhment for the matters we charge as offences in 1784. On a cool and diſpaſſionate view of the affairs of this time and country, it appears obvious to me, that one or the other of thoſe two great men, that is, Mr. Pitt or Mr. Fox, muſt be miniſter. They are, I am ſorry for it, irreconcileable. Mr. Fox's conduct *in this ſeſſion* has rendered the idea of his power a matter of ſerious alarm to many people, who were very little pleaſed with the proceedings of Mr. Pitt in the beginning of his adminiſtration. They like neither the conduct of Mr. Pitt, in 1784, nor that of Mr. Fox, in 1793; but they eſtimate, which of the evils is moſt preſſing at the time, and what is likely to be the conſequence of a change. If Mr. Fox be wedded, they muſt be ſenſible, that his opinions and principles, on the now exiſting ſtate of things at home and abroad, muſt be taken as his portion. In his train muſt alſo be taken the whole body of gentlemen, who are pledged to him and to each other, and to their common politicks and principles.—I believe no king of Great Britain ever will adopt for his confidential ſervants, that body of gentlemen, holding that body of principles. Even if the preſent king or his ſucceſſor ſhould think fit to take that ſtep, I apprehend a general diſcontent of thoſe, who

wiſh that this nation and that Europe ſhould continue in their preſent ſtate, would enſue; a diſcontent, which combined with the principles and progreſs of the new men in power, would ſhake this kingdom to its foundations. I do not believe any one political conjecture can be more certain than this.

53. Without at all defending or palliating Mr. Pitt's conduct in 1784, I muſt obſerve, that the criſis of 1793, with regard to every thing at home and abroad, is full as important as that of 1784 ever was; and, if for no other reaſon, by being preſent is much more important. It is not to nine years ago we are to look for the danger of Mr. Fox's and Mr. Sheridan's conduct, and that of the gentlemen who act with them. It is at *this* very time, and in *this* very ſeſſion, that, if they had not been ſtrenuouſly reſiſted, they would not merely have diſcredited the houſe of commons (as Mr. Pitt did in 1784, when he perſuaded the king to reject their advice, and to appeal from them to the people), but in my opinion, would have been the means of wholly ſubverting the houſe of commons and the houſe of peers, and the whole conſtitution actual and virtual, together with the ſafety and independence of this nation, and the peace and ſettlement of every ſtate in the now chriſtian world. It is to our opinion of the nature of jacobiniſm, and of the probability by corruption,

corruption, faction, and force, of its gaining ground every where, that the queſtion whom and what you are to ſupport is to be determined. For my part, without doubt or heſitation, I look upon jacobiniſm as the moſt dreadful, and the moſt ſhameful evil, which ever afflicted mankind, a thing which goes beyond the power of all calculation in its miſchief; and that if it is ſuffered to exiſt in France, we muſt in England, and ſpeedily too, fall into that calamity.

54. I figure to myſelf the purpoſe of theſe gentlemen accompliſhed, and this miniſtry deſtroyed. I ſee that the perſons who in that caſe muſt rule, can be no other than Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Grey, the Marquis of Lanſdowne, Lord Thurlow, Lord Lauderdale, and the Duke of Norfolk, with the other chiefs of the friends of the people, the parliamentary reformers, and the admirers of the French revolution. The principal of theſe are all formally pledged to their projects. If the Duke of Portland and Lord Fitzwilliam ſhould be admitted into that ſyſtem (as they might and probably would be), it is quite certain they could not have the ſmalleſt weight in it; leſs, indeed, than what they now poſſeſs, if leſs were poſſible: becauſe they would be leſs wanted than they now are; and, becauſe all thoſe who wiſhed to join them, and to act under them, have been rejected by the Duke of Portland and Lord Fitzwilliam

themſelves; and Mr. Fox, finding them thus by themſelves diſarmed, has built quite a new fabrick, upon quite a new foundation. There is no trifling on this ſubject. We ſee very diſtinctly before us the miniſtry that would be formed, and the plan that would be purſued. If we like the plan, we muſt wiſh the power of thoſe who are to carry it into execution; but to purſue the political exaltation of thoſe whoſe political meaſures we diſapprove, and whoſe principles we diffent from, is a ſpecies of modern politicks not eaſily comprehenſible, and which muſt end in the ruin of the country, if it ſhould continue and ſpread. Mr. Pitt may be the worſt of men, and Mr. Fox may be the beſt; but, at preſent, the former is in the intereſt of his country, and of the order of things long eſtabliſhed in Europe: Mr. Fox is not. I have, for one, been born in this order of things, and would fain die in it. I am ſure it is ſufficient to make men as virtuous, as happy, and as knowing as any thing which Mr. Fox, and his friends abroad or at home, would ſubſtitute in its place; and I ſhould be ſorry that any ſet of politicians ſhould obtain power in England, whoſe principles or ſchemes ſhould lead them to countenance perſons or factions whoſe object is to introduce ſome new deviſed order of things into England, or to ſupport that order where it is already introduced, in France; a place, in which if it can be fixed, in

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my mind, it muſt have a certain and decided influence in and upon this kingdom. This is my account of my conduct to my private friends. I have already ſaid all I with to ſay, or nearly ſo, to the publick. I write this with pain, and with a heart full of grief!

PREFACE

TO

THE ADDRESS OF M. BRISSOT

TO HIS

CONSTITUENTS.

TRANSLATED BY

THE LATE WILLIAM BURKE, ESQ.

1794.

PREFACE,

&c. &c.

THE French revolution has been the ſubject of various ſpeculations, and various hiſtories. As might be expected, the royaliſts and the republicans have differed a good deal in their accounts of the principles of that revolution, of the ſprings which have ſet it in motion, and of the true character of thoſe who have been, or ſtill are, the principal actors on that aſtoniſhing ſcene.

They who are inclined to think favourably of that event, will undoubtedly object to every ſtate of facts which comes only from the authority of a royaliſt. Thus much muſt be allowed by thoſe who are the moſt firmly attached to the cauſe of religion, law, and order (for of ſuch, and not of friends to deſpotiſm, the royal party is compoſed) that their very affection to this generous and manly cauſe, and their abhorrence of a revolution, not leſs fatal to liberty than to government, may poſſibly lead them in ſome particulars to a more harſh repreſentation of the proceedings of their adverſaries, than would be allowed by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. This ſort of errour ariſes from a ſource highly laudable; but the exactneſs

of

of truth may ſuffer even from the feelings of virtue. Hiſtory will do juſtice to the intentions of worthy men; but it will be on its guard againſt their infirmities; it will examine with great ſtrictneſs of ſcrutiny, whatever appears from a writer in favour of his own cauſe. On the other hand, whatever eſcapes him, and makes againſt that cauſe, comes with the greateſt weight.

In this important controverſy, the tranſlator of the following work brings forward to the Engliſh tribunal of opinion, the teſtimony of a witneſs beyond all exception. His competence is undoubted. He knows every thing which concerns this revolution to the bottom. He is a chief actor in all the ſcenes which he preſents. No man can object to him as a royaliſt: the royal party, and the Chriſtian religion, never had a more determined enemy. In a word it is BRISSOT.—It is Briſſot the republican, the jacobin, and the philoſopher, who is brought to give an account of jacobiniſm, and of republicaniſm, and of philoſophy.

It is worthy of obſervation, that this his account of the genius of jacobiniſm, and its effects, is not confined to the period in which that faction came to be divided within itſelf. In ſeveral, and thoſe very important particulars, Briſſot's obſervations apply to the whole of the preceding period, before the great ſchiſm, and whilſt the jacobins acted as one body; inſomuch, that the far greater part of

the proceedings of the ruling powers, ſince the commencement of the revolution in France, ſo ſtrikingly painted, ſo ſtrongly and ſo juſtly reprobated by Briſſot, were the acts of Briſſot himſelf and his aſſociates. All the members of the Girondin ſubdiviſion were as deeply concerned as any of the Mountain could poſſibly be, and ſome of them much more deeply, in thoſe horrid tranſactions which have filled all the thinking part of Europe with the greateſt deteſtation, and with the moſt ſerious apprehenſions for the common liberty and ſafety.

A queſtion will very naturally be aſked, what could induce Briſſot to draw ſuch a picture? He muſt have been ſenſible it was his own. The anſwer is—the inducement was the ſame with that which led him to partake in the perpetration of all the crimes, the calamitous effects of which he deſcribes with the pen of a maſter—ambition. His faction having obtained their ſtupendous and unnatural power, by rooting out of the minds of his unhappy countrymen every principle of religion, morality, loyalty, fidelity, and honour, diſcovered, that when authority came into their hands, it would be a matter of no ſmall difficulty for them to carry on government on the principles by which they had deſtroyed it.

The rights of men, and the new principles of liberty and equality, were very unhandy inſtruments for

for thoſe who wiſhed to eſtabliſh a ſyſtem of tranquillity and order. They who were taught to find nothing to reſpect in the title and the virtues of Louis the ſixteenth, a prince ſucceeding to the throne by the fundamental laws, in the line of a ſucceſſion of monarchs continued for fourteen hundred years, found nothing which could bind them to an implicit fidelity, and dutiful allegiance to Meſſ. Briſſot, Vergniaux, Condorcet, Anacharſis Cloots, and Thomas Paine.

In this difficulty, they did as well as they could. To govern the people, they muſt incline the people to obey. The work was difficult, but it was neceſſary. They were to accompliſh it by ſuch materials and by ſuch inſtruments as they had in their hands. They were to accompliſh the purpoſes of order, morality, and ſubmiſſion to the laws, from the principles of atheiſm, profligacy, and ſedition. Ill as the diſguiſe became them, they began to aſſume the maſk of an auſtere and rigid virtue; they exhauſted all the flores of their eloquence (which in ſome of them were not inconſiderable) in declamations againſt tumult and confuſion; they made daily harangues on the bleſſings of order, diſcipline, quiet, and obedience to authority; they even ſhewed ſome ſort of diſpoſition to protect ſuch property as had not been confiſcated. They, who on every occaſion had diſcovered a ſort of furious thirſt of blood, and a greedy appetite for ſlaughter,

who avowed and gloried in the murders and maſſacres of the fourteenth of July, of the fifth and ſixth of October, and of the tenth of Auguſt, now began to be ſqueamiſh and faſtidious with regard to thoſe of the ſecond of September.

In their pretended ſcruples on the ſequel of the ſlaughter of the tenth of Auguſt, they impoſed upon no living creature, and they obtained not the ſmalleſt credit for humanity. They endeavoured to eſtabliſh a diſtinction, by the belief of which they hoped to keep the ſpirit of murder ſafely bottled up, and ſealed for their own purpoſes, without endangering themſelves by the fumes of the poiſon which they prepared for their enemies.

Roland was the chief and the moſt accredited of the faction:—His morals had furniſhed little matter of exception againſt him;—old, domeſtick, and uxorious, he led a private life ſufficiently blameleſs. He was therefore ſet up as the *Cato* of the republican party, which did not abound in ſuch characters.

This man like moſt of the chiefs, was the manager of a newſpaper, in which he promoted the intereſt of his party. He was a fatal preſent made by the revolutioniſts, to the unhappy king, as one of his miniſters under the new conſtitution. Amongſt his colleagues were Claviere and Servan. All the three have ſince that time, eitheir loſt their heads by the axe of their aſſociates in rebellion, or

to

to evade their own revolutionary juſtice have fallen by their own hands.

Theſe miniſters were regarded by the king as in a conſpiracy to dethrone him. Nobody who conſiders the circumſtances which preceded the depoſition of Louis the ſixteenth; nobody who attends to the ſubſequent conduct of thoſe miniſters, can heſitate about the reality of ſuch a conſpiracy. The king certainly had no doubt of it; he found himſelf obliged to remove them; and the neceſſity which firſt obliged him to chooſe ſuch regicide miniſters, conſtrained him to replace them by Dumourier the Jacobin, and ſome others of little efficiency, though of a better deſcription.

A little before this removal, and evidently as a part of the conſpiracy, Roland put into the king's hands as a memorial, the moſt infolent, ſeditious, and atrocious libel, that has probably ever been penned. This paper Roland a few days after delivered to the National Aſſembly,* who inſtantly publiſhed and diſperſed it over all France; and in order to give it the ſtronger operation they declared, that he and his brother miniſters had carried with them the regret of the nation. None of the writings which have inflamed the jacobin ſpirit to a ſavage fury, ever worked up a fiercer ferment

* Preſented to the king June 13, delivered to him the preceding Monday.—*Tranſlator.*

through

through the whole maſs of the republicans in every part of France.

Under the thin veil of *prediction*, he ſtrongly *recommends* all the abominable practices which afterwards followed. In particular he inflamed the minds of the populace againſt the reſpectable and conſcientious clergy, who became the chief objects of the maſſacre, and who were to him the chief objects of a malignity and rancour that one could hardly think to exiſt in an human heart.

We have the relicks of his fanatical perſecution here. We are in a condition to judge of the merits of the perſecutors and of the perſecuted—I do not ſay the accuſers and accuſed; becauſe in all the furious declamations of the atheiſtick faction againſt theſe men, not one ſpecifick charge has been made upon any one perſon of thoſe who ſuffered in their maſſacre, or by their decree of exile.

The king had declared that he would ſooner periſh under their axe (he too well ſaw what was preparing for him) than give his ſanction to the iniquitous act of proſcription, under which thoſe innocent people were to be tranſported.

On this proſcription of the clergy, a principal part of the oſtenſible quarrel between the king and thoſe miniſters, had turned. From the time of the authorized publication of this libel, ſome of the manœuvres long and uniformly purſued for the king's

king's depoſition became more and more evident and declared.

The tenth of Auguſt came on, and in the manner in which Roland had predicted; it was followed by the ſame conſequences—The king was depoſed, after cruel maſſacres, in the courts and the apartments of his palace, and in almoſt all parts of the city. In reward of his treaſon to his old maſter, Roland was by his new maſters named miniſter of the home department.

The maſſacres of the ſecond of September were begotten by the maſſacres of the tenth of Auguſt. They were univerſally foreſeen and hourly expected. During this ſhort interval between the two murderous ſcenes, the furies, male and female, cried out havock as loudly and as fiercely as ever. The ordinary jails were all filled with prepared victims; and when they overflowed, churches were turned into jails. At this time the relentleſs Roland had the care of the general police; he had for his colleague the bloody Danton, who was miniſter of juſtice:—the inſidious Petion was mayor of Paris—the treacherous Manuel was procurator of the Common-hall. The magiſtrates (ſome or all of them) were evidently the authors of this maſſacre. Leſt the national guards ſhould, by their very name, be reminded of their duty in preſerving the lives of their fellow citizens, the common council

council of Paris, pretending that it was in vain to think of reſiſting the murderers (although in truth neither their numbers nor their arms were at all formidable) obliged thoſe guards to draw the charges from their muſquets, and took away their bayonets. One of their journaliſts, and according to their fashion, one of their leading ſtateſmen, Gorſas, mentions this fact in his newſpaper, which he formerly called the Galley Journal. The title was well ſuited to the paper and its author. For ſome felonies he had been ſentenced to the gallies; but by the benignity of the late king, this felon (to be one day advanced to the rank of a regicide) had been pardoned and releaſed at the interceſſion of the ambaſſadors of Tippoo Sultan. His gratitude was ſuch as might naturally have been expected; and it has lately been rewarded as it deſerved. This liberated galley-ſlave was raiſed, in mockery of all criminal law, to be miniſter of juſtice: he became from his elevation a more conſpicuous object of accuſation, and he has ſince received the puniſhment of his former crimes in proſcription and death.

It will be aſked, how the miniſter of the home department was employed at this criſis? The day after the maſſacre had commenced Roland appeared, but not with the powerful apparatus of a protecting magiſtrate, to reſcue thoſe who had ſurvived the ſlaughter of the firſt day: nothing of

this. On the third of September (that is the day after the commencement of the maſſacre)* he writes a long, elaborate, verboſe epiſtle to the aſſembly, in which, after magnifying, according to the *bon ton* of the revolution, his own integrity, humanity, courage, and patriotiſm, he firſt directly juſtifies all the bloody proceedings of the tenth of Auguſt. He conſiders the ſlaughter of that day as a neceſſary meaſure for defeating a conſpiracy, which (with a full knowledge of the falſehood of his aſſertion) he aſſerts to have been formed for a maſſacre of the people of Paris, and which he more than inſinuates, was the work of his late unhappy maſter, who was univerſally known to carry his dread of ſhedding the blood of his moſt guilty ſubjects to an exceſs.

"Without the day of the tenth," ſays he, "it "is evident that we ſhould have been loſt. The "court, prepared for a long time, waited for the "hour which was to accumulate all treaſons, to "diſplay over Paris the ſtandard of death, and to "reign there by terrour. The ſenſe of the people "(le ſentiment) always juſt and ready when their "opinion is not corrupted, foreſaw the epoch "marked for their deſtruction, and rendered it "fatal to the conſpirators." He then proceeds, in the cant which has been applied to palliate all their atrocities from the fourteenth of July, 1789, to the

* Letter to the National Aſſembly, ſigned—*The Miniſter of the interior*, ROLAND, dated Paris, Sept. 3d, 4*th year of Liberty*.

preſent

preſent time;—"It is in the nature of things," continues he "and in that of the human heart, "that victory ſhould bring with it *ſome* exceſs. "The ſea, agitated by a violent ſtorm, roars *long* "after the tempeſt; but *every thing has bounds*, "which ought *at length* to be obſerved."

In this memorable epiſtle, he conſiders ſuch *exceſſes* as fatalities ariſing from the very nature of things, and conſequently not to be puniſhed. He allows a ſpace of time for the duration of theſe agitations: and leſt he ſhould be thought rigid and too ſcanty in his meaſure, he thinks it may be *long*. But he would have things to ceaſe *at length*. But when, and where?—When they may approach his own perſon.

"*Yeſterday*," ſays he, "the Miniſters *were de-* "*nounced: vaguely* indeed as to the *matter*, be- "cauſe ſubjects of reproach were wanting; but "with that warmth and force of aſſertion, which "ſtrike the imagination and ſeduce it for a "moment, and which miſlead and deſtroy con- "fidence, without which no man ſhould remain "in place in a free government. *Yeſterday*, "*again*, in an aſſembly of the preſidents of all "the ſections, convoked by the miniſters, with a "view of conciliating all minds, and of mutual "explanation, I perceived that *diſtruſt which* "*ſuſpects, interrogates, and ſetters operations.*"

In this manner (that is, in mutual ſuſpicions and

interrogatories) this virtuous miniſter of the home department, and all the magiſtracy of Paris, ſpent the firſt day of the maſſacre, the atrocity of which has ſpread horrour and alarm throughout Europe. It does not appear that the putting a ſtop to the maſſacre, had any part in the object of their meeting, or in their conſultations when they were met. Here was a miniſter tremblingly alive to his own ſafety, dead to that of his fellow citizens, eager to preſerve his place, and worſe than indifferent about its moſt important duties. Speaking of the people, he ſays, "that their hidden enemies may make "uſe of this *agitation*," (the tender appellation which he give to horrid maſſacre) "to hurt *their* "*beſt friends, and their moſt able defenders. Al-* "*ready the example begins*; let it reſtrain and "arreſt a *juſt* rage. Indignation carried to its "height commences proſcriptions which fall only "on the *guilty*, but in which errour and particular "paſſions may ſhortly involve the *honeſt man*."

He ſaw that the able artificers in the trade and myſtery of murder did not chuſe that their ſkill ſhould be unemployed after their firſt work; and that they were full as ready to cut off their rivals as their enemies. This gave him *one* alarm, that was ſerious. This letter of Roland in every part of it lets out the ſecret of all the parties in this revolution. *Plena rimarum eſt; hac, atque illac perfluit.* We ſee that none of them condemn the occaſional

occaſional practice of murder; provided it is properly applied; provided it is kept within the bounds, which each of thoſe parties think proper to preſcribe. In this caſe Roland feared, that if what was occaſionally uſeful, ſhould become habitual, the practice might go further than was convenient. It might involve the beſt friends of the laſt revolution, as it had done the heroes of the firſt revolution: he feared that it would not be confined to the La Fayettes and Clermont-Tonnerres, the Duponts and Barnaves, but that it might extend to the Briſſots and Vergniauxs, to the Condorcets, the Petions, and to himſelf. Under this apprehenſion there is no doubt that his humane feelings were altogether unaffected.

His obſervations on the maſſacre of the preceding day are ſuch as cannot be paſſed over:—"Yeſ-" terday," ſaid he, "was a day upon the events of " which it is perhaps neceſſary to leave a *veil;* I " know that the people with their vengeance " *mingled a ſort of juſtice;* they did not take for " victims *all* who preſented themſelves to their " fury; they directed it to *them who had for a* " *long time been ſpared by the ſword of the law,* " and who they *believed,* from the peril of cir-" cumſtances, ſhould be ſacrificed without delay. " But I know that it is eaſy to *villains and* " *traitors* to miſrepreſent this *effervescence,* and " that it muſt be checked: I know that we owe

"to all France the declaration, that the *exe-*
"*cutive power* could not foreſee or prevent this
"exceſs. I know that it is due to the conſti-
"tuted authorities to place a limit to it, or con-
"ſider themſelves as aboliſhed."

In the midſt of this carnage he thinks of nothing but throwing a veil over it; which was at once to cover the guilty from puniſhment, and to extinguiſh all compaſſion for the ſufferers. He apologizes for it; in fact, he juſtifies it. He who (as the reader has juſt ſeen in what is quoted from this letter) feels ſo much indignation at "vague "denunciations" when made againſt himſelf, and from which he then feared nothing more than the ſubverſion of his power, is not aſhamed to conſider the charge of a conſpiracy to maſſacre the Pariſians brought againſt his maſter upon denunciations as vague as poſſible, or rather upon no denunciations, as a perfect juſtification of the monſtrous proceedings againſt him. He is not aſhamed to call the murder of the unhappy prieſts in the *Carmes*, who were under no criminal denunciation whatſoever, "a *vengeance* mingled with a *ſort of juſtice*;" he obſerves that "they had been a long time ſpared by the ſword of the law," and calls by anticipation all thoſe who ſhould repreſent this "*effervescence*" in other colours, *villains and traitors*: he did not then foreſee, how ſoon himſelf and his accomplices would be under the neceſſity

of

of aſſuming the pretended character of this new ſort of "*villany and treaſon,*" in the hope of obliterating the memory of their former real *villanies and treaſons*:—he did not foreſee, that in the courſe of ſix months a formal manifeſto on the part of himſelf and his faction, written by his confederate Briſſot, was to repreſent this "*effervescence*" as another "*St. Bartholomew;*" and ſpeak of it as "*having made humanity ſhudder, and ſullied the revolution for ever.*"*

It is very remarkable that he takes upon himſelf to know the motives of the aſſaſſins, their policy, and even what they "believed." How could this be if he had no connexion with them? He praiſes the murderers for not having taken as yet *all* the lives of thoſe who had, as he calls it, "*preſented themſelves* as victims to their fury." He paints the miſerable priſoners who had been forcibly piled upon one another in the church of the Carmelites, by his faction, as *preſenting themſelves* as victims to their fury; as if death was their choice; or, (allowing the idiom of his language to make this equivocal) as if they were by ſome accident *preſented* to the fury of their aſſaſſins: whereas he knew, that the leaders of the murderers fought theſe pure and innocent victims in the places where they had depoſited them, and were ſure to find them. The very ſelection. which he praiſes as a *ſort of juſtice* tempering their fury, proves

* See p. 12, and p. 13, of this tranſlation.

beyond a doubt, the foreſight, deliberation, and method with which this maſſacre was made. He knew that circumſtance on the very day of the commencement of the maſſacres, when, in all probability, he had begun this letter, for he preſented it to the Aſſembly on the very next.

Whilſt, however, he defends theſe acts, he is conſcious that they will appear in another light to the world. He therefore acquits the executive power, that is, he acquits himſelf (but only by his own aſſertion) of thoſe acts "of *vengeance mixed with a ſort of juſtice*," "as an *exceſs* which he could neither foreſee nor prevent." He could not, he ſays, foreſee theſe acts; when he tells us, the people of Paris had ſagacity ſo well to foreſee the deſigns of the court on the tenth of Auguſt; to foreſee them ſo well, as to mark the preciſe epoch on which they were to be executed, and to contrive to anticipate them on the very day: he could not foreſee theſe events, though he declares in this very letter that victory *muſt* bring with it ſome *exceſs*; —"that the ſea roars *long* after the tempeſt." So far as to his foreſight. As to his diſpoſition to prevent, if he had foreſeen the maſſacres of that day; this will be judged by his care in putting a ſtop to the maſſacre then going on. This was no matter of foreſight. He was in the very midſt of it. He does not ſo much as pretend, that he had uſed any force to put a ſtop to it. But if he had uſed

uſed any, the ſanction given under his hand, to a ſort of juſtice in the murderers, was enough to diſarm the protecting force.

That approbation of what they had already done, had its natural effect on the executive aſſaſſins, then in the paroxyſm of their fury, as well as on their employers, then in the midſt of the execution of their deliberate cold-blooded ſyſtem of murder. He did not at all differ from either of them in the principle of thoſe executions, but only in the time of their duration; and that only as it affected himſelf. This, though to him a great conſideration, was none to his confederates, who were at the ſame time his rivals. They were encouraged to accompliſh the work they had in hand. They did accompliſh it; and whilſt this grave moral epiſtle from a grave miniſter, recommending a ceſſation of their work of "vengeance mingled with a ſort of juſtice" was before a grave aſſembly, the authors of the maſſacres proceeded without interruption in their buſineſs for four days together; that is, until the ſeventh of that month, and until all the victims of the firſt proſcription in Paris and at Verſailles, and ſeveral other places, were immolated at the ſhrine of the grim Moloch of liberty and equality. All the prieſts, all the loyaliſts, all the firſt eſſayiſts and novices of revolution in 1789, that could be found, were promiſcuouſly put to death.

Through the whole of this long letter of Roland, it

it is curious to remark how the nerve and vigour of his ſtyle, which had ſpoken ſo potently to his ſovereign, is relaxed, when he addreſſes himſelf to the *ſans-culottes;* how that ſtrength and dexterity of arm, with which he parries and beats down the ſcepter, is enfeebled and loſt, when he comes to fence with the poignard! When he ſpeaks to the populace he can no longer be direct. The whole compaſs of the language is tried to find ſynonimes and circumlocutions for maſſacre and murder. Things are never called by their common names. Maſſacre is ſometimes *agitation*, ſometimes *effervescence*, ſometimes *exceſs;* ſometimes too continued an exerciſe of a *revolutionary power*.

However, after what had paſſed had been praiſed, or excuſed, or pardoned, he declares loudly againſt ſuch proceedings in *future*. Crimes had pioneered and made ſmooth the way for the march of the virtues; and from that time order and juſtice, and a ſacred regard for perſonal property, were to become the rules for the new democracy. Here Roland and the Briſſotins leagued for their own preſervation, by endeavouring to preſerve peace. This ſhort ſtory will render many of the parts of Briſſot's pamphlet, in which Roland's views and intentions are ſo often alluded to, the more intelligible in themſelves, and the more uſeful in their application by the Engliſh reader.

Under the cover of theſe artifices, Roland, Briſſot, and

and their party hoped to gain the bankers, merchants, ſubſtantial tradeſmen, hoarders of aſſignats, and purchaſers of the confiſcated lands of the clergy and gentry, to join with their party, as holding out ſome ſort of ſecurity to the effects which they poſſeſſed, whether theſe effects were the acquiſitions of fair commerce, or the gains of jobbing in the misfortunes of their country, and the plunder of their fellow citizens. In this deſign the party of Roland and Briſſot ſucceeded in a great degree. They obtained a majority in the National Convention. Compoſed however as that Aſſembly is, their majority was far from ſteady: but whilſt they appeared to gain the Convention, and many of the outlying departments, they loſt the city of Paris entirely and irrecoverably; it was fallen into the hands of Marat, Robeſpierre, and Danton. Their inſtruments were the *ſans-culottes*, or rabble, who domineered in that capital, and were wholly at the devotion of thoſe incendiaries, and received their daily pay. The people of property were of no conſequence, and trembled before Marat and his janiſſaries. As that great man had not obtained the helm of the ſtate, it was not yet come to his turn to act the part of Briſſot and his friends, in the aſſertion of ſubordination and regular government. But Robeſpierre has ſurvived both theſe rival chiefs, and is now the great patron of Jacobin order.

To

To balance the exorbitant power of Paris, (which threatened to leave nothing to the National Convention, but a character as inſignificant as that which the firſt aſſembly had aſſigned to the unhappy Louis the Sixteenth) the faction of Briſſot, whoſe leaders were Roland, Petion, Vergniaux, Iſnard, Condorcet, &c. &c. &c. applied themſelves to gain the great commercial towns, Lyons, Marſeilles, Rouen, Nantz, and Bourdeaux. The republicans of the Briſſotin deſcription, to whom the concealed royaliſts, ſtill very numerous, joined themſelves, obtained a temporary ſuperiority in theſe places. In Bourdeaux, on account of the activity and eloquence of ſome of its repreſentatives, this ſuperiority was the moſt diſtinguiſhed. This laſt city is ſeated on the Garonne, or Gironde; and being the centre of a department named from that river, the appellation of Girondiſts was given to the whole party. Theſe and ſome other towns declared ſtrongly againſt the principles of anarchy; and againſt the deſpotiſm of Paris. Numerous addreſſes were ſent to the Convention, promiſing to maintain its authority, which the addreſſers were pleaſed to conſider as legal and conſtitutional, though choſen, not to compoſe an executive government, but to form a plan for a conſtitution.

In the Convention meaſures were taken to obtain an armed force from the ſeveral departments to maintain

maintain the freedom of that body, and to provide for the perſonal ſafety of the members; neither of which, from the fourteenth of July, 1789, to this hour, have been really enjoyed by their aſſemblies ſitting under any denomination.

This ſcheme, which was well conceived, had not the deſired ſucceſs. Paris, from which the Convention did not dare to move, though ſome threats of ſuch a departure were from time to time thrown out, was too powerful for the party of the Gironde. Some of the propoſed guards, but neither with regularity nor in force, did indeed arrive; they were debauched as faſt as they came; or were ſent to the frontiers. The game played by the revolutioniſts in 1789, with reſpect to the French guards of the unhappy king, was now played againſt the departmental guards, called together for the protection of the revolutioniſts. Every part of their own policy comes round, and ſtrikes at their own power and their own lives.

The Pariſians, on their part, were not ſlow in taking the alarm. They had juſt reaſon to apprehend, that if they permitted the ſmalleſt delay, they ſhould ſee themſelves beſieged by an army collected from all parts of France. Violent threats were thrown out againſt that city in the aſſembly. Its total deſtruction was menaced. A very remarkable expreſſion was uſed in theſe debates, " that

" that in future times it might be inquired, on " what part of the Seine Paris had ſtood." The faction which ruled in Paris, too bold to be intimidated, and too vigilant to be ſurpriſed, inſtantly armed themſelves. In their turn they accuſed the Girondiſts of a treaſonable deſign to break *the republick one and indiviſible* (whoſe unity they contended could only be preſerved by the ſupremacy of Paris) into a number of *confederate* commonwealths. The Girondin faction on this account received alſo the name of *federaliſts*.

Things on both ſides haſtened faſt to extremities. Paris, the mother of equality, was herſelf to be equaliſed. Matters were come to this alternative; either that city muſt be reduced to a mere member of the federative republick, or, the Convention, choſen, as they ſaid, by all France, was to be brought regularly and ſyſtematically under the dominion of the common-hall, and even of any one of the ſections of Paris.

In this awful conteſt, thus brought to iſſue, the great mother club of the jacobins was entirely in the Pariſian intereſt. The Girondins no longer dared to ſhew their faces in that aſſembly. Nine tenths at leaſt of the jacobin clubs throughout France, adhered to the great patriarchal jacobiniere of Paris, to which they were (to uſe their own term) *affiliated*. No authority of magiſtracy, judicial

judicial or executive, had the leaſt weight, whenever theſe clubs choſe to interfere; and they choſe to interfere in every thing, and on every occaſion. All hope of gaining them to the ſupport of property, or to the acknowledgement of any law but their own will, was evidently vain, and hopeleſs. Nothing but an armed inſurrection againſt their anarchical authority, could anſwer the purpoſe of the Girondins. Anarchy was to be cured by rebellion, as it had been cauſed by it.

As a preliminary to this attempt on the jacobins and the commons of Paris, which it was hoped would be ſupported by all the remaining property of France, it became abſolutely neceſſary to prepare a manifeſto, laying before the publick the whole policy, genius, character, and conduct of the partiſans of club government. To make this expoſition as fully and clearly as it ought to be made, it was of the ſame unavoidable neceſſity to go through a ſeries of tranſactions, in which all thoſe concerned in this revolution, were at the ſeveral periods of their activity, deeply involved. In conſequence of this deſign, and under theſe difficulties, Briſſot prepared the following eclaratı on of his party, which he executed with no ſmall ability; and in this manner the whole myſtery of the French revolution was laid open in all its parts.

It is almoſt needleſs to mention to the reader the

the fate of the deſign to which this pamphlet was to be ſubſervient. The jacobins of Paris were more prompt than their adverſaries. They were the readieſt to reſort to what La Fayette calls the *moſt ſacred of all duties, that of inſurrection.* Another æra of holy inſurrection, commenced the thirty-firſt of laſt May. As the firſt fruits of that inſurrection grafted on inſurrection, and of that rebellion improving upon rebellion, the ſacred irreſponſible character of the members of the Convention was laughed to ſcorn. They had themſelves ſhewn in their proceedings againſt the late king, how little the moſt fixed principles are to be relied upon, in their revolutionary conſtitution. The members of the Girondin party in the Convention, were ſeized upon or obliged to ſave themſelves by flight. The unhappy author of this piece, with twenty of his aſſociates, ſuffered together on the ſcaffold, after a trial, the iniquity of which puts all deſcription to defiance.

The Engliſh reader will draw from this work of Briſſot, and from the reſult of the laſt ſtruggles of this party, ſome uſeful leſſons. He will be enabled to judge of the information of thoſe, who have undertaken to guide and enlighten us, and who, for reaſons beſt known to themſelves, have choſen to paint the French revolution and its conſequences in brilliant and flattering colours.—They will

know how to appreciate the liberty of France, which has been ſo much magnified in England. They will do juſtice to the wiſdom, and goodneſs of their ſovereign and his parliament, who have put them in a ſtate of defence, in the war audaciouſly made upon us, in favour of that kind of liberty. When we ſee (as here we muſt ſee) in their true colours, the character and policy of our enemies, our gratitude will become an active principle. It will produce a ſtrong and zealous co-operation with the efforts of our government, in favour of a conſtitution under which we enjoy advantages, the full value of which, the querulous weakneſs of human nature requires ſometimes the opportunity of a compariſon, to underſtand and to reliſh.

Our confidence in thoſe who watch for the publick will not be leſſened. We ſhall be ſenſible that to alarm us in the late circumſtances of our affairs, was not for our moleſtation, but for our ſecurity. We ſhall be ſenſible that this alarm was not ill-timed—and that it ought to have been given, as it was given, before the enemy had time fully to mature and accompliſh their plans, for reducing us to the condition of France, as that condition is faithfully and without exaggeration deſcribed in the following work. We now have our arms in our hands; we have the means of

oppoſing the ſenſe, the courage, and the reſources of England, to the deepeſt, the moſt craftily deviſed, the beſt combined, and the moſt extenſive deſign, that ever was carried on ſince the beginning of the world, againſt all property, all order, all religion, all law, and all real freedom.

The reader is requeſted to attend to the part of this pamphlet which relates to the conduct of the Jacobins, with regard to the Auſtrian Netherlands, which they call Belgia, or Belgium. It is from page ſeventy-two to page eighty-four of this tranſlation. Here the views and deſigns upon all their neighbours are fully diſplayed. Here the whole myſtery of their ferocious politicks is laid open with the utmoſt clearneſs. Here the manner in which they would treat every nation, into which they could introduce their doctrines and influence, is diſtinctly marked. We ſee that no nation was out of danger, and we ſee what the danger was with which every nation was threatened. The writer of this pamphlet throws the blame of ſeveral of the moſt violent of the proceedings on the other party. He and his friends, at the time alluded to, had a majority in the National Aſſembly. He admits that neither he nor they *ever publickly* oppoſed theſe meaſures; but he attributes their ſilence, to a fear of rendering themſelves ſuſpected. It is moſt certain, that

that whether from fear, or from approbation, they never diſcovered any diſlike of thoſe proceedings, till Dumourier was driven from the Netherlands. But whatever their motive was, it is plain that the moſt violent is, and ſince the revolution has always been, the predominant party.

If Europe could not be ſaved without our interpoſition, (moſt certainly it could not) I am ſure there is not an Engliſhman, who would not bluſh to be left out of the general effort made in favour of the general ſafety. But we are not ſecondary parties in this war; *we are principals in the danger, and ought to be principals in the exertion.* If any Engliſhman aſks whether the deſigns of the French aſſaſſins are confined to the ſpot of Europe which they actually deſolate, the citizen Briſſot, the author of this book, and the author of the declaration of war againſt England, will give him his anſwer. He will find in this book, that the republicans are divided into factions, full of the moſt furious and deſtructive animoſity againſt each other: but he will find alſo that there is one point in which they perfectly agree —that they are all enemies alike, to the government of all other nations, and only contend with each other about the means of propagating their tenets, and extending their empire by conqueſt.

It is true, that in this preſent work, which the author profeſſedly deſigned for an appeal to foreign nations and poſterity, he has dreſſed up the philoſophy of his own faction in as decent a garb as he could to make her appearance in publick; but through every diſguiſe her hideous figure may be diſtinctly ſeen. If, however, the reader ſtill wiſhes to ſee her in all her naked deformity, I would further refer him to a private letter of Briſſot written towards the end of the laſt year, and quoted in a late very able pamphlet of Mallat du Pan. "We muſt," (ſays our philoſopher) "*ſet fire to the four corners of Europe;*" in that alone is our ſafety. "*Dumourier cannot* "*ſuit us.* I always diſtruſted him. Miranda is "the general for us: he underſtands the *revo-* "*lutionary power*, he has *courage, lights*, &c."* Here every thing is fairly avowed in plain language. The triumph of philoſophy is the univerſal conflagration of Europe; the only real diſſatisfaction with Dumourier is a ſuſpicion of his moderation; and the ſecret motive of that preference which in this very pamphlet the author gives to Miranda, though without aſſigning his reaſons, is declared to be the ſuperior fitneſs of that foreign adventurer for the purpoſes of ſubverſion and deſtruction.—On the other hand, if there

* See the tranſlation of Mallet Du Pan's work, printed for Owen, page 53.

can

can be any man in this country ſo hardy as to undertake the defence or the apology of the preſent monſtrous uſurpers of France; and if it ſhould be ſaid in their favour, that it is not juſt to credit the charges of their enemy Briſſot againſt them, who have actually tried and condemned him on the very ſame charges among others; we are luckily ſupplied with the beſt poſſible evidence in ſupport of this part of his book againſt them: it comes from among themſelves. Camille Deſmoulins publiſhed the "Hiſtory of the Briſſotins" in anſwer to this very addreſs of Briſſot. It was the counter-manifeſto of the laſt Holy revolution of the thirty-firſt of May; and the flagitious orthodoxy of his writings at that period, has been admitted in the late ſcrutiny of him by the Jacobin club, when they ſaved him from that guillotine "which he grazed." In the beginning of his work he diſplays "the taſk of glory," as he calls it, which preſented itſelf at the opening of the Convention. All is ſummoned up in two points: "to create the French republick, and "*to diſorganize Europe; perhaps to purge it of* "*its tyrants by the eruption of the volcanick* "*principles of equality.*"* The coincidence is exact; the proof is complete and irreſiſtible.

* See the tranſlation of the Hiſtory of the Briſſotins, by Camille Deſmoulins, printed for Owen, p. 2.

In a cauſe like this, and in a time like the preſent, there is no neutrality. They who are not actively, and with deciſion and energy, againſt jacobiniſm, are its partiſans. They who do not dread it, love it. It cannot be viewed with indifference. It is a thing made to produce a powerful impreſſion on the feelings. Such is the nature of jacobiniſm, ſuch is the nature of man, that this ſyſtem muſt be regarded either with enthuſiaſtick admiration, or with the higheſt degree of deteſtation, reſentment, and horrour.

Another great leſſon may be taught by this book, and by the fortune of the author, and his party: I mean a leſſon drawn from the conſequences of engaging in daring innovations, from an hope that we may be able to limit their miſchievous operation at our pleaſure, and by our policy to ſecure ourſelves againſt the effect of the evil examples we hold out to the world. This leſſon is taught through almoſt all the important pages of hiſtory; but never has it been taught ſo clearly and ſo awfully as at this hour. The revolutioniſts who have juſt ſuffered an ignominious death, under the ſentence of the revolutionary tribunal (a tribunal compoſed of thoſe with whom they had triumphed in the total deſtruction of the ancient government) were by no means ordinary men, or without very conſiderable

conſiderable talents and reſources. But with all their talents and reſources, and the apparent momentary extent of their power, we ſee the fate of their projects, their power, and their perſons. We ſee before our eyes the abſurdity of thinking to eſtabliſh order upon principles of confuſion, or with the materials and inſtruments of rebellion, to build up a ſolid and ſtable government.

Such partiſans of a republick amongſt us, as may not have the worſt intentions, will ſee, that the principles, the plans, the manners, the morals, and the whole ſyſtem of France, is altogether as adverſe to the formation and duration of any rational ſcheme of a republick, as it is to that of a monarchy abſolute or limited. It is indeed a ſyſtem which can only anſwer the purpoſes of robbers and murderers.

The tranſlator has only to ſay for himſelf, that he has found ſome difficulty in this verſion. His original author, through haſte, perhaps, or through the perturbation of a mind filled with a great and arduous enterpriſe, is often obſcure. There are ſome paſſages too, in which his language requires to be firſt tranſlated into French, at leaſt into ſuch French as the academy would in former times have tolerated. He writes with great force and vivacity; but the language, like every thing elſe in his country, has undergone a revolution.

The tranſlator thought it beſt to be as literal as poſſible; conceiving ſuch a tranſlation would perhaps be the moſt fit to convey the author's peculiar mode of thinking. In this way the tranſlator has no credit for ſtyle; but he makes it up in fidelity. Indeed the facts and obſervations are ſo much more important than the ſtyle, that no apology is wanted for producing them in any intelligible manner.

APPENDIX.

[The addreſs of M. BRISSOT to his Conſtituents being now almoſt forgotten, it has been thought right to add, as an Appendix, that part of it to which Mr. BURKE points our particular attention, and upon which he ſo forcibly comments in his Preface.]

****THREE ſorts of anarchy have ruined our affairs in Belgium.

The anarchy of the adminiſtration of Pachè, which has completely diſorganized the ſupply of our armies: which by that diſorganization reduced the army of Dumourier to ſtop in the middle of its conqueſts; which ſtruck it motionleſs through the months of November and December; which hindered it from joining Bournonville and Cuſtine, and from forcing the Pruſſians and Auſtrians to repaſs the Rhine, and afterwards from putting themſelves in a condition to invade Holland ſooner than they did.

To this ſtate of miniſterial anarchy, it is neceſſary to join that other anarchy which diſorganized the troops, and occaſioned their habits of pillage; and laſtly, that anarchy which created the revolutionary power, and forced the union to France of the countries we had invaded, before things were ripe for ſuch a meaſure.

Who

Who could, however, doubt the frightful evils that were occaſioned in our armies by that doctrine of anarchy which under the ſhadow of equality of *right*, would eſtabliſh equality of fact? This is univerſal equality, the ſcourge of ſociety, as the other is the ſupport of ſociety. An anarchical doctrine which would level all things, talents, and ignorance, virtues, and vices, places, uſages, and ſervices; a doctrine which begot that fatal project of organizing the army, preſented by Dubois de Crance, to which it will be indebted for a complete diſorganization.

Mark the date of the preſentation of the ſyſtem of this equality of fact, entire equality. It had been projected and decreed even at the very opening of the Dutch campaign. If any project could encourage the want of diſcipline in the ſoldiers, any ſcheme could diſguſt and baniſh good officers, and throw all things into confuſion at the moment when order alone could give victory, it is this project, in truth ſo ſtubbornly defended by the anarchiſts, and tranſplanted into their ordinary tactick.

How could they expect that there ſhould exiſt any diſcipline, any ſubordination, when even in the camp they permit motions, cenſures, and denunciations of officers, and of generals? Does not ſuch a diſorder deſtroy all the reſpect that is due to ſuperiours, and all the mutual confidence without which ſucceſs cannot be hoped for? For the

ſpirit of diſtruſt makes the ſoldier ſuſpicious, and intimidates the general. The firſt diſcerns treaſon in every danger; the ſecond, always placed between the neceſſity of conqueſt, and the image of the ſcaffold, dares not raiſe himſelf to bold conception, and thoſe heights of courage which electrify an army and enſure victory. Turenne, in our time, would have carried his head to the ſcaffold; for he was ſometimes beat: but the reaſon why he more frequently conquered was, that his diſcipline was ſevere: It was, that his ſoldiers confiding in his talents, never muttered diſcontent inſtead of fighting.—Without reciprocal confidence between the ſoldier and the general, there can be no army, no victory, eſpecially in a free government.

Is it not to the ſame ſyſtem of anarchy, of equaliſation, and want of ſubordination, which has been recommended in ſome clubs, and defended even in the Convention, that we owe the pillages, the murders, the enormities of all kinds which it was difficult for the officers to put a ſtop to, from the general ſpirit of inſubordination; exceſſes which have rendered the French name odious to the Belgians? Again, is it not to this ſyſtem of anarchy, and of robbery, that we are indebted for the *revolutionary power*, which has ſo juſtly aggravated the hatred of the Belgians againſt France?

What did enlightened republicans think before the

the tenth of Auguſt, men who wiſhed for liberty, *not only for their own country, but for all Europe? They believed that they could generally eſtabliſh it, by exciting the governed againſt the governors, in letting the people ſee the facility and the advantages of ſuch inſurrections.*

But how can the people be led to that point? By the example of good government eſtabliſhed among us; by the example of order; by the care of ſpreading nothing but moral ideas among them; to reſpect their properties and their rights; to reſpect their prejudices, even when we combat them; by diſintereſtedneſs in defending the people, by a zeal to extend the ſpirit of liberty amongſt them.

This ſyſtem was at firſt followed.* Excellent pamphlets from the pen of Condorcet prepared the people for liberty; the tenth of Auguſt, the republican decrees, the battle of Valmy, the retreat of the Pruſſians, the victory of Jemappe, all ſpoke in favour of France; all was rapidly deſtroyed by *the revolutionary power*. Without doubt, good intentions made the majority of the Aſſembly adopt it; they would plant the tree of liberty in a foreign ſoil, under the ſhade of a people already free. To the eyes of the people of Belgium, it ſeemed but the maſk of a new foreign tyranny. This opinion was

* The moſt ſeditious libels upon all governments, in order to excite inſurrection in Spain, Holland, and other countries. *Tranſlator.*

erroneous;

erroneous; I will ſuppoſe it for a moment; but ſtill this opinion of Belgium deſerved to be conſidered. In general we have always conſidered our own opinions and our own intentions, rather than the people whoſe cauſe we defend. We have given thoſe people a will; that is to ſay, we have more than ever alienated them from liberty.

How could the Belgick people believe themſelves free, ſince we exerciſe for them, and over them, the rights of ſovereignty; when without conſulting them, we ſuppreſs all in a maſs, their ancient uſages, their abuſes, their prejudices, thoſe claſſes of ſociety which without doubt are contrary to the ſpirit of liberty, but the utility of whoſe deſtruction was not as yet proved to them? How could they believe themſelves free, and ſovereign, when we made them take ſuch an oath as we thought fit, as a teſt to give them the right of voting? How could they believe themſelves free, when openly deſpiſing their religious worſhip, which religious worſhip that ſuperſtitious people valued beyond their liberty, beyond even their life: when we proſcribed their prieſts; when we baniſhed them from their aſſemblies, where they were in the practice of ſeeing them govern; when we ſeized their revenues, their domains, and riches, to the profit of the nation; when we carried to the very cenſer thoſe hands which they regarded as profane? Doubtleſs theſe operations were founded on principles; but

thoſe

thoſe principles ought to have had the conſent of the Belgians, before they were carried into practice, otherwiſe they neceſſarily became our moſt cruel enemies.

Arrived ourſelves at the laſt bounds of liberty and equality, trampling under our feet all human ſuperſtitions, (after, however, a four years war with them,) we attempt all at once to raiſe to the ſame eminence, men, ſtrangers even to the firſt elementary principles of liberty, and plunged for fifteen hundred years in ignorance and ſuperſtition; we wiſhed to force men to ſee, when a thick cataract covered their eyes, even before we had removed that cataract; we would force men to ſee, whoſe dullneſs of character had raiſed a miſt before their eyes, and before that character was altered.*

Do you believe that the doctrine which now prevails in France would have found many partiſans among us in 1789? No; a revolution in ideas, and in

* It may not be amiſs once for all to remark on the ſtyle of all the philoſophical politicians of France. Without any diſtinction in the ſeveral ſects and parties, they agree in treating all nations who will not conform their government, laws, manners, and religion, to the new French faſhion, as *an herd of ſlaves*. They conſider the content with which men live under thoſe governments as ſtupidity, and all attachment to religion, as the effects of the groſſeſt ignorance.

The people of the Netherlands, by their conſtitution, are as much entitled to be called free, as any nation upon earth. The Auſtrian

in prejudices, is not made with that rapidity; it moves gradually: it does not eſcalade.

Philoſophy does not inſpire by violence, nor by ſeduction, nor is it the ſword that begets love of liberty.

Joſeph the Second alſo borrowed the language of philoſophy, when he wiſhed to ſuppreſs the monks in Belgium, and to ſeize upon their revenues. There was ſeen on him a maſk only of philoſophy, covering the hideous countenance of a greedy deſpot, and the people ran to arms. Nothing better than another kind of deſpotiſm has been ſeen in the *revolutionary power.*

Auſtrian government (until ſome wild attempts the emperour Joſeph made on the French principle, but which have been ſince abandoned by the court of Vienna,) has been remarkably mild. No people were more at their eaſe than the Flemiſh ſubjects, particularly the lower claſſes. It is curious to hear this great oculiſt talk of couching the *cataract* by which the Netherlands were blinded, and hindered from ſeeing, in its proper colours, the beautiful viſion of the French Republick, which he has himſelf painted with ſo maſterly an hand. That people muſt needs be dull, blind, and brutalized by fifteen hundred years of ſuperſtition, (the time elapſed ſince the introduction of Chriſtianity amongſt them) who could prefer their former ſtate to the *preſent ſtate of France!* The reader will remark, that the only difference between Briſſot and his adverſaries, is in the *mode* of bringing other nations into the pale of the French Republick—*They* would aboliſh the order and claſſes of ſociety, and all religion at a ſtroke: Briſſot would have juſt the ſame thing done, but with more addreſs and management. *Tranſlator.*

We

We have ſeen in the commiſſioners of the National Convention, nothing but pro-conſuls working the mine of Belgium for the profit of the French nation; ſeeking to conquer it for the ſovereign of Paris; either to aggrandize his empire, or to ſhare the burdens of the debts, and furniſh a rich prize to the robbers who domineered in France.

Do you believe the Belgians have ever been the dupes of thoſe well-rounded periods, which they vended in the pulpit, in order to familiarize them to the idea of an union with France? Do you believe they were ever impoſed upon by thoſe votes and reſolutions, made by what is called acclamation, for their union, of which corruption paid one part,* and fear forced the remainder? Who, at this time of day, is unacquainted with the ſprings and wires of their miſerable puppet ſhew? *Who does not know the farces of primary aſſemblies, compoſed of a preſident, of a ſecretary, and of ſome aſſiſtants, whoſe days' work was paid for?* No; it is not by means which belong only to thieves and deſpots, that the foundations of liberty can be laid in an enſlaved country. It is not by thoſe means, that a new-born republick, a people who know not yet the elements of republican governments, can be united to us. Even ſlaves do not ſuffer themſelves to be ſeduced by ſuch artifices; and if they have not the ſtrength to reſiſt,

* See the Correſpondence of Dumourier, eſpecially the letter of the 12th of March.

they

they have at leaſt the ſenſe to know how to appretiate the value of ſuch an attempt.

If we would attach the Belgians to us, we muſt at leaſt enlighten their minds by *good writings;* we muſt ſend to them *miſſionaries,* and not deſpotick commiſſioners.* We ought to give them time to ſee; to perceive by themſelves the advantages of liberty; the unhappy effects of ſuperſtition; the fatal ſpirit of prieſthood. And whilſt we waited for this moral revolution, we ſhould have accepted the offers which they inceſſantly repeated, to join to the French army, an army of 50,000 men; to entertain them at their own expence: and to advance to France, the ſpecie of which ſhe ſtood in need.

But have we ever ſeen thoſe fifty thouſand ſoldiers who were to join our army, as ſoon as the ſtandard of liberty ſhould be diſplayed in Belgium? Have we ever ſeen thoſe treaſures which they were to count into our hands? Can we either accuſe the ſterility of their country, or the penury of their treaſure, or the coldneſs of their love for liberty? No! deſpotiſm and anarchy, theſe are the benefits which we have tranſplanted into their ſoil. We

* They have not as yet proceeded farther with regard to the Engliſh dominions. Here we only ſee as yet *the good writings* of Paine, and of his learned aſſociates, and the labours of the *miſſionary clubs*, and other zealous inſtructors. *Tranſlator.*

have acted, we have ſpoken like maſters; and from that time we have found the Flemings nothing but jugglers, who made the grimace of liberty for money; or ſlaves, who in their hearts curſed their new tyrants. Our commiſſioners addreſs them in this ſort; "you have nobles and prieſts among "you, drive them out without delay, or we will "neither be your brethren nor your patrons." They anſwered, give us but time; only leave to us the care of reforming theſe inſtitutions. Our anſwer to them was, "No! it muſt be at "the moment; it muſt be on the ſpot, or we "will treat you as enemies; we will abandon "you to the reſentment of the Auſtrians."

What could the diſarmed Belgians object to all this, ſurrounded as they were by ſeventy thouſand men? They had only to hold their tongues, and to bow down their heads before their maſters! They did hold their tongues, and their ſilence is received as a ſincere and free aſſent.

Have not the ſtrangeſt artifices been adopted to prevent that people from retreating, and to conſtrain them to an union? It was foreſeen, that as long as they were unable to effect an union, the ſtates would preſerve the ſupreme authority amongſt themſelves. Under pretence, therefore, of relieving the people, and of exerciſing the ſovereignty in their right, at one ſtroke they aboliſhed

abolished all the duties and taxes; they shut up all the treasuries. From that time no more receipts; no more publick money; no more means of paying the salaries of any man in office appointed by the states. Thus was anarchy organized amongst the people, that they might be compelled to throw themselves into our arms. It became necessary for those who administered their affairs, under the penalty of being exposed to sedition, and in order to avoid their throats being cut, to have recourse to the treasury of France. What did they find in this treasury? ASSIGNATS.——These Assignats were advanced at par to Belgium. By this means, on the one hand, they naturalized this currency in that country; and on the other, they expected to make a good pecuniary transaction. Thus it is that covetousness cut its throat with its own hands. *The Belgians have seen in this forced introduction of assignats, nothing but a double robbery;* and they have only the more violently hated the union with France.

Recollect the solicitude of the Belgians on that subject. With what earnestness did they conjure you to take off a retroactive effect from these assignats, and to prevent them from being applied to the payment of debts that were contracted anterior to the union?

Did not this language energetically enough

ſignify that they looked upon the aſſignats as a leproſy, and the union as a deadly contagion?

And yet what regard was paid to ſo juſt a demand? It was buried in the committee of finance. That committee wanted to make anarchy the means of an union. They only buſied themſelves in making the Belgick provinces ſubſervient to their finances.

Cambon ſaid loftily before the Belgians themſelves, the Belgian war coſts us hundreds of millions. Their ordinary revenues, and even ſome extraordinary taxes, will not anſwer to our reimburſements; and yet we have occaſion for them. The mortgage of our aſſignats draws near its end. What muſt be done? Sell the church property of Brabant. There is a mortgage of two thouſand millions (eighty millions ſterling.) How ſhall we get poſſeſſion of them? By an immediate Union. Inſtantly they decreed this Union. Men's minds were not diſpoſed to it. What does it ſignify? Let us make them vote by means of money. Without delay, therefore, they ſecretly order the miniſter of foreign affairs to diſpoſe of four or five hundred thouſand livres (20,000l. ſterling) to *make the vagabonds of Bruſſels drunk, and to buy proſelytes to the union in all the ſtates.* But even theſe means, it was ſaid, will obtain but a weak minority in our favour. What does that ſignify? *Revolutions,*

ſaid

ſaid they, are made only by minorities. It is the minority which has made the revolution of France; it is a minority which has made the people triumph.

The Belgick provinces were not ſufficient to ſatisfy the voracious cravings of this financial ſyſtem. Cambon wanted to unite every thing, that he might ſell every thing. Thus he forced the union of Savoy; in the war with Holland, he ſaw nothing but gold to ſeize on, and aſſignats to ſell at par.* Do not let us diſſemble, ſaid he one day to the committee of general defence, in preſence even of the patriot deputies of Holland, you have no eccleſiaſtical goods to offer us for our indemnity.—IT IS A REVOLUTION IN THEIR COUNTERS AND IRON CHESTS,† that muſt be made amongſt the DUTCH. The word was ſaid, and the bankers *Abema* and *Vanſtaphorſt* underſtood it.

* The ſame thing will happen in Savoy. The perſecution of the clergy has ſoured people's minds. The Commiſſaries repreſent them to us as good Frenchmen. I put them to the proof. Where are the legions? How, thirty thouſand Savoyards—are they not armed to defend, in concert with us, their liberty? *Briſſot.*

† *Portefeuille*—is the word in the original. It ſignifies all moveable property which may be repreſented in bonds, notes, bills, ſtocks, or any ſort of publick or private ſecurities. I do not know of a ſingle word in Engliſh that anſwers it: I have therefore ſubſtituted that of *Iron Cheſts*, as coming neareſt to the idea. *Tranſlator.*

Do you think that that word has not been worth an army to the Stadtholder, that it has not cooled the ardour of the Dutch patriots, that it has not commanded the vigorous defence of Williamſtadt?

Do you believe that the patriots of Amſterdam, when they read the preparatory decree which gave France an execution on their goods; do you believe, that thoſe patriots would not have liked better to have remained under the government of the Stadtholder, who took from them no more than a fixed portion of their property, than to paſs under that of a revolutionary power, which would make a complete revolution in their bureaus and ſtrong boxes, and reduce them to wretchedneſs and rags?* Robbery, and anarchy, inſtead of encouraging, will always ſtifle revolutions.

But why, they object to me, have not you and your friends choſen to expoſe theſe meaſures in the roſtrum of the National Convention? Why have you not oppoſed yourſelf to all theſe fatal projects of union?

There are two anſwers to make here, one general, one particular.

You complain of the ſilence of honeſt men! You quite forget, then, honeſt men are the objects of your ſuſpicion. Suſpicion, if it does not ſtain

* In the original letter, *les reduire à la Sanſculoterie.*

the

the ſoul of a courageous man, at leaſt arreſts his thoughts in their paſſage to his lips. The ſuſpicions of a good citizen, freeze thoſe men, whom the calumny of the wicked could not ſtop in their progreſs.

You complain of their ſilence! You forget, then, that you have often eſtabliſhed an inſulting equality between them and men covered with crimes, and made up of ignominy.—

You forget, then, that you have twenty times left them covered with opprobrium by your galleries.—

You forget, then, that you have not thought yourſelves ſufficiently powerful to impoſe ſilence upon theſe galleries.

What ought a wiſe man to do in the midſt of theſe circumſtances? He is ſilent. He waits the moment when the paſſions give way; he waits till reaſon ſhall preſide, and till the multitude ſhall liſten to her voice.

What has been the tactick diſplayed during all theſe unions? Cambon, incapable of political calculation, boaſting his ignorance in the diplomatick, flattering the ignorant multitude, lending his name and popularity to the anarchiſts, ſeconded by their vociferations, denounced inceſſantly as counter-revolutioniſts, thoſe intelligent perſons who were deſirous, at leaſt, of having things diſcuſſed. To oppoſe the acts of

union, appeared to Cambon an overt act of treaſon. The wiſh ſo much as to reflect and to deliberate, was in his eyes a great crime. He calumniated our intentions. The voice of every deputy, eſpecially my voice, would infallibly have been ſtifled. There were ſpies on the very monoſyllables that eſcaped our lips.****

LETTER

TO

WILLIAM ELLIOT, ESQ.

OCCASIONED

BY THE ACCOUNT GIVEN IN A NEWSPAPER

OF THE

SPEECH

MADE

IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS,

BY

THE **** OF *******

In the Debate concerning

LORD FITZWILLIAM.

1795.

LETTER, &c.

Beaconsfield, May 26, 1795.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE been told of the voluntary, which, for the entertainment of the houſe of lords, has been lately played by his Grace the **** of *******, a great deal at my expence, and a little at his own. I confeſs I ſhould have liked the compoſition rather better, if it had been quite new: But every man has his taſte, and his Grace is an admirer of antient muſick.

There may be ſometimes too much even of a good thing. A toaſt is good, and a bumper is not bad: but the beſt toaſts may be ſo often repeated as to diſguſt the palate, and ceaſeleſs rounds of bumpers may nauſeate and overload the ſtomach. The ears of the moſt ſteady-voting politicians may at laſt be ſtunned with three times three. I am ſure I have been very grateful for the flattering remembrance made of me in the toaſts of the revolution ſociety, and of other clubs formed on the ſame laudable plan. After giving the brimming honours to citizen Thomas Paine, and to citizen

citizen Dr. Prieſtley, the gentlemen of theſe clubs ſeldom failed to bring me forth in my turn, and to drink, " Mr. Burke, and thanks to him for the " diſcuſſion he has provoked."

I found myſelf elevated with this honour; for even by the colliſion of reſiſtance, to be the means of ſtriking out ſparkles of truth, if not merit, is at leaſt felicity.

Here I might have reſted. But when I found that the great advocate, Mr. Erſkine, condeſcended to reſort to theſe bumper toaſts, as the pure and exuberant fountains of politicks and of rhetorick, (as I hear he did, in three or four ſpeeches made in defence of certain worthy citizens) I was rather let down a little. Though ſtill ſomewhat proud of myſelf, I was not quite ſo proud of my voucher. Though he is no idolater of fame, in ſome way or other, Mr. Erſkine will always do himſelf honour. Methinks, however, in following the precedents of theſe toaſts, he ſeemed to do more credit to his diligence, as a ſpecial pleader, than to his invention as an orator. To thoſe who did not know the abundance of his reſources, both of genius and erudition, there was ſomething in it that indicated the want of a good aſſortment, with regard to richneſs and variety, in the magazine of topicks and common-places, which I ſuppoſe he keeps by him, in imitation of Cicero and other renowned declaimers of antiquity.

Mr.

Mr. Erſkine ſupplied ſomething, I allow, from the ſtores of his imagination, in metamorphoſing the jovial toaſts of clubs, into ſolemn ſpecial arguments at the bar. So far the thing ſhewed talent: however I muſt ſtill prefer the bar of the tavern to the other bar. The toaſts at the firſt hand were better than the arguments at the ſecond. Even when the toaſts began to grow old as ſarcaſms, they were waſhed down with ſtill older pricked election port; then the acid of the wine made ſome amends for the want of any thing piquant in the wit. But when his Grace gave them a ſecond transformation, and brought out the vapid ſtuff, which had wearied the clubs and diſguſted the courts; the drug made up of the bottoms of rejected bottles, all ſmelling ſo woefully of the cork and of the caſk, and of every thing except the honeſt old lamp, and when that ſad draught had been farther infected with the gaol pollution of the Old Bailey, and was daſhed and brewed, and ineffectually ſtummed again into a ſenatorial exordium in the houſe of lords, I found all the high flavour and mantling of my honours, taſteleſs, flat, and ſtale. Unluckily, the new tax on wine is felt even in the greateſt fortunes, and his Grace ſubmits to take up with the heel-taps of Mr. Erſkine.

I have had the ill or good fortune to provoke two great men of this age to the publication of their opinions; I mean, citizen Thomas Paine, and

and his Grace the **** of *******. I am not ſo great a leveller as to put theſe two great men on a par, either in the ſtate, or the republick of letters: but, "the field of glory is a field for all." It is a large one indeed, and we all may run, God knows where, in chace of glory, over the boundleſs expanſe of that wild heath, whoſe horizon always flies before us. I aſſure his Grace (if he will yet give me leave to call him ſo) whatever may be ſaid on the authority of the clubs, or of the bar, that citizen Paine (who, they will have it, hunts with me in couples, and who only moves as I drag him along), has a ſufficient activity in his own native benevolence to diſpoſe and enable him to take the lead for himſelf. He is ready to blaſpheme his God, to inſult his king, and to libel the conſtitution of this country, without any provocation from me, or any encouragement from his Grace. I aſſure him, that I ſhall not be guilty of the injuſtice of charging Mr. Paine's next work againſt religion and human ſociety, upon his Grace's excellent ſpeech in the houſe of lords. I farther aſſure this noble Duke, that I neither encouraged nor provoked that worthy citizen to ſeek for plenty, liberty, ſafety, juſtice or lenity, in the famine, in the priſons, in the decrees of convention, in the revolutionary tribunal, and in the guillotine of Paris, rather than quietly to take up with what he could find in the glutted markets, the unbarricadoed ſtreets, the drowſy Old Bailey

judges, or, at worſt, the airy, wholeſome pillory of Old England. The choice of country was his own taſte. The writings were the effects of his own zeal. In ſpite of his friend Dr. Prieſtley, he was a free agent. I admit, indeed, that my praiſes of the Britiſh government, loaded with all its encumbrances; clogged with its peers and its beef; its parſons and its pudding; its commons and its beer; and its dull ſlaviſh liberty of going about juſt as one pleaſes, had ſomething to provoke a jockey of Norfolk*, who was inſpired with the reſolute ambition of becoming a citizen of France, to do ſomething which might render him worthy of naturalization in that grand aſylum of perſecuted merit: ſomething which ſhould intitle him to a place in the ſenate of the adoptive country of all the gallant, generous and humane. This, I ſay, was poſſible. But the truth is (with great deference to his Grace I ſay it) citizen Paine acted without any provocation at all; he acted ſolely from the native impulſes of his own excellent heart.

His Grace, like an able orator, as he is, begins with giving me a great deal of praiſe for talents which I do not poſſeſs. He does this to intitle himſelf, on the credit of this gratuitous kindneſs, to exaggerate my abuſe of the parts which his bounty, and not that of nature has beſtowed upon

* Mr. Paine is a Norfolk man, from Thetford.

me.

me. In this, too, he has condeſcended to copy Mr. Erſkine. Theſe prieſts (I hope they will excuſe me; I mean prieſts of the rights of man) begin by crowning me with their flowers and their fillets, and bedewing me with their odours, as a preface to the knocking me on the head with their conſecrated axes. I have injured, ſay they, the conſtitution; and I have abandoned the whig party and the whig principles that I profeſſed. I do not mean, my dear Sir, to defend myſelf againſt his Grace. I have not much intereſt in what the world ſhall think or ſay of me; as little has the world an intereſt in what I ſhall think or ſay of any one in it; and I wiſh that his Grace had ſuffered an unhappy man to enjoy, in his retreat, the melancholy privileges of obſcurity and ſorrow. At any rate, I have ſpoken, and I have written on the ſubject. If I have written or ſpoken ſo poorly as to be quite forgot, a freſh apology will not make a more laſting impreſſion. "I muſt let the tree lie "as it falls." Perhaps I muſt take ſome ſhame to myſelf. I confeſs that I have acted on my own principles of government, and not on thoſe of his Grace, which are, I dare ſay, profound and wiſe; but which I do not pretend to underſtand. As to the party to which he alludes, and which has long taken its leave of me, I believe the principles of the book which he condemns, are very conformable to the opinions of many of the moſt conſiderable

conſiderable and moſt grave in that deſcription of politicians. A few indeed, who, I admit, are equally reſpectable in all points, differ from me, and talk his Grace's language. I am too feeble to contend with them. They have the field to themſelves. There are others very young and very ingenious perſons, who form, probably, the largeſt part of what his Grace, I believe, is pleaſed to conſider as that party. Some of them were not born into the world, and all of them were children, when I entered into that connexion. I give due credit to the cenſorial brow, to the broad phylacteries, and to the impoſing gravity of thoſe magiſterial rabbins and doctors in the cabala of political ſcience. I admit that "wiſdom is as the grey hair to man, "and that learning is like honourable old age." But, at a time when liberty is a good deal talked of, perhaps I might be excuſed, if I caught ſomething of the general indocility. It might not be ſurpriſing, if I lengthened my chain a link or two, and in an age of relaxed diſcipline, gave a trifling indulgence to my own notions. If that could be allowed, perhaps I might ſometimes (by accident, and without an unpardonable crime) truſt as much to my own very careful and very laborious, though, perhaps, ſomewhat purblind diſquiſitions, as to their ſoaring, intuitive, eagle-eyed authority; but the modern liberty is a precious thing. It muſt not be profaned by too vulgar an uſe. It

belongs only to the choſen few, who are born to the hereditary repreſentation of the whole democracy, and who leave nothing at all, no, not the offal, to us poor outcaſts of the plebeian race.

Amongſt thoſe gentlemen who came to authority, as ſoon, or ſooner than they came of age, I do not mean to include his Grace. With all thoſe native titles to empire over our minds which diſtinguiſh the others, he has a large ſhare of experience. He certainly ought to underſtand the Britiſh conſtitution better than I do. He has ſtudied it in the fundamental part. For one election I have ſeen, he has been concerned in twenty. Nobody is leſs of a viſionary theoriſt; nobody has drawn his ſpeculations more from practice. No peer has condeſcended to ſuperintend with more vigilance the declining franchiſes of the poor commons. "With thrice great Hermes he has out-"watched the bear." Often have his candles been burned to the ſnuff, and glimmered and ſtunk in the ſockets, whilſt he grew pale at his conſtitutional ſtudies; long ſleepleſs nights has he waſted; long, laborious, ſhiftleſs journies has he made, and great ſums has he expended, in order to ſecure the purity, the independence, and the ſobriety of elections, and to give a check, if poſſible, to the ruinous charges that go nearly to the deſtruction of the right of election itſelf.

Amidſt theſe his labours, his Grace will be pleaſed

pleaſed to forgive me, if my zeal, leſs enlightened to be ſure than his by midnight lamps and ſtudies, has preſumed to talk too favourably of this conſtitution, and even to ſay ſomething ſounding like approbation of that body which has the honour to reckon his Grace at the head of it. Thoſe who diſlike this partiality, or, if his Grace pleaſes, this flattery of mine, have a comfort at hand. I may be refuted and brought to ſhame by the moſt convincing of all refutations, a practical refutation. Every individual peer for himſelf may ſhew that I was ridiculouſly wrong; the whole body of thoſe noble perſons may refute me for the whole corps. If they pleaſe, they are more powerful advocates againſt themſelves, than a thouſand ſcribblers like me can be in their favour. If I were even poſſeſſed of thoſe powers which his Grace, in order to heighten my offence, is pleaſed to attribute to me, there would be little difference. The eloquence of Mr. Erſkine might ſave Mr. **** from the gallows, but no eloquence could ſave Mr. Jackſon from the effects of his own potion.

In that unfortunate book of mine, which is put in the *index expurgatorius* of the modern whigs, I might have ſpoken too favourably not only of thoſe who wear coronets, but of thoſe who wear crowns. Kings however have not only long arms, but ſtrong ones too. A great northern potentate for inſtance, is able in one moment, and with one bold ſtroke

of his diplomatick pen, to efface all the volumes which I could write in a century, or which the moſt laborious publiciſts of Germany ever carried to the fair of Leipſick, as an apology for monarchs and monarchy. Whilſt I, or any other poor puny private ſophiſt, was defending the declaration of Pilnitz, his majeſty might refute me by the treaty of Baſle. Such a monarch may deſtroy one republick becauſe it had a king at its head, and he may balance this extraordinary act by founding another republick that has cut off the head of its king. I defended that great potentate for aſſociating in a grand alliance for the preſervation of the old governments of Europe; but he puts me to ſilence by delivering up all thoſe governments (his own virtually included) to the new ſyſtem of France. If he is accuſed before the Pariſian tribunal (conſtituted for the trial of kings) for having polluted the ſoil of liberty by the tracks of his diſciplined ſlaves, he clears himſelf by ſurrendering the fineſt parts of Germany (with a handſome cut of his own territories) to the offended majeſty of the regicides of France. Can I reſiſt this? Am I reſponſible for it, if with a torch in his hand, and a rope about his neck, he makes *amende honorable to the Sans-Culotterie* of the republick one and indiviſible? In that humiliating attitude, in ſpite of my proteſts, he may ſupplicate pardon for his menacing proclamations; and as an expiation to

thoſe

thoſe whom he failed to terrify with his threats, he may abandon thoſe whom he had ſeduced by his promiſes. He may ſacrifice the royaliſts of France whom he had called to his ſtandard, as a ſalutary example to thoſe who ſhall adhere to their native ſovereign, or ſhall confide in any other who undertakes the cauſe of oppreſſed kings and of loyal ſubjects.

How can I help it, if this high-minded prince will ſubſcribe to the invectives which the regicides have made againſt all kings, and particularly againſt himſelf? How can I help it, if this royal propagandiſt will preach the doctrine of the rights of men? Is it my fault, if his profeſſors of literature read lectures on that code in all his academies, and if all the penſioned managers of the news-papers in his dominions diffuſe it throughout Europe in an hundred journals? Can it be attributed to me, if he will initiate all his grenadiers and all his huſſars in theſe high myſteries? Am I reſponſible, if he will make *le droit de l'homme*, or *la ſouveraineté du peuple* the favourite parole of his military orders? Now that his troops are to act with the brave legions of freedom, no doubt he will fit them for their fraternity. He will teach the Pruſſians to think, to feel and to act like them, and to emulate the glories of the *regiment de l'échaffaut*. He will employ the illuſtrious citizen Santerre, the general of his new allies, to inſtruct the dull Germans how they ſhall conduct themſelves

towards perſons who, like Louis the XVIth (whoſe cauſe and perſon he once took into his protection) ſhall dare without the ſanction of the people, or with it, to conſider themſelves as hereditary kings. Can I arreſt this great potentate in his career of glory? Am I blameable in recommending virtue and religion as the true foundation of all monarchies, becauſe the protector of the three religions of the Weſtphalian arrangement, to ingratiate himſelf with the republick of philoſophy, ſhall aboliſh all the three? It is not in my power to prevent the grand patron of the reformed church, if he chooſes it, from annulling the Calviniſtick ſabbath, and eſtabliſhing the decadi of atheiſm in all his ſtates. He may even renounce and abjure his favourite myſticiſm in the temple of reaſon. In theſe things, at leaſt, he is truly deſpotick. He has now ſhaken hands with every thing which at firſt had inſpired him with horrour. It would be curious indeed to ſee (what I ſhall not however travel ſo far to ſee) the ingenious devices, and the elegant tranſparencies which on the reſtoration of peace and the commencement of Pruſſian liberty are to decorate Potzdam and Charlottenburg *feſtigiante*. What ſhades of his armed anceſtors of the houſe of Brandenburgh will the committee of *illuminés* raiſe up in the opera-houſe of Berlin, to dance a grand ballet in the rejoicings for this auſpicious event? Is it a grand maſter of the teutonick order,

order, or is it the great elector? Is it the firſt king of Pruſſia or the laſt? or is the whole long line (long, I mean *a parte anté)* to appear like Banquo's royal proceſſion in the tragedy of Macbeth?

How can I prevent all theſe arts of royal policy, and all theſe diſplays of royal magnificence? How can I prevent the ſucceſſor of Frederick the Great from aſpiring to a new, and in this age unexampled kind of glory? Is it in my power to ſay, that he ſhall not make his confeſſions in the ſtyle of St. Auſtin or of Rouſſeau? That he ſhall not aſſume the character of the penitent and flagellant, and, grafting monkery on philoſophy, ſtrip himſelf of his regal purple, clothe his gigantick limbs in the ſackcloth and the *hair-ſhirt*, and exerciſe on his broad ſhoulders the diſciplinary ſcourge of the holy order of the *ſans-culottes?* It is not in me to hinder kings from making new orders of religious and martial knighthood. I am not Hercules enough to uphold thoſe orbs which the Atlaſſes of the world are ſo deſirous of ſhifting from their weary ſhoulders. What can be done againſt the magnanimous reſolution of the great, to accompliſh the degradation and the ruin of their own character and ſituation?

What I ſay of the German princes, that I ſay of all the other dignities and all the other inſtitutions of the holy roman empire. If they have a mind to deſtroy themſelves, they may put their advocates

to ſilence and their adviſers to ſhame. I have often praiſed the aulick council. It is very true I did ſo. I thought it a tribunal, as well formed as human wiſdom could form a tribunal, for coercing the great, the rich and the powerful; for obliging them to ſubmit their necks to the imperial laws, and to thoſe of nature and of nations; a tribunal well conceived for extirpating peculation, corruption and oppreſſion, from all the parts of that vaſt heterogeneous maſs called the germanick body. I ſhould not be inclined to retract theſe praiſes upon any of the ordinary lapſes into which human infirmity will fall; they might ſtill ſtand, though ſome of their *concluſums* ſhould taſte of the prejudices of country or of faction, whether political or religious. Some degree, even of corruption, ſhould not make me think them guilty of ſuicide; but if we could ſuppoſe, that the aulick council, not regarding duty or even common decorum, liſtening neither to the ſecret admonitions of conſcience, nor to the publick voice of fame, ſome of the members baſely abandoning their poſt, and others continuing in it, only the more infamouſly to betray it, ſhould give a judgment ſo ſhameleſs and ſo proſtitute, of ſuch monſtrous and even portentous corruption, that no example in the hiſtory of human depravity, or even in the fictions of poetick imagination, could poſſibly match it; if it ſhould be a judgment which with

cold unfeeling cruelty, after long deliberations, ſhould condemn millions of innocent people to extortion, to rapine and to blood, and ſhould devote ſome of the fineſt countries upon earth to ravage and deſolation—does any one think that any ſervile apologies of mine, or any ſtrutting and bullying inſolence of their own, can ſave them from the ruin that muſt fall on all inſtitutions of dignity or of authority that are perverted from their purport to the oppreſſion of human nature in others, and to its diſgrace in themſeves? As the wiſdom of men makes ſuch inſtitutions, the folly of men deſtroys them. Whatever we may pretend, there is always more in the ſoundneſs of the materials, than in the faſhion of the work. The order of a good building is ſomething. But if it be wholly declined from its perpendicular; if the cement is looſe and incoherent; if the ſtones are ſcaling with every change of the weather, and the whole toppling on our heads, what matter is it whether we are cruſhed by a corinthian or a dorick ruin? The fine form of a veſſel is a matter of uſe and of delight. It is pleaſant to ſee her decorated with coſt and art. But what ſignifies even the mathematical truth of her form? What ſignify all the art and coſt with which ſhe can be carved, and painted, and gilded, and covered with decorations from ſtem to ſtern; what ſignify all her rigging and ſails, her flags, her pendants and her

her ſtreamers? What ſignify even her cannon, her ſtores and her proviſions, if all her planks and timbers be unſound and rotten?

Quamvis Pontica pinus
Silvæ filia nobilis
Jactes & genus & nomen inutile.

I have been ſtimulated, I know not how, to give you this trouble by what very few, except myſelf, would think worth any trouble at all. In a ſpeech in the houſe of lords, I have been attacked for the defence of a ſcheme of government, in which that body inheres, and in which alone it can exiſt. Peers of Great Britain may become as penitent as the ſovereign of Pruſſia. They may repent of what they have done in aſſertion of the honour of their king, and in favour of their own ſafety. But never the gloom that lowers over the fortune of the cauſe, nor any thing which the great may do towards haſtening their own fall, can make me repent of what I have done by pen or voice (the only arms I poſſeſs) in favour of the order of things into which I was born, and in which I fondly hope to die.

In the long ſeries of ages which have furniſhed the matter of hiſtory, never was ſo beautiful and ſo auguſt a ſpectacle preſented to the moral eye, as Europe afforded the day before the revolution in

in France. I knew indeed that this proſperity contained in itſelf the ſeeds of its own danger. In one part of the ſociety it cauſed laxity and debility. In the other it produced bold ſpirits and dark deſigns. A falſe philoſophy paſſed from academies into courts, and the great themſelves were infected with the theories which conducted to their ruin. Knowledge, which in the two laſt centuries either did not exiſt at all, or exiſted ſolidly on right principles and in choſen hands, was now diffuſed, weakened and perverted. General wealth looſened morals, relaxed vigilance, and increaſed preſumption. Men of talent began to compare, in the partition of the common ſtock of publick proſperity, the proportions of the dividends with the merits of the claimants. As uſual, they found their portion not equal to their eſtimate (or perhaps to the publick eſtimate) of their own worth. When it was once diſcovered by the revolution in France, that a ſtruggle between eſtabliſhment and rapacity could be maintained, though but for one year, and in one place, I was ſure that a practicable breach was made in the whole order of things and in every country. Religion, that held the materials of the fabrick together, was firſt ſyſtematically looſened. All other opinions, under the name of prejudices, muſt fall along with it; and property, left undefended by principles, became a repoſitory of ſpoils to tempt cupidity, and not a magazine

to

to furniſh arms for defence. I knew that, attacked on all ſides by the infernal energies of talents ſet in action by vice and diſorder, authority could not ſtand upon authority alone. It wanted ſome other ſupport than the poiſe of its own gravity. Situations formerly ſupported perſons. It now became neceſſary that perſonal qualities ſhould ſupport ſituations. Formerly, where authority was found, wiſdom and virtue were preſumed. But now the veil was torn, and to keep off ſacrilegious intruſion, it was neceſſary that in the ſanctuary of government ſomething ſhould be diſcloſed not only venerable, but dreadful. Government was at once to ſhew itſelf full of virtue and full of force. It was to invite partiſans, by making it appear to the world that a generous cauſe was to be aſſerted; one fit for a generous people to engage in. From paſſive ſubmiſſion was it to expect reſolute defence? No! It muſt have warm advocates and paſſionate defenders, which an heavy, diſcontented acquieſcence never could produce. What a baſe and fooliſh thing is it for any conſolidated body of authority to ſay, or to act as if it ſaid, "I will put my truſt "not in my own virtue, but in your patience; "I will indulge in effeminacy, in indolence, "in corruption; I will give way to all my per- "verſe and vitious humours, becauſe you can- "not puniſh me without the hazard of ruining "yourſelves?"

I wiſhed

I wiſhed to warn the people againſt the greateſt of all evils; a blind and furious ſpirit of innovation, under the name of reform. I was indeed well aware that power rarely reforms itſelf. So it is undoubtedly when all is quiet about it. But I was in hopes that provident fear might prevent fruitleſs penitence. I truſted that danger might produce at leaſt circumſpection; I flattered myſelf in a moment like this, that nothing would be added to make authority top-heavy; that the very moment of an earthquake would not be the time choſen for adding a ſtory to our houſes. I hoped to ſee the ſureſt of all reforms, perhaps the only ſure reform, the ceaſing to do ill. In the meantime I wiſhed to the people, the wiſdom of knowing how to tolerate a condition which none of their efforts can render much more than tolerable. It was a condition, however, in which every thing was to be found that could enable them to live to nature, and if ſo they pleaſed, to live to virtue and to honour.

I do not repent that I thought better of thoſe to whom I wiſhed well, than they will ſuffer me long to think that they deſerved. Far from repenting, I would to God, that new faculties had been called up in me, in favour not of this or that man, or this or that ſyſtem, but of the general vital principle, that whilſt it was in its vigour produced the ſtate of things tranſmitted to us from

our

our fathers; but which, through the joint operations of the abuſes of authority and liberty, may periſh in our hands. I am not of opinion that the race of men, and the commonwealths they create, like the bodies of individuals, grow effete and languid and bloodleſs, and oſſify by the neceſſities of their own conformation, and the fatal operation of longevity and time. Theſe analogies between bodies natural and politick, though they may ſometimes illuſtrate arguments, furniſh no argument of themſelves. They are but too often uſed under the colour of a ſpecious philoſophy, to find apologies for the deſpair of lazineſs and puſillanimity, and to excuſe the want of all manly efforts, when the exigencies of our country call for them the more loudly.

How often has publick calamity been arreſted on the very brink of ruin by the ſeaſonable energy of a ſingle man! Have we no ſuch man amongſt us? I am as ſure as I am of my being, that one vigorous mind without office, without ſituation, without publick functions of any kind (at a time when the want of ſuch a thing is felt, as I am ſure it is) I ſay, one ſuch man, confiding in the aid of God, and full of juſt reliance in his own fortitude, vigour, enterpriſe and perſeverance, would firſt draw to him ſome few like himſelf, and then that multitudes, hardly thought to be in exiſtence, would appear and troop about him.

If

If I ſaw this auſpicious beginning, baffled and fruſtrated as I am, yet on the very verge of a timely grave, abandoned abroad and deſolate at home, ſtripped of my boaſt, my hope, my conſolation, my helper, my counſellor and my guide, (you know in part what I have loſt, and would to God I could clear myſelf of all neglect and fault in that loſs) yet thus, even thus, I would rake up the fire under all the aſhes that oppreſs it. I am no longer patient of the publick eye; nor am I of force to win my way, and to juſtle and elbow in a crowd. But, even in ſolitude, ſomething may be done for ſociety. The meditations of the cloſet have infected ſenates with a ſubtle frenzy, and inflamed armies with the brands of the furies. The cure might come from the ſame ſource with the diſtemper. I would add my part to thoſe who would animate the people (whoſe hearts are yet right) to new exertions in the old cauſe.

Novelty is not the only ſource of zeal. Why ſhould not a Maccabeus and his brethren ariſe to aſſert the honour of the antient law, and to defend the temple of their forefathers, with as ardent a ſpirit, as can inſpire any innovator to deſtroy the monuments of the piety and the glory of antient ages? It is not a hazarded aſſertion, it is a great truth, that when once things are gone out of their ordinary courſe, it is by acts out of the ordinary courſe they can alone be re-eſtabliſhed.

Republican

Republican ſpirit can only be combated by a ſpirit of the ſame nature: of the ſame nature, but informed with another principle, and pointing to another end. I would perſuade a reſiſtance both to the corruption and to the reformation that prevails. It will not be the weaker, but much the ſtronger, for combating both together. A victory over real corruptions would enable us to baffle the ſpurious and pretended reformations. I would not wiſh to excite, or even to tolerate, that kind of evil ſpirit which evokes the powers of hell to rectify the diſorders of the earth. No! I would add my voice with better, and, I truſt, more potent charms, to draw down juſtice, and wiſdom and fortitude from heaven, for the correction of human vice, and the recalling of human errour from the devious ways into which it has been betrayed. I would wiſh to call the impulſes of individuals at once to the aid and to the controul of authority. By this which I call the true republican ſpirit, parodoxical as it may appear, monarchies alone can be reſcued from the imbecility of courts and the madneſs of the crowd. This republican ſpirit would not ſuffer men in high place to bring ruin on their country and on themſelves. It would reform, not by deſtroying, but by ſaving, the great, the rich and the powerful. Such a republican ſpirit, we perhaps fondly conceive to have animated the diſtinguiſhed heroes and

and patriots of old, who knew no mode of policy but religion and virtue. Theſe, they would have paramount to all conſtitutions; they would not ſuffer monarchs or ſenates or popular aſſemblies, under pretences of dignity or authority, or freedom, to ſhake off thoſe moral riders which reaſon has appointed to govern every ſort of rude power. Theſe, in appearance loading them by their weight, do by that preſſure augment their eſſential force. The momentum is increaſed by the extraneous weight. It is true in moral, as it is in mechanical ſcience. It is true, not only in the draught, but in the race. Theſe riders of the great, in effect, hold the reins which guide them in their courſe, and wear the ſpur that ſtimulates them to the goals of honour and of ſafety. The great muſt ſubmit to the dominion of prudence and of virtue; or none will long ſubmit to the dominion of the great.

"*Dis te minorem quod geris imperas.*"

This is the feudal tenure which they cannot alter.

Indeed, my dear Sir, things are in a bad ſtate. I do not deny a good ſhare of diligence; a very great ſhare of ability, and much publick virtue to thoſe who direct our affairs. But they are encumbered, not aided, by their very inſtruments, and by all the apparatus of the ſtate. I think that our miniſtry (though there are things againſt them,

them, which neither you nor I can diſſemble, and which grieve me to the heart) is by far the moſt honeſt and by far the wiſeſt ſyſtem of adminiſtration in Europe. Their fall would be no trivial calamity.

Not meaning to depreciate the minority in parliament, whoſe talents are alſo great, and to whom I do not deny virtues, their ſyſtem ſeems to me to be fundamentally wrong. But whether wrong or right, they have not enough of coherence among themſelves, nor of eſtimation with the publick, nor of numbers. They cannot make up an adminiſtration. Nothing is more viſible. Many other things are againſt them, which I do not charge as faults, but reckon among national misfortunes. Extraordinary things muſt be done, or one of the parties cannot ſtand as a miniſtry, nor the other even as an oppoſition. They cannot change their ſituations, nor can any uſeful coalition be made between them. I do not ſee the mode of it, nor the way to it. This aſpect of things I do not contemplate with pleaſure.

I well know that every thing of the daring kind which I ſpeak of, is critical—but the times are critical. New things in a new world! I ſee no hopes in the common tracks. If men are not to be found who can be got to feel within them ſome impulſe,

"—— *quod nequeo monſtrare, & ſentio tantum,*"

and

and which makes them impatient of the preſent; if none can be got to feel that private perſons may ſometimes aſſume that ſort of magiſtracy which does not depend on the nomination of kings, or the election of the people, but has an inherent and ſelf-exiſtent power which both would recogniſe; I ſee nothing in the world to hope.

If I ſaw ſuch a group beginning to cluſter, ſuch as they are, they ſhould have (all that I can give) my prayers and my advice. People talk of war, or cry for peace—Have they to the bottom conſidered the queſtions either of war, or peace, upon the ſcale of the exiſting world? No. I fear they have not.

Why ſhould not you, yourſelf, be one of thoſe to enter your name in ſuch a liſt as I ſpeak of. You are young; you have great talents, you have a clear head; you have a natural, fluent and unforced elocution; your ideas are juſt, your ſentiments benevolent, open and enlarged—but this is too big for your modeſty. Oh! this modeſty in time and place is a charming virtue, and the grace of all other virtues. But it is ſometimes the worſt enemy they have. Let him, whoſe print I gave you the other day, be engraved in your memory! Had it pleaſed Providence to have ſpared him for the trying ſituations that ſeem to be coming on, notwithſtanding that he was ſometimes a little diſpirited by the diſpoſition

which we thought ſhewn to depreſs him and ſet him aſide; yet he was always buoyed up again; and on one or two occaſions, he diſcovered what might be expected from the vigour and elevation of his mind, from his unconquerable fortitude, and from the extent of his reſources for every purpoſe of ſpeculation and of action. Remember him, my friend, who in the higheſt degree honoured and reſpected you, and remember that great parts are a great truſt. Remember, too, that miſtaken or miſapplied virtues, if they are not as pernicious as vice, fruſtrate at leaſt their own natural tendencies, and diſappoint the purpoſes of the Great Giver.

Adieu. My dreams are finiſhed.

THOUGHTS AND DETAILS

ON

SCARCITY,

ORIGINALLY PRESENTED

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT,

IN THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER,

1795.

THOUGHTS AND DETAILS

ON

SCARCITY.

OF all things, an indiſcreet tampering with the trade of proviſions is the moſt dangerous, and it is always worſt in the time when men are moſt diſpoſed to it: that is, in the time of ſcarcity. Becauſe there is nothing on which the paſſions of men are ſo violent, and their judgment ſo weak, and on which there exiſts ſuch a multitude of ill-founded popular prejudices.

The great uſe of government is as a reſtraint; and there is no reſtraint which it ought to put upon others, and upon itſelf too, rather than that which is impoſed on the fury of ſpeculating under circumſtances of irritation. The number of idle tales ſpread about by the induſtry of faction, and by the zeal of fooliſh good-intention, and greedily devoured by the malignant credulity of mankind, tends infinitely to aggravate prejudices, which, in themſelves, are more than ſufficiently ſtrong. In that ſtate of affairs, and of the publick with relation to them, the firſt thing that government owes

to us, the people, is *information;* the next is timely coercion:—the one to guide our judgment; the other to regulate our tempers.

To provide for us in our neceſſities is not in the power of government. It would be a vain preſumption in ſtateſmen to think they can do it. The people maintain them, and not they the people. It is in the power of government to prevent much evil; it can do very little poſitive good in this, or perhaps in any thing elſe. It is not only ſo of the ſtate and ſtateſman, but of all the claſſes and deſcriptions of the rich—they are the penſioners of the poor, and are maintained by their ſuperfluity. They are under an abſolute, hereditary, and indefeaſible dependence on thoſe who labour, and are miſcalled the poor.

The labouring people are only poor, becauſe they are numerous. Numbers in their nature imply poverty. In a fair diſtribution among a vaſt multitude, none can have much. That claſs of dependant penſioners called the rich, is ſo extremely ſmall, that if all their throats were cut, and a diſtribution made of all they conſume in a year, it would not give a bit of bread and cheeſe for one night's ſupper to thoſe who labour, and who in reality feed both the penſioners and themſelves.

But the throats of the rich ought not to be cut, nor their magazines plundered; becauſe, in their perſons they are truſtees for thoſe who labour, and their

their hoards are the banking-houſes of theſe latter. Whether they mean it or not, they do, in effect, execute their truſt—ſome with more, ſome with leſs fidelity and judgment. But on the whole, the duty is performed, and every thing returns, deducting ſome very trifling commiſſion and diſcount, to the place from whence it aroſe. When the poor riſe to deſtroy the rich, they act as wiſely for their own purpoſes as when they burn mills, and throw corn into the river, to make bread cheap.

When I ſay, that we of the people ought to be informed, incluſively I ſay, we ought not to be flattered; flattery is the reverſe of inſtruction. The *poor* in that caſe would be rendered as improvident as the rich, which would not be at all good for them.

Nothing can be ſo baſe and ſo wicked as the political canting language, "The labouring *poor*." Let compaſſion be ſhewn in action, the more the better, according to every man's ability, but let there be no lamentation of their condition. It is no relief to their miſerable circumſtances; it is only an inſult to their miſerable underſtandings. It ariſes from a total want of charity, or a total want of thought. Want of one kind was never relieved by want of any other kind. Patience, labour, ſobriety, frugality, and religion, ſhould be recommended to them; all the reſt is downright *fraud*.

It

It is horrible to call them "The *once happy* labourer."

Whether what may be called the moral or philoſophical happineſs of the laborious claſſes is increaſed or not, I cannot ſay. The ſeat of that ſpecies of happineſs is in the mind; and there are few data to aſcertain the comparative ſtate of the mind at any two periods. Philoſophical happineſs is to want little. Civil or vulgar happineſs is to want much, and to enjoy much.

If the happineſs of the animal man (which certainly goes ſomewhere towards the happineſs of the rational man) be the object of our eſtimate, then I aſſert without the leaſt heſitation, that the condition of thoſe who labour (in all deſcriptions of labour, and in all gradations of labour, from the higheſt to the loweſt incluſively) is on the whole extremely meliorated, if more and better food is any ſtandard of melioration. They work more, it is certain; but they have the advantage of their augmented labour; yet whether that increaſe of labour be on the whole a *good* or an *evil*, is a conſideration that would lead us a great way, and is not for my preſent purpoſe. But as to the fact of the melioration of their diet, I ſhall enter into the detail of proof whenever I am called upon: in the mean time, the known difficulty of contenting them with any thing but bread made of the fineſt flour,

flour, and meat of the firſt quality, is proof ſufficient.

I further aſſert, that even under all the hardſhips of the laſt year, the labouring people did, either out of their direct gains, or from charity, (which it ſeems is now an inſult to them) in fact, fare better than they did, in ſeaſons of common plenty, fifty or ſixty years ago; or even at the period of my Engliſh obſervation, which is about forty-four years. I even aſſert, that full as many in that claſs, as ever were known to do it before, continued to ſave money; and this I can prove, ſo far as my own information and experience extend.

It is not true that the rate of wages has not increaſed with the nominal price of proviſions. I allow it has not fluctuated with that price, nor ought it; and the ſquires of Norfolk had dined, when they gave it as their opinion, that it might or ought to riſe and fall with the market of proviſions. The rate of wages in truth has no *direct* relation to that price. Labour is a commodity like every other, and riſes or falls according to the demand. This is in the nature of things; however, the nature of things has provided for their neceſſities. Wages have been twice raiſed in my time, and they bear a full proportion, or even a greater than formerly, to the medium of proviſion during the laſt bad cycle of twenty years. They bear a full proportion to the reſult of their labour. If we

we were wildly to attempt to force them beyond it, the ſtone which we had forced up the hill would only fall back upon them in a diminiſhed demand, or, what indeed is the far leſſer evil, an aggravated price of all the proviſions, which are the reſult of their manual toil.

There is an implied contract, much ſtronger than any inſtrument or article of agreement between the labourer in any occupation and his employer—that the labour, ſo far as that labour is concerned, ſhall be ſufficient to pay to the employer a profit on his capital, and a compenſation for his riſk; in a word, that the labour ſhall produce an advantage equal to the payment. Whatever is above that, is a direct *tax;* and if the amount of that tax be left to the will and pleaſure of another, it is an *arbitrary tax.*

If I underſtand it rightly, the tax propoſed on the farming intereſt of this kingdom, is to be levied at what is called the diſcretion of juſtices of peace.

The queſtions ariſing on this ſcheme of arbitrary taxation are theſe—Whether it is better to leave all dealing, in which there is no force or fraud, colluſion or combination, entirely to the perſons mutually concerned in the matter contracted for; or to put the contract in the hands of thoſe who can have none, or a very remote intereſt in it, and little or no knowledge of the ſubject.

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It might be imagined that there would be very little difficulty in ſolving this queſtion; for what man, of any degree of reflection, can think, that a want of intereſt in any ſubject cloſely connected with a want of ſkill in it, qualifies a perſon to intermeddle in any the leaſt affair; much leſs in affairs that vitally concern the agriculture of the kingdom, the firſt of all its concerns, and the foundation of all its proſperity in every other matter, by which that proſperity is produced.

The vulgar errour on this ſubject ariſes from a total confuſion in the very idea of things widely different in themſelves;—thoſe of convention, and thoſe of judicature. When a contract is making, it is a matter of diſcretion and of intereſt between the parties. In that intercourſe, and in what is to ariſe from it, the parties are the maſters. If they are not completely ſo, they are not free, and therefore their contracts are void.

But this freedom has no farther extent, when the contract is made; then their diſcretionary powers expire, and a new order of things takes its origin. Then, and not till then, and on a difference between the parties, the office of the judge commences. He cannot dictate the contract. It is his buſineſs to ſee that it be *enforced*; provided that it is not contrary to pre-exiſting laws, or obtained by force or fraud. If he is in any way a maker or regulator of the contract, in ſo much he

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is diſqualified from being a judge. But this ſort of confuſed diſtribution of adminiſtrative and judicial characters, (of which we have already as much as is ſufficient, and a little more) is not the only perplexity of notions and paſſions which trouble us in the preſent hour.

What is doing, ſuppoſes or pretends that the farmer and the labourer have oppoſite intereſts;—that the farmer oppreſſes the labourer; and that a gentleman called a juſtice of peace, is the protector of the latter, and a controul and reſtraint on the former; and this is a point I wiſh to examine in a manner a good deal different from that in which gentlemen proceed, who confide more in their abilities than is fit, and ſuppoſe them capable of more than any natural abilities, fed with no other than the provender furniſhed by their own private ſpeculations, can accompliſh. Legiſlative acts attempting to regulate this part of œconomy, do, at leaſt, as much as any other, require the exacteſt detail of circumſtances, guided by the ſureſt general principles that are neceſſary to direct experiment and inquiry, in order again from thoſe details to elicit principles, firm and luminous general principles, to direct a practical legiſlative proceeding.

Firſt, then, I deny that it is in this caſe, as in any other of neceſſary implication, that contracting parties ſhould originally have had different intereſts. By accident it may be ſo undoubtedly at the outſet;

outſet; but then the contract is of the nature of a compromiſe; and compromiſe is founded on circumſtances that ſuppoſe it the intereſt of the parties to be reconciled in ſome medium. The principle of compromiſe adopted, of conſequence the intereſts ceaſe to be different.

But in the caſe of the farmer and the labourer, their intereſts are always the ſame, and it is abſolutely impoſſible that their free contracts can be onerous to either party. It is the intereſt of the farmer, that his work ſhould be done with effect and celerity: and that cannot be, unleſs the labourer is well fed, and otherwiſe found with ſuch neceſſaries of animal life, according to his habitudes, as may keep the body in full force, and the mind gay and cheerful. For of all the inſtruments of his trade, the labour of man (what the antient writers have called the *inſtrumentum vocale*) is that on which he is moſt to rely for the repayment of his capital. The other two, the *ſemivocale* in the antient claſſification, that is, the working ſtock of cattle, and the *inſtrumentum mutum*, ſuch as carts, ploughs, ſpades, and ſo forth, though not all inconſiderable in themſelves, are very much inferiour in utility or in expence; or without a given portion of the firſt, are nothing at all. For in all things whatever, the mind is the moſt valuable and the moſt important; and in this ſcale the whole of agriculture is in a natural and juſt order; the beaſt is

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as an informing principle to the plough and cart; the labourer is as reaſon to the beaſt; and the farmer is as a thinking and preſiding principle to the labourer. An attempt to break this chain of ſubordination in any part is equally abſurd; but the abſurdity is the moſt miſchievous in practical operation, where it is the moſt eaſy, that is, where it is the moſt ſubject to an erroneous judgment.

It is plainly more the farmer's intereſt that his men ſhould thrive, than that his horſes ſhould be well fed, ſleek, plump, and fit for uſe, or than that his waggon and ploughs ſhould be ſtrong, in good repair, and fit for ſervice.

On the other hand, if the farmer ceaſe to profit of the labourer, and that his capital is not continually manured and fructified, it is impoſſible that he ſhould continue that abundant nutriment, and clothing, and lodging, proper for the protection of the inſtruments he employs.

It is therefore the firſt and fundamental intereſt of the labourer, that the farmer ſhould have a full incoming profit on the product of his labour. The propoſition is ſelf-evident, and nothing but the malignity, perverſeneſs, and ill governed paſſions of mankind, and particularly the envy they bear to each other's proſperity, could prevent their ſeeing and acknowledging it, with thankfulneſs to the benign and wiſe Diſpoſer of all things, who obliges men, whether they will or not, in purſuing their

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own ſelfiſh intereſts, to connect the general good with their own individual ſucceſs.

But who are to judge what that profit and advantage ought to be? Certainly no authority on earth. It is a matter of convention dictated by the reciprocal conveniences of the parties, and indeed by their reciprocal neceſſities.—But, if the farmer is exceſſively avaricious?—why ſo much the better—the more he deſires to increaſe his gains, the more intereſted is he in the good condition of thoſe, upon whoſe labour his gains muſt principally depend.

I ſhall be told by the zealots of the ſect of regulation, that this may be true, and may be ſafely committed to the convention of the farmer and the labourer, when the latter is in the prime of his youth, and at the time of his health and vigour, and in ordinary times of abundance. But in calamitous ſeaſons, under accidental illneſs, in declining life, and with the preſſure of a numerous offſpring, the future nouriſhers of the community but the preſent drains and blood-ſuckers of thoſe who produce them, what is to be done? When a man cannot live and maintain his family by the natural hire of his labour, ought it not to be raiſed by authority?

On this head I muſt be allowed to ſubmit, what my opinions have ever been; and ſomewhat at large.

And, firſt, I premiſe that labour is, as I have already intimated, a commodity, and as ſuch, an article of trade. If I am right in this notion, then labour muſt be ſubject to all the laws and principles of trade, and not to regulation foreign to them, and that may be totally inconſiſtent with thoſe principles and thoſe laws. When any commodity is carried to market, it is not the neceſſity of the vender, but the neceſſity of the purchaſer that raiſes the price. The extreme want of the ſeller has rather (by the nature of things with which we ſhall in vain contend) the direct contrary operation. If the goods at market are beyond the demand, they fall in their value; if below it, they riſe. The impoſſibility of the ſubſiſtence of a man, who carries his labour to a market, is totally beſide the queſtion in his way of viewing it. The only queſtion is, what is it worth to the buyer?

But if authority comes in and forces the buyer to a price, who is this in the caſe (ſay) of a farmer, who buys the labour of ten or twelve labouring men, and three or four handycrafts, what is it, but to make an arbitrary diviſion of his property among them?

The whole of his gains, I ſay it with the moſt certain conviction, never do amount any thing like in value to what he pays to his labourers and artificers; ſo that a very ſmall advance upon what *one* man pays to *many*, may abſorb the whole of what

what he poſſeſſes, and amount to an actual partition of all his ſubſtance among them. A perfect equality will indeed be produced;—that is to ſay, equal want, equal wretchedneſs, equal beggary, and on the part of the partitioners, a woful, helpleſs, and deſperate diſappointment. Such is the event of all compulſory equalizations. They pull down what is above. They never raiſe what is below: and they depreſs high and low together beneath the level of what was originally the loweſt.

If a commodity is raiſed by authority above what it will yield with a profit to the buyer, that commodity will be the leſs dealt in. If a ſecond blundering interpoſition be uſed to correct the blunder of the firſt, and an attempt is made to force the purchaſe of the commodity (of labour for inſtance), the one of theſe two things muſt happen, either that the forced buyer is ruined, or the price of the product of the labour, in that proportion is raiſed. Then the wheel turns round, and the evil complained of falls with aggravated weight on the complainant. The price of corn, which is the reſult of the expence of all the operations of huſbandry, taken together, and for ſome time continued, will riſe on the labourer, conſidered as a conſumer. The very beſt will be, that he remains where he was. But if the price of the corn ſhould not compenſate the price of labour, what is far more to be feared, the moſt ſerious

evil, the very deſtruction of agriculture itſelf, is to be apprehended.

Nothing is ſuch an enemy to accuracy of judgment as a coarſe diſcrimination; a want of ſuch claſſification and diſtribution as the ſubject admits of. Increaſe the rate of wages to the labourer, ſay the regulators—as if labour was but one thing and of one value. But this very broad generick term, *labour*, admits, at leaſt of two or three ſpecifick deſcriptions: and theſe will ſuffice, at leaſt, to let gentlemen diſcern a little the neceſſity of proceeding with caution in their coercive guidance of thoſe whoſe exiſtence depends upon the obſervance of ſtill nicer diſtinctions and ſub-diviſions, than commonly they reſort to in forming their judgments on this very enlarged part of œconomy.

The labourers in huſbandry may be divided: 1ſt. into thoſe who are able to perform the full work of a man; that is, what can be done by a perſon from twenty-one years of age to fifty. I know no huſbandry work (mowing hardly excepted) that is not equally within the power of all perſons within thoſe ages, the more advanced fully compenſating by knack and habit what they loſe in activity. Unqueſtionably, there is a good deal of difference between the value of one man's labour and that of another, from ſtrength, dexterity, and honeſt application. But I am quite ſure, from my beſt obſervation, that any given five men will in their

their total, afford a proportion of labour equal to any other five within the periods of life I have ſtated; that is, that among ſuch five men there will be one poſſeſſing all the qualifications of a good workman, one bad, and the other three middling, and approximating to the firſt and the laſt. So that in ſo ſmall a platoon as that of even five, you will find the full complement of all that five men *can* earn. Taking five and five throughout the kingdom, they are equal: therefore, an errour with regard to the equalization of their wages by thoſe who employ five, as farmers do at the very leaſt, cannot be conſiderable.

2dly. Thoſe who are able to work, but not the complete taſk of a day-labourer. This claſs is infinitely diverſified, but will aptly enough fall into principal diviſions. *Men*, from the decline, which after fifty becomes every year more ſenſible, to the period of debility and decrepitude, and the maladies that precede a final diſſolution. *Women*, whoſe employment on huſbandry is but occaſional, and who differ more in effective labour one from another than men do, on account of geſtation, nurſing, and domeſtick management, over and above the difference they have in common with men in advancing, in ſtationary, and in declining life. *Children*, who proceed on the reverſe order, growing from leſs to greater utility, but with a ſtill greater diſproportion of nutriment to labour

than is found in the ſecond of theſe ſub-diviſions; as is viſible to thoſe who will give themſelves the trouble of examining into the interiour œconomy of a poor-houſe.

This inferiour claſſification is introduced to ſhew, that laws preſcribing, or magiſtrates exerciſing, a very ſtiff, and often inapplicable rule, or a blind and raſh diſcretion, never can provide the juſt proportions between earning and ſalary on the one hand, and nutriment on the other: whereas intereſt, habit, and the tacit convention, that ariſe from a thouſand nameleſs circumſtances, produce a *tact* that regulates without difficulty, what laws and magiſtrates cannot regulate at all. The firſt claſs of labour wants nothing to equalize it; it equalizes itſelf. The ſecond and third are not capable of any equalization.

But what if the rate of hire to the labourer comes far ſhort of his neceſſary ſubſiſtence, and the calamity of the time is ſo great as to threaten actual famine? Is the poor labourer to be abandoned to the flinty heart and griping hand of baſe ſelf-intereſt, ſupported by the ſword of law, eſpecially when there is reaſon to ſuppoſe that the very avarice of farmers themſelves has concurred with the errours of government to bring famine on the land?

In that caſe, my opinion is this. Whenever it happens that a man can claim nothing according to

to the rules of commerce, and the principles of juſtice, he paſſes out of that department, and comes within the juriſdiction of mercy. In that province the magiſtrate has nothing at all to do: his interference is a violation of the property which it is his office to protect. Without all doubt, charity to the poor is a direct and obligatory duty upon all Chriſtians, next in order after the payment of debts, full as ſtrong, and by nature made infinitely more delightful to us. Puffendorff, and other caſuiſts, do not, I think, denominate it quite properly, when they call it a duty of imperfect obligation. But the manner, mode, time, choice of objects, and proportion, are left to private diſcretion; and perhaps, for that very reaſon it is performed with the greater ſatisfaction, becauſe the diſcharge of it has more the appearance of freedom; recommending us beſides very ſpecially to the divine favour, as the exerciſe of a virtue moſt ſuitable to a being ſenſible of its own infirmity.

The cry of the people in cities and towns, though unfortunately (from a fear of their multitude and combination) the moſt regarded, ought, in *fact*, to be the *leaſt* attended to upon this ſubject; for citizens are in a ſtate of utter ignorance of the means by which they are to be fed, and they contribute little or nothing, except in an infinitely circuitous manner, to their own maintenance. They are truly, "*Fruges conſumere nati.*" They

are to be heard with great reſpect and attention upon matters within their province, that is, on trades and manufactures; but on any thing that relates to agriculture, they are to be liſtened to with the ſame *reverence* which we pay to the dogmas of other ignorant and preſumptuous men.

If any one were to tell them, that they were to give in an account of all the ſtock in their ſhops; that attempts would be made to limit their profits, or raiſe the price of the labouring manufacturers upon them, or recommend to government, out of a capital from the publick revenues, to ſet up a ſhop of the ſame commodities, in order to rival them, and keep them to reaſonable dealing, they would very ſoon ſee the impudence, injuſtice, and oppreſſion of ſuch a courſe. They would not be miſtaken; but they are of opinion, that agriculture is to be ſubject to other laws, and to be governed by other principles.

A greater and more ruinous miſtake cannot be fallen into, than that the trades of agriculture and grazing can be conducted upon any other than the common principles of commerce; namely, that the producer ſhould be permitted, and even expected, to look to all poſſible profit, which, without fraud or violence, he can make; to turn plenty or ſcarcity to the beſt advantage he can; to keep back or to bring forward his commodities at his pleaſure; to account to no one for his ſtock or for his gain.

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On any other terms he is the ſlave of the conſumer; and that he ſhould be ſo is of no benefit to the conſumer. No ſlave was ever ſo beneficial to the maſter, as a freeman that deals with him on an equal footing by convention, formed on the rules and principles of contending intereſts and compromiſed advantages. The conſumer, if he were ſuffered, would in the end always be the dupe of his own tyranny and injuſtice. The landed gentleman is never to forget, that the farmer is his repreſentative.

It is a perilous thing to try experiments on the farmer. The farmer's capital (except in a few perſons, and in a very few places) is far more feeble than commonly is imagined. The trade is a very poor trade; it is ſubject to great riſks and loſſes. The capital, ſuch as it is, is turned but once in the year; in ſome branches it requires three years before the money is paid. I believe never leſs than three in the turnip and graſs-land courſe, which is the prevalent courſe on the more or leſs fertile, ſandy and gravelly loams, and theſe compoſe the ſoil in the ſouth and ſouth-eaſt of England, the beſt adapted, and perhaps the only ones that are adapted to the turnip huſbandry.

It is very rare that the moſt proſperous farmer, counting the value of his quick and dead ſtock, the intereſt of the money he turns, together with his

his own wages as a bailiff or overſeer, ever does make twelve or fifteen *per centum* by the year on his capital. I ſpeak of the proſperous. In moſt of the parts of England which have fallen within my obſervation, I have rarely known a farmer, who to his own trade has not added ſome other employment or traffick, that, after a courſe of the moſt unremitting parſimony and labour (ſuch for the greater part is theirs), and perſevering in his buſineſs for a long courſe of years, died worth more than paid his debts, leaving his poſterity to continue in nearly the ſame equal conflict between induſtry and want, in which the laſt predeceſſor, and a long line of predeceſſors before him, lived and died.

Obſerve that I ſpeak of the generality of farmers who have not more than from one hundred and fifty to three or four hundred acres. There are few in this part of the country within the former, or much beyond the latter, extent. Unqueſtionably in other places there are much larger. But, I am convinced, whatever part of England be the theatre of his operations, a farmer who cultivates twelve hundred acres, which I conſider as a large farm, though I know there are larger, cannot proceed, with any degree of ſafety and effect, with a ſmaller capital than ten thouſand pounds: and that he cannot, in the ordinary courſe

courſe of culture, make more upon that great capital of ten thouſand pounds, than twelve hundred a year.

As to the weaker capitals, an eaſy judgment may be formed by what very ſmall errours they may be farther attenuated, enervated, rendered unproductive, and perhaps totally deſtroyed.

This conſtant precarioufneſs, and ultimate moderate limits of a farmer's fortune, on the ſtrongeſt capital, I preſs, not only on account of the hazardous ſpeculations of the times, but becauſe the excellent and moſt uſeful works of my friend, Mr. Arthur Young, tend to propagate that errour (ſuch I am very certain it is), of the largeneſs of a farmer's profits. It is not that his account of the produce does often greatly exceed, but he by no means makes the proper allowance for accidents and loſſes. I might enter into a convincing detail, if other more troubleſome and more neceſſary details were not before me.

This propoſed diſcretionary tax on labour militates with the recommendations of the board of agriculture: they recommend a general uſe of the drill culture. I agree with the board, that where the ſoil is not exceſſively heavy, or encumbered with large looſe ſtones (which however is the caſe with much otherwiſe good land), that courſe is the beſt, and moſt productive, provided that the moſt accurate eye; the moſt vigilant ſuperintend-

ance;

ance; the moſt prompt activity, which has no ſuch day as to-morrow in its calendar; the moſt ſteady foreſight and pre-diſpoſing order to have every body and every thing ready in its place, and prepared to take advantage of the fortunate fugitive moment in this coquetting climate of ours—provided, I ſay, all theſe combine to ſpeed the plough, I admit its ſuperiority over the old and general methods. But under procraſtinating, improvident, ordinary huſbandmen, who may neglect or let ſlip the few opportunities of ſweetening and purifying their ground with perpetually renovated toil, and undiſſipated attention, nothing, when tried to any extent, can be worſe, or more dangerous: the farm may be ruined, inſtead of having the ſoil enriched and ſweetened by it.

But the excellence of the method on a proper ſoil, and conducted by huſbandmen, of whom there are few, being readily granted, how, and on what conditions, is this culture obtained? Why, by a very great increaſe of labour; by an augmentation of the third part, at leaſt, of the hand-labour, to ſay nothing of the horſes and machinery employed in ordinary tillage. Now, every man muſt be ſenſible how little becoming the gravity of legiſlature it is to encourage a board, which recommends to us, and upon very weighty reaſons unqueſtionably, an enlargement of the capital we employ in the operations of the hand, and then to

paſs

paſs an act which taxes that manual labour, already at a very high rate; thus compelling us to diminiſh the quantity of labour which in the vulgar courſe we actually employ.

What is true of the farmer is equally true of the middle man; whether the middle man acts as factor, jobber, faleſman, or ſpeculator, in the markets of grain. Theſe traders are to be left to their free courſe; and the more they make, and the richer they are, and the more largely they deal, the better both for the farmer and conſumer, between whom they form a natural and moſt uſeful link of connection; though, by the machinations of the old evil counſellor, *Envy*, they are hated and maligned by both parties.

I hear that middle men are accuſed of monopoly. Without queſtion, the monopoly of authority is, in every inſtance and in every degree, an evil; but the monopoly of capital is the contrary. It is a great benefit, and a benefit particularly to the poor. A tradeſman who has but a hundred pound capital, which (ſay) he can turn but once a year, cannot live upon a *profit* of 10 *per cent.* becauſe he cannot live upon ten pounds a year; but a man of ten thouſand pounds capital can live and thrive upon 5 *per cent.* profit in the year, becauſe he has five hundred pounds a year. The ſame proportion holds in turning it twice or thrice. Theſe principles are plain and ſimple; and it is

not

not our ignorance, ſo much as the levity, the envy, and the malignity of our nature, that hinders us from perceiving and yielding to them: but we are not to ſuffer our vices to uſurp the place of our judgment.

The balance between conſumption and production makes price. The market ſettles, and alone can ſettle that price. Market is the meeting and conference of the *conſumer* and *producer*, when they mutually diſcover each other's wants. Nobody, I believe, has obſerved with any reflexion what market is, without being aſtoniſhed at the truth, the correctneſs, the celerity, the general equity, with which the balance of wants is ſettled. They who wiſh the deſtruction of that balance, and would fain by arbitrary regulation decree, that defective production ſhould not be compenſated by increaſed price, directly lay their *axe* to the root of production itſelf.

They may even in one year of ſuch falſe policy, do miſchiefs incalculable; becauſe the trade of a farmer is, as I have before explained, one of the moſt precarious in its advantages, the moſt liable to loſſes, and the leaſt profitable of any that is carried on. It requires ten times more of labour, of vigilance, of attention, of ſkill, and let me add, of good fortune alſo, to carry on the buſineſs of a farmer with ſucceſs, than what belongs to any other trade. Seeing things in this light, I am far from

from preſuming to cenſure the late circular inſtruction of council to lord lieutenants—but I confeſs I do not clearly diſcern its object. I am greatly afraid that the inquiry will raiſe ſome alarm as a meaſure, leading to the French ſyſtem of putting corn into requiſition. For that was preceded by an inquiſition ſomewhat ſimilar in its principle, though, according to their mode, their principles are full of that violence, *which here* is not much to be feared. It goes on a principle directly oppoſite to mine: it preſumes, that the market is no fair *teſt* of plenty or ſcarcity. It raiſes a ſuſpicion, which may affect the tranquillity of the publick mind, "that the farmer keeps back, "and takes unfair advantages by delay;" on the part of the dealer, it gives riſe obviouſly to a thouſand nefarious ſpeculations.

In caſe the return ſhould on the whole prove favourable, is it meant to ground a meaſure for encouraging exportation and checking the import of corn? If it is not, what end can it anſwer? And, I believe, it is not.

This opinion may be fortified by a report gone abroad, that intentions are entertained of erecting publick granaries, and that this inquiry is to give government an advantage in its purchaſes.

I hear that ſuch a meaſure has been propoſed, and is under deliberation, that is, for government to ſet up a granary in every market town, at the expence

expence of the ſtate, in order to extinguiſh the dealer, and to ſubject the farmer to the conſumer, by ſecuring corn to the latter at a certain and ſteady price.

If ſuch a ſcheme is adopted, I ſhould not like to anſwer for the ſafety of the granary, of the agents, or of the town itſelf, in which the granary was erected—the firſt ſtorm of popular phrenzy would fall upon that granary.

So far in a political light.

In an œconomical light, I muſt obſerve, that the conſtruction of ſuch granaries throughout the kingdom, would be at an expence beyond all calculation. The keeping them up would be at a great charge. The management and attendance would require an army of agents, ſtore-keepers, clerks, and ſervants. The capital to be employed in the purchaſe of grain would be enormous. The waſte, decay, and corruption, would be a dreadful drawback on the whole dealing; and the diſſatisfaction of the people, at having decayed, tainted, or corrupted corn ſold to them, as muſt be the caſe, would be ſerious.

This climate (whatever others may be) is not favourable to granaries, where wheat is to be kept for any time. The beſt, and indeed the only good granary, is the rick yard of the farmer, where the corn is preſerved in its own ſtraw, ſweet, clean, wholeſome, free from vermin and from inſects,

and comparatively at a trifle of expence. This, and the barn, enjoying many of the ſame advantages, have been the ſole granaries of England from the foundation of its agriculture to this day. All this is done at the expence of the undertaker, and at his ſole riſk. He contributes to government; he receives nothing from it but protection; and to this he has a *claim.*

The moment that government appears at market, all the principles of market will be ſubverted. I don't know whether the farmer will ſuffer by it as long as there is a tolerable market of competition; but I am ſure that, in the firſt place, the trading government will ſpeedily become a bankrupt, and the conſumer in the end will ſuffer. If government makes all its purchaſes at once, it will inſtantly raiſe the market upon itſelf. If it makes them by degrees, it muſt follow the courſe of the market. If it follows the courſe of the market, it will produce no effect, and the conſumer may as well buy as he wants—therefore all the expence is incurred gratis.

But if the object of this ſcheme ſhould be, what I ſuſpect it is, to deſtroy the dealer, commonly called the middle man, and by incurring a voluntary loſs to carry the baker to deal with government, I am to tell them that they muſt ſet up another trade, that of a miller or a mealman, attended with a new train of expences and riſks. If in

both theſe trades they ſhould ſucceed, ſo as to exclude thoſe who trade on natural and private capitals, then they will have a monopoly in their hands, which, under the appearance of a monopoly of capital, will, in reality, be a monopoly of authority, and will ruin whatever it touches. The agriculture of the kingdom cannot ſtand before it.

A little place like Geneva, of not more than from twenty-five to thirty thouſand inhabitants, which has no territory, or next to none; which depends for its exiſtence on the good-will of three neighbouring powers, and is of courſe continually in a ſtate of ſomething like a *ſiege*, or in the ſpeculation of it, might find ſome reſource in ſtate granaries, and ſome revenue from the monopoly of what was ſold to the keepers of publick-houſes. This is a policy for a ſtate too ſmall for agriculture. It is not (for inſtance) fit for ſo great a country as the Pope poſſeſſes, where, however, it is adopted and purſued in a greater extent, and with more ſtrictneſs. Certain of the Pope's territories, from whence the city of Rome is ſupplied, being obliged to furniſh Rome and the granaries of his Holineſs with corn at a certain price, that part of the papal territories is utterly ruined. That ruin may be traced with certainty to this ſole cauſe, and it appears indubitably by a compariſon of their ſtate and condition with that of the other part of the

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eccleſiaſtical dominions not ſubjected to the ſame regulations, which are in circumſtances highly flouriſhing.

The reformation of this evil ſyſtem is in a manner impracticable; for, firſt, it does keep bread and all other proviſions equally ſubject to the chamber of ſupply, at a pretty reaſonable and regular price, in the city of Rome. This preſerves quiet among the numerous poor, idle, and naturally mutinous people, of a very great capital. But the quiet of the town is purchaſed by the ruin of the country, and the ultimate wretchedneſs of both. The next cauſe which renders this evil incurable, is, the jobs which have grown out of it, and which, in ſpite of all precautions, would grow out of ſuch things, even under governments far more potent than the feeble authority of the Pope.

This example of Rome, which has been derived from the moſt ancient times, and the moſt flouriſhing period of the Roman empire (but not of the Roman agriculture) may ſerve as a great caution to all governments, not to attempt to feed the people out of the hands of the magiſtrates. If once they are habituated to it, though but for one half-year, they will never be ſatisfied to have it otherwiſe. And having looked to government for bread, on the very firſt ſcarcity they will turn and bite the hand that fed them. To avoid that *evil*, government will redouble the cauſes of

it; and then it will become inveterate and incurable.

I beſeech the government (which I take in the largeſt ſenſe of the word, comprehending the two houſes of parliament) ſeriouſly to conſider that years of ſcarcity or plenty, do not come alternately or at ſhort intervals, but in pretty long cycles and irregularly, and conſequently that we cannot aſſure ourſelves, if we take a wrong meaſure, from the temporary neceſſities of one ſeaſon; but that the next, and probably more, will drive us to the continuance of it; ſo that, in my opinion, there is no way of preventing this evil which goes to the deſtruction of all our agriculture, and of that part of our internal commerce which touches our agriculture the moſt nearly, as well as the ſafety and very being of government, but manfully to reſiſt the very firſt idea, ſpeculative or practical, that it is within the competence of government, taken as government, or even of the rich, as rich, to ſupply to the poor, thoſe neceſſaries which it has pleaſed the Divine Providence for a while to with-hold from them. We, the people, ought to be made ſenſible, that it is not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and conſequently the laws of God, that we are to place our hope of ſoftening the Divine diſpleaſure to remove any calamity under which we ſuffer, or which hangs over us.

So

So far as to the principles of general policy.

As to the ſtate of things which is urged as a reaſon to deviate from them, theſe are the circumſtances of the harveſt of 1794 and 1795. With regard to the harveſt of 1794, in relation to the nobleſt grain, wheat, it is allowed to have been ſomewhat ſhort, but not exceſſively; and in quality, for the ſeven-and-twenty years, during which I have been a farmer, I never remember wheat to have been ſo good. The world were, however, deceived in their ſpeculations upon it—the farmer as well as the dealer. Accordingly the price fluctuated beyond any thing I can remember; for, at one time of the year, I ſold my wheat at 14l. a load, (I ſold off all I had, as I thought this was a reaſonable price), when at the end of the ſeaſon, if I had then had any to ſell, I might have got thirty guineas for the ſame ſort of grain. I ſold all that I had, as I ſaid, at a comparatively low price, becauſe I thought it a good price, compared with what I thought the general produce of the harveſt; but when I came to conſider what my own *total* was, I found that the quantity had not anſwered my expectation. It muſt be remembered, that this year of produce, (the year 1794) ſhort, but excellent, followed a year which was not extraordinary in production, nor of a ſuperiour quality, and left but little in ſtore. At firſt this was not felt, becauſe the harveſt came in unuſually early—earlier than common, by a full month.

The winter, at the end of 1794, and beginning of 1795, was more than uſually unfavourable both to corn and graſs, owing to the ſudden relaxation of very rigorous froſts, followed by rains, which were again rapidly ſucceeded by froſts of ſtill greater rigour than the firſt.

Much wheat was utterly deſtroyed. The clover graſs ſuffered in many places. What I never obſerved before, the rye-graſs, or coarſe bent, ſuffered more than the clover. Even the meadow-graſs in ſome places was killed to the very roots. In the ſpring, appearances were better than we expected. All the early ſown grain recovered itſelf, and came up with great vigour; but that, which was late ſown, was feeble, and did not promiſe to reſiſt any blights, in the ſpring, which, however, with all its unpleaſant viciſſitudes paſſed off very well; and nothing looked better than the wheat at the time of blooming:—but at that moſt critical time of all, a cold dry eaſt wind, attended with very ſharp froſts, longer and ſtronger than I recollect at that time of year, deſtroyed the flowers, and withered up, in an aſtoniſhing manner, the whole ſide of the ear next to the wind. At that time I brought to town ſome of the ears, for the purpoſe of ſhewing to my friends the operation of thoſe unnatural froſts, and according to their extent I predicted a great ſcarcity. But ſuch is the pleaſure of agreeable proſpects, that my opinion was little regarded.

On

On threſhing, I found things as I expected—the ears not filled, ſome of the capſules quite empty, and ſeveral others containing only withered hungry grain, inferiour to the appearance of rye. My beſt ears and grain were not fine; never had I grain of ſo low a quality—yet I ſold one load for 21l. At the ſame time I bought my ſeed wheat (it was excellent) at 23l. Since then the price has riſen, and I have ſold about two load of the ſame ſort at 23l. Such was the ſtate of the market when I left home laſt Monday. Little remains in my barn. I hope ſome in the rick may be better; ſince it was earlier ſown, as well as I can recollect. Some of my neighbours have better, ſome quite as bad, or even worſe. I ſuſpect it will be found, that wherever the blighting wind and thoſe froſts at blooming time have prevailed, the produce of the wheat crop will turn out very indifferent. Thoſe parts which have eſcaped, will, I can hardly doubt, have a reaſonable produce.

As to the other grains, it is to be obſerved, as the wheat ripened very late, (on account, I conceive, of the blights) the barley got the ſtart of it, and was ripe firſt. The crop was with me, and wherever my inquiry could reach, excellent; in ſome places far ſuperiour to mine.

The clover, which came up with the barley, was the fineſt I remember to have ſeen.

The turnips of this year are generally good.

The clover ſown laſt year, where not totally deſtroyed, gave two good crops, or one crop and a plentiful feed; and, bating the loſs of the rye-graſs, I do not remember a better produce.

The meadow-graſs yielded but a middling crop, and neither of the ſown or natural graſs was there in any farmer's poſſeſſion any remainder from the year worth taking into account. In moſt places, there was none at all.

Oats with me were not in a quantity more conſiderable than in commonly good ſeaſons; but I have never known them heavier, than they were in other places. The oat was not only an heavy, but an uncommonly abundant crop. My ground under peaſe did not exceed an acre, or thereabouts, but the crop was great indeed. I believe it is throughout the country exuberant.

It is however to be remarked, as generally of all the grains, ſo particularly of the peaſe, that there was not the ſmalleſt quantity in reſerve.

The demand of the year muſt depend ſolely on its own produce; and the price of the ſpring-corn is not to be expected to fall very ſoon, or at any time very low.

Uxbridge is a great corn market. As I came through that town, I found that at the laſt market-day, barley was at forty ſhillings a quarter; oats

there

there were literally none; and the innkeeper was obliged to ſend for them to London. I forgot to aſk about peaſe. Potatoes were 5s. the buſhel.

In the debate on this ſubject in the houſe, I am told that a leading member of great ability, *little converſant in theſe matters*, obſerved, that the general uniform dearneſs of butcher's meat, butter, and cheeſe, could not be owing to a defective produce of wheat; and on this ground inſinuated a ſuſpicion of ſome unfair practice on the ſubject, that called for inquiry.

Unqueſtionably the mere deficiency of wheat, could not cauſe the dearneſs of the other articles, which extends not only to the proviſions he mentioned, but to every other without exception.

The cauſe is indeed ſo very plain and obvious, that the wonder is the other way. When a properly directed inquiry is made, the gentlemen who are amazed at the price of theſe commodities will find, that when hay is at ſix pound a load, as they muſt know it is, herbage, and for more than one year, muſt be ſcanty, and they will conclude, that if graſs be ſcarce, beef, veal, mutton, butter, milk, and cheeſe, *muſt* be dear.

But to take up the matter ſomewhat more in detail—if the wheat harveſt in 1794, excellent in quality, was defective in quantity, the barley harveſt was in quality ordinary enough; and in quantity deficient. This was ſoon felt in the price of malt.

Another

Another article of produce (beans) was not at all plentiful. The crop of peaſe was wholly deſtroyed, ſo that ſeveral farmers pretty early gave up all hopes on that head, and cut the green haulm as fodder for the cattle, then periſhing for want of food in that dry and burning ſummer. I myſelf came off better than moſt—I had about the fourth of a crop of peaſe.

It will be recollected, that, in a manner, all the bacon and pork conſumed in this country, (the far largeſt conſumption of meat out of towns) is, when growing, fed on graſs, and on whey, or ſkimmed milk; and when fatting, partly on the latter. This is the caſe in the dairy countries, all of them great breeders and feeders of ſwine; but for the much greater part, and in all the corn countries, they are fattened on beans, barley meal, and peaſe. When the food of the animal is ſcarce, his fleſh muſt be dear. This, one would ſuppoſe, would require no great penetration to diſcover.

This failure of ſo very large a ſupply of fleſh in one ſpecies, naturally throws the whole demand of the conſumer on the diminiſhed ſupply of all kinds of fleſh, and, indeed, on all the matters of human ſuſtenance. Nor, in my opinion, are we to expect a greater cheapneſs in that article for this year, even though corn ſhould grow cheaper, as it is to be hoped it will. The ſtore ſwine, from the failure of ſubſiſtence laſt year, are now at an extravagant price.

price. Pigs, at our fairs, have ſold lately for fifty ſhillings, which, two years ago, would not have brought more than twenty.

As to ſheep, none, I thought, were ſtrangers to the general failure of the article of turnips laſt year; the early having been burned as they came up, by the great drought and heat; the late, and thoſe of the early which had eſcaped, were deſtroyed by the chilling froſts of the winter, and the wet and ſevere weather of the ſpring. In many places a full fourth of the ſheep or the lambs were loſt; what remained of the lambs were poor and ill-fed, the ewes having had no milk. The calves came late, and they were generally an article, the want of which was as much to be dreaded as any other. So that article of food, formerly ſo abundant in the early part of the ſummer, particularly in London, and which in a great part ſupplied the place of mutton for near two months, did little leſs than totally fail.

All the productions of the earth link in with each other. All the ſources of plenty, in all and every article, were dried or frozen up. The ſcarcity was not, as gentlemen ſeem to ſuppoſe, in wheat only.

Another cauſe, and that not of inconſiderable operation, tended to produce a ſcarcity in fleſh proviſion. It is one that on many accounts cannot be too much regretted, and, the rather, as it

was

was the ſole *cauſe* of a ſcarcity in that article, which aroſe from the proceedings of men themſelves. I mean the ſtop put to the diſtillery.

The hogs (and that would be ſufficient) which were fed with the waſte waſh of that produce, did not demand the fourth part of the corn uſed by farmers in fattening them. The ſpirit was nearly ſo much clear gain to the nation. It is an odd way of making fleſh cheap, to ſtop or check the diſtillery.

The diſtillery in itſelf produces an immenſe article of trade almoſt all over the world, to Africa, to North America, and to various parts of Europe. It is of great uſe, next to food itſelf, to our fiſheries and to our whole navigation. A great part of the diſtillery was carried on by damaged corn, unfit for bread, and by barley and malt of the loweſt quality. Theſe things could not be more unexceptionably employed. The domeſtick conſumption of ſpirits, produced, without complaints, a very great revenue, applicable, if we pleaſed, in bounties to the bringing corn from other places, far beyond the value of that conſumed in making it, or to the encouragement of its increaſed production at home.

As to what is ſaid, in a phyſical and moral view, againſt the home conſumption of ſpirits, experience has long ſince taught me very little to reſpect the declamations on that ſubject—Whether the thunder

thunder of the laws, or the thunder of eloquence, "is hurled on *gin*," always I am thunderproof. The alembick, in my mind, has furniſhed the world a far greater benefit and bleſſing, than if the *opus maximum* had been really found by chemiſtry, and, like Midas, we could turn every thing into gold.

Undoubtedly there may be a dangerous abuſe in the exceſs of ſpirits; and at one time I am ready to believe the abuſe was great. When ſpirits are cheap, the buſineſs of drunkenneſs is achieved with little time or labour; but that evil I conſider to be wholly done away. Obſervation for the laſt forty years, and very particularly for the laſt thirty, has furniſhed me with ten inſtances of drunkenneſs from other cauſes, for one from this. Ardent ſpirit is a great medicine, often to remove diſtempers—much more frequently to prevent them, or to chaſe them away in their beginnings. It is not nutritive in *any great* degree. But, if not food, it greatly alleviates the want of it. It invigorates the ſtomach for the digeſtion of poor meagre diet, not eaſily alliable to the human conſtitution. Wine the poor cannot touch. Beer, as applied to many occaſions, (as among ſeamen and fiſhermen for inſtance) will by no means do the buſineſs. Let me add, what wits inſpired with champaign and claret will turn into ridicule—it is a medicine for the mind. Under the preſſure of the cares and ſorrows of our mortal condition, men have at all

times,

times, and in all countries, called in ſome phyſical aid to their moral conſolations,—wine, beer, opium, brandy, or tobacco.

I conſider therefore the ſtopping of the diſtillery, œconomically, financially, commercially, medicinally, and in ſome degree morally too, as a meaſure rather well meant than well conſidered. It is too precious a ſacrifice to prejudice.

Gentlemen well know whether there be a ſcarcity of partridges, and whether that be an effect of hoarding and combination. All the tame race of birds live and die as the wild do.

As to the leſſer articles, they are like the greater. They have followed the fortune of the ſeaſon. Why are fowls dear? was not this the farmer's or jobbers's fault? I ſold from my yard to a jobber, ſix young and lean fowls, for four and twenty ſhillings; fowls, for which, two years ago, the ſame man would not have given a ſhilling apiece.—He ſold them afterwards at Uxbridge, and they were taken to London to receive the laſt hand.

As to the operation of the war in cauſing the ſcarcity of proviſions, I underſtand that Mr. Pitt has given a particular anſwer to it—but I do not think it worth powder and ſhot.

I do not wonder the papers are ſo full of this ſort of matter, but I am a little ſurpriſed it ſhould be mentioned in parliament. Like all great ſtate queſtions, peace and war may be diſcuſſed, and different opinions

opinions fairly formed, on political grounds, but on a queſtion of the preſent price of proviſions, when peace with the regicides is always uppermoſt, I can only ſay, that great is the love of it.

After all, have we not reaſon to be thankful to the Giver of all good? In our hiſtory, and when "the labourer of England is ſaid to have been "once happy," we find conſtantly, after certain intervals, a period of real famine; by which, a melancholy havock was made among the human race. The price of proviſions fluctuated dreadfully, demonſtrating a deficiency very different from the worſt failures of the preſent moment. Never ſince I have known England, have I known more than a comparative ſcarcity. The price of wheat, taking a number of years together, has had no very conſiderable fluctuation, nor has it riſen exceedingly until within this twelvemonth. Even now, I do not know of one man, woman, or child, that has periſhed from famine; fewer, if any, I believe, than in years of plenty, when ſuch a thing may happen by accident. This is owing to a care and ſuperintendance of the poor, far greater than any I remember.

The conſideration of this ought to bind us all, rich and poor together, againſt thoſe wicked writers of the newſpapers, who would inflame the poor againſt their friends, guardians, patrons, and protectors. Not only very few (I have obſerved,

that I know of none, though I live in a place as poor as moſt) have actually died of want, but we have ſeen no traces of thoſe dreadful exterminating epidemicks, which, in conſequence of ſcanty and unwholeſome food, in former times, not unfrequently waſted whole nations. Let us be ſaved from too much wiſdom of our own, and we ſhall do tolerably well.

It is one of the fineſt problems in legiſlation, and what has often engaged my thoughts whilſt I followed that profeſſion, "What the ſtate ought "to take upon itſelf to direct by the publick wiſ- "dom, and what it ought to leave, with as little "interference as poſſible, to individual diſcretion." Nothing, certainly, can be laid down on the ſubject that will not admit of exceptions, many permanent, ſome occaſional. But the cleareſt line of diſtinction which I could draw, whilſt I had my chalk to draw any line, was this; that the ſtate ought to confine itſelf to what regards the ſtate, or the creatures of the ſtate, namely, the exteriour eſtabliſhment of its religion; its magiſtracy; its revenue; its military force by ſea and land; the corporations that owe their exiſtence to its fiat; in a word, to every thing that is *truly and properly* publick, to the publick peace, to the publick ſafety, to the publick order, to the publick proſperity. In its preventive police it ought to be ſparing of its efforts, and to employ means, rather few, unfrequent,

frequent, and ſtrong, than many, and frequent, and, of courſe, as they multiply their puny politick race, and dwindle, ſmall and feeble. Stateſmen who know themſelves will, with the dignity which belongs to wiſdom, proceed only in this the ſuperiour orb and firſt mover of their duty ſteadily, vigilantly, ſeverely, courageouſly: whatever remains will, in a manner, provide for itſelf. But as they deſcend from the ſtate to a province, from a province to a pariſh, and from a pariſh to a private houſe, they go on accelerated in their fall. They *cannot* do the lower duty; and, in proportion as they try it, they will certainly fail in the higher. They ought to know the different departments of things; what belongs to laws, and what manners alone can regulate. To theſe, great politicians may give a leaning, but they cannot give a law.

Our legiſlature has fallen into this fault as well as other governments; all have fallen into it more or leſs. The once mighty ſtate, which was neareſt to us locally, neareſt to us in every way, and whoſe ruins threaten to fall upon our heads, is a ſtrong inſtance of this errour. I can never quote France without a foreboding ſigh—ΕΣΣΕΤΑΙ ΗΜΑΡ! Scipio ſaid it to his recording Greek friend amidſt the flames of the great rival of his country. That ſtate has fallen by the hands of the parricides of their country, called the revolutioniſts, and

conſtitutionaliſts, of France, a ſpecies of traitors, of whoſe fury and atrocious wickedneſs nothing in the annals of the phrenzy and depravation of mankind had before furniſhed an example, and of whom I can never think or ſpeak without a mixed ſenſation of diſguſt, of horrour, and of deteſtation, not eaſy to be expreſſed. Theſe nefarious monſters deſtroyed their country for what was good in it; for much good there was in the conſtitution of that noble monarchy, which, in all kinds, formed and nouriſhed great men, and great patterns of virtue to the world. But though its enemies were not enemies to its faults, its faults furniſhed them with means for its deſtruction. My dear departed friend, whoſe loſs is even greater to the publick than to me, had often remarked, that the leading vice of the French monarchy (which he had well ſtudied) was in good intention ill-directed, and a reſtleſs deſire of governing too much. The hand of authority was ſeen in every thing, and in every place. All, therefore, that happened amiſs in the courſe even of domeſtick affairs, was attributed to the government; and, as it always happens in this kind of officious univerſal interference, what began in odious power, ended always, I may ſay without an exception, in contemptible imbecility. For this reaſon, as far as I can approve of any novelty, I thought well of the provincial adminiſtrations. Thoſe, if the ſuperiour power had been

ſevere,

ſevere, and vigilant, and vigorous, might have been of much uſe politically in removing government from many invidious details. But as every thing is good or bad, as it is related or combined, government being relaxed above as it was relaxed below, and the brains of the people growing more and more addle with every ſort of viſionary ſpeculation, the ſhiftings of the ſcene in the provincial theatres became only preparatives to a revolution in the kingdom, and the popular actings there only the rehearſals of the terrible drama of the republick.

Tyranny and cruelty may make men juſtly wiſh the downfall of abuſed powers, but I believe that no government ever yet periſhed from any other direct cauſe than its own weakneſs. My opinion is againſt an over-doing of any ſort of adminiſtration, and more eſpecially againſt this moſt momentous of all meddling on the part of authority; the meddling with the ſubſiſtence of the people.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH VOLUME.

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